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FOREWORD 
This  i s  the final r epo r t  on the study of damage control  sy s t ems  
for  the Space Station per formed  under  NASA cont rac t  
NAS1- 10184, Study of Damage Control  Systems for  Space 
Station and P re l im ina ry  Design of a Space Station Simulator.  
This study was conducted during the period f r o m  July 24, 
1970 t o  October 24, 1971. 
The final r epo r t  on the p r e l im ina ry  design of a Space Station 
damage control  s imulator  was  published in March  1971. 
The pro jec t  was  c a r r i e d  out for  the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administrat ion,  Langley R e s e a r c h  Center under  the 
di rect ion of Mr .  Victor L. Vaughan, J r .  of the Structural  
Mechanics Branch,  S t ruc tures  Division. 
The p r o g r a m  was conducted by M. V. Scherb,  Pr in ic ipa l  
Investigator and Study Manager fo r  the McDonnell Douglas 
Astronaut ics  Company. 
This  r epo r t  was  p repared  by M. V. Scherb,  E. S. Chambers ,  
G. V. Colombo, D. C. Giedt, J. F. Harkee,  G. P. Kazokas,  
T. J. Linzey,  D. C. MacKallor,  D. L. Magargee,  
K. E. Meadows, E. S. Mills ,  G.  L. Murphy, Ph.D,  
E. R. Regis,  J. S. Seeman,  D. A. Tiede,  M. M. Yakut, 
and J. A. Zelik, Ph. D. 
P r o f e s s o r  Anatol Roshko, P r o f e s s o r  of Aeronaut ics ,  
California Inst i tute of Technology, acted a s  consultant  to the 
p r o g r a m  on the p rob lem of noise sou rce s  f r o m  a choked 
or i f ice  o r  c rack .  
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x iv  
Para l l e l  Phase  B definition studies of a 10, 1-m-dia Space Station were  
recently completed by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDXC\ di i i '  
the Space Division of North American Ro ckwell Corporation. The supp, r-sng 
r e s e a r c h  and technology plans f r o m  both studies (References  I ,  2 ,  an?  - i  
Identified the need for damage control  sys tems  on the station for  t9.2 c te I , c -~c  7 1  
of leaks  or  significant damage modes conducive to leaks ,  sucli a s  r l c a l c ? <  i . ~ 1 ~ : 1  
impact. 
I t  was found that unplanned overboard leakage can threaten the safely 01 Il-re 
crew,  shorten the miss ion  t ime,  o r  pose a s eve re  penalty in added .i\re;F :G i c r  
gas r e se rves .  Onboard leaks  f r o m  equipment, experiments,  plumbing ALL,-, 
gas supplies can endanger c rew safety by contaminating the Space Sra t ic I 
atmosphere  and presenting a threat  of toxic gas or f i r e ,  
To minimize these haza rds ,  a damage control sys tem should be cai3ab~e ~ 3 ~ "  
sensing both onboard and overboard leaks,  identifying and quantifyinq l e , ~ ~ i ; s  
locating l eaks ,  and indicating counteraction procedures  by means rrs leak, 
evaluation displays and crew warning sys tems .  
Detecting overboard Leaks or damage modes in  the p re s su re  shell  sf t12e 
Space Station under the vacuum conditions of space presents  novel C O Y L G " ~ L J O ~ S  
f o r  investigation, A recent  s ta te-of- the-ar t  survey (Reference 4) last< 
2 2  methods of detecting or  locatrng overboard leaks.  This survey I 0x1- SL 6:- 
mented by a review of cur ren t  r e s e a r c h  on leak detection, served a s  G 
guideline for the selectron of damage coi?trol sys tems  for overboare t i > a ~  t3 
Summary of Overboard Leak Detection Methods 
Sect ion  1 
SUMMARY 
Resu l t s  of the study indicated that  a n  in teg ra ted  overboard  damage  contl-o! 
s y s t e m  (DCS) should contain a t  l e a s t  four  independent  s e n s o r  e l e m e n t s  l o r  
m a x i m u m  flexibi l i ty i n  identifying the p r e s e n c e  and locat ion  of a  leak and 
the  p r e c u r s o r  damage  mode.  T h e s e  a r e :  
A. A s e n s o r  which wil l  moni to r  the p r e s s u r i z e d  c o m p a r t m e n t  p r e - , s u r e  
and s e n s e  the r a t e  of change of p r e s s u r e  a s  well  a s  absolute  p r c s -  
s u r e .  F o r  a n  oxygen-ni t rogen a t m o s p h e r e ,  n i t rogen m o n i t ~ ~ r l n g  IS 
p r e f e r a b l e  to  to ta l  p r e s s u r e  s ince  i t  e l i m i n a t e s  v a r i a t i o n s  d u e  kc: 
metabol ic  consumpt ion of oxygen by the c r e w .  This  type o f  sensor 
c a n  detec t  and quantify a  leak ,  but not locate  i t .  
B. S e n s o r s  located on the p r e s s u r i z e d  c o m p a r t m e n t  m a i n  wall  rn am, 
op t imum a r r a y  to  both de tec t  and locate  the s o u r c e  of a  lea& w i t ~ ~ i :  
a  speci f ic  a r e a .  Ideally, the  s e n s o r s  wil l  quantify the l eak  r a t ?  
C .  A s e n s o r  f o r  moni tor ing  the p e r f o r m a n c e  of s e a l s .  This  s c n s c r  
c a n  detec t ,  loca te ,  and quantify the l e a k  r a t e  above the n o r m a l  
molecu la r  diffusion (planned) r a t e  of l o s s .  
D. A por table  leak  de tec to r  to de tec t  l e a k s  to  space  f r o m  the  snter i9 . r  
of the p r e s s u r i z e d  c o m p a r t m e n t .  
The b a s i c  p r e s s u r e  s e n s o r  f o r  moni tor ing  c o m p a r t m e n t  a t m o s p h e r e  car, 132 
a n  independent s e n s o r  o r  the function can  be in tegra ted  into the p e r f o r a ~ a n c e  
of a  two-gas  c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  the c o m p a r t m e n t  a t m o s p h e r e  a s  p a r t  o f  the 
env i ronmenta l  con t ro l  and l i fe  suppor t  (EC/LS) s y s t e m .  
P r e s s u r e  wall  s e n s o r  a r r a y s  p re fe rab ly  should be mounted in te rna l ly  tc 
e l imina te  e x t r a  pene t ra t ions  of the wa l l s .  However, s e n s o r s  s u c h  a s  ion 
gages  o r  t h e r m i s t o r s  could be  mounted on the e x t e r i o r  in  compar t r raen t~  
f o r m e d  by the m a i n  wall and a  me teoro id  b u m p e r .  
Wall damage mode detection techniques such a s  liquid c rys ta l s ,  S t resscoa t ,  
and such advanced nondestructive techniques a s  exo-elect ron emiss ion,  
in f ra red  radiometry ,  and holography (Reference 5 )  were  not considered 
promising for  space stat ion.  With the exception of a portable leak detector ,  
the emphas i s  in  th is  study was on sensing techniques which permi t  d i rec t  
readout a t  a  control  cen te r  without the required presence  of a man  at  the 
location of the damaged wall.  This  c l a s s  of techniques does not readi ly  
supply remote  readout.  
Conventional portable leak de tec tors  do not lend themse lves  to detecting a n  
overboard leak f r o m  within a p r e s su r i zed  compartment .  A promising 
detection technique for  a portable leak de tec tor  to be operated inside oE 
space stat ion was identified in  th is  study. The principle of operation i s  
based on sensing the reduced p r e s s u r e  gradient  which ex i s t s  in  the vicinity 
of an  overboard leak to space.  
Five detection concepts fo r  overboard leakage show p romise  fo r  fu r ther  
development in damage control  sy s t ems  for  the Space Station. These  a r e :  
A. Nitrogen Use Rate Monitor-Detection accomplished by nitrogen 
channel of two-gas control ler .  
B. Pass ive  Ultrasonics-Detection of impact  s t r e s s  waves produced lay 
meteoroids ,  o rb i ta l  debr i s ,  o r  docking impact.  Detection of 
acoust ic  emi s s ions  generated by dynamic flaw o r  c r ack .  
6.  Active Ultrasonics-Pulse echo detection of flaw o r  c rack .  
D. Moisture Monitor (Seals)-Electrolytic hygromet ry  o r  capacitance.  
E. The rma l  Conductivity-Thermistor bridge technique a s  applied to  
s e a l s  and a portable leak de tec tor .  
F o r  onboard leakage damage control  sys tems ,  the  m o s t  c r i t i ca l  functions 
a r e :  (1) to  detect  contamination of the c r ew  compartment ,  ( 2 )  to s ense  
incipient degradat ion of the  EC/LS system,  and ( 3 )  to  moni tor  propellant  
s t o r age  tank l ines  and valving. An evaluation of onboard leakage contains 
many of the requ i rements  fo r  t r a c e  contamination and control. F o r  onboard 
leakage detection,  the emphas i s  i s  on s e n s o r s  to moni tor  inventory depletion 
and sys t em fa i lu res .  Many of the s e n s o r s  considered n e c e s s a r y  a r e  a l r e a d y  
under  development fo r  fu tu re  manned space  flights. 
The following p r i m a r y  detection concepts show promise  fo r  in tegra t ion into 
a h  onboard leakage damage control  s y s t e m  fo r  the Space Station. 
A ,  Mass  Spectrometer-Flight-type to allow measu remen t  of hrgh m a s s  
(molecu la r  weights of 150 to  250) compounds.  
B. Gas Chromatograph-Flexibility to use  s e v e r a l  column m a t e r ~ a i . ;  a s  
well a s  de tec to rs .  
C. F l a m e  Ionization Detector-Total hydrocarbon measu remen t s .  
D. Hydrogen Detector .  
E. In f ra red  Analyzer .  
Space Station p a r a m e t e r s  that  have a m a j o r  influence on the  s e l e c t ~ o n  of 
damage  control  s y s t e m s  w e r e  evaluated.  These  included s i z e  of p r e s s r a r ~ z e d  
volume, s ta t ion d iamete r ,  baseline-planned overboard  leakage,  noise b;. ck- 
ground f r o m  onboard equipment, and c r e w  safe  t ime.  
A mi s s ion  h a z a r d  analys is  was  conducted to  identify the type of leak.. o r  
damage tha t  each  h a z a r d  m a y  produce.  Major  m i s s ion  haza rd s  identified 
include l o s s  of compar tment  p r e s s u r e ,  l o s s  of oxygen, coll is ion with a 
me teo ro id  o r  space  debr i s ,  docking collision, explosion, f i r e  and smoke 
toxicity, and contamination. 
A weight tradeoff  ana lys i s  was  c a r r i e d  out between the se lected darxage 
control  sy s t ems  and the weight of a tmospher ic  supply r e s e r v e s .  The resu i t s  
of th i s  study indicated that  the welght penalty for  the overboard darrla ge con- 
t r o l  sy s t ems  i s  rapidly  exceeded by the weight of a tmospher ic  r e s e r v e s  
r equ i r ed  t o  compensate  for  smal l  overboard  l eaks  f r o m  Space Statioii ovz: 
t ime  per iods  cons idered  shor t  compared  t o  i t s  projected 10-year life. 
A study of methods  and p rocedures  f o r  gaining a c c e s s  to the p r e s s u r e  walls 
of the Space Stat ion emphasized that  a c c e s s  should be  designed into the 
Space Station fo r  the  l e a s t  weight penalty. An evaluation study and 
ranking of va r ious  a c c e s s  methods indicated that  the  pivot and displace- 
ment  methods  w e r e  favored for  a major i ty  of conditions preventing access, 
A parametr ic  study of leak repa i r  systems reveals  that where practical, 
replacement of the defective component in the case  of onboard leaks is 
preferred.  Where replacement i s  not feasible, e lastomeric  sealants o r  
epoxy adhesive patches a r e  recommended repa i r  methods for those f lu ids  a n d  
containers permitting this approach, F o r  remaining fluid-container com- 
binations, an equally desirable method i s  the bolt and sea l  approach. 
The prel iminary design of selected onboard and overboard leakage damage 
control sys tems for  the Space Station indicated that processing and s torage 
requirements  for  the damage control systems represent  about 10 pe rcen to f  
the total  requirements  for  onboard checkout. Most of the damage control 
sys tem sensor  inputs can be monitored by the existing data acquisition 
system. Caution and warning signals a s  well a s  display and control require-  
ments  a r e  compatible with the planned sys tem for  onboard checkout. 
The final conclusion of this study was that Space Station damage control 
sys tems for both overboard and onboard leakage a r e  feasible, cost-effective, 
and should be included in future design phases of Space Station. 
Sec t ion  2 
I N F L U E N C E  O F  S P A C E  STATION P A R A M E T E R S  
T h e  b a s e l i n e  Space  S ta t ion  f o r  t h i s  p r o g r a m  i s  t h e  P h a s e  B def in i t ion  S p a ~ e  
S ta t ion  as de f ined  by t h e  p a r a l l e l  s t u d i e s  of McDonnel l  Doug la s  Askronaut;c s 
Company  and  the  S p a c e  Div i s ion  of N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  Rockwel l .  T h i s  Space 
Sta t ion  i s  a  10. I - m  (33-f t )  d i a  f o u r - d e c k  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  a vo lume  of 65P 131' 
3 (30, 000 ft ). The  o r i g i n a l  P h a s e  13 s t u d i e s  have  b e e n  followed by clrsrrcnt 
P h a s e  B e f f o r t s  on  shu t t l e - l aunched  m o d u l a r  S p a c e  S ta t ions  ( F i g u r e  2- -.I 1, 
F o r  a  m o d u l a r  Space  Stat ion,  the b a s i c  m o d u l e  m u s t  b e  con f igu red  to f i t  16c 
d i m e n s i o n s  of the  shut t le  c a r g o  bay  which  is  4. 27- rn  (14 - f t )  d ia  by S ' i ,  5 r t ;  
(58  f t )  long.  A typ ica l  c r e w  module  i s  a  cy l inde r  of 4. 9.-m (13. 5-Cti dl, ;\y7 
3  9. 7 6 - m  (32-11) l eng th  wi th  a  vo lume  of 124  rn3 (4, 580 ft ). 
B a s i c  p a r a m e t e r s  s u c h  a s  volurne,  d i a m e t e r ,  and exposed  a r e a ,  whleh 
influence s e l e c t i o n  of d a m a g e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s ,  c a n  v a r y  s igni f icant ly  
b e t w e e n  t h e  e x t r e m e s  p o s e d  b y  the two t y p e s  of Space  S ta t ions ,  The danl-itge 
c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  ( D C S ' s )  s e l e c t e d  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  m u s t  b e  v e r s a t r l e  enolagi? t.3 
a d a p t  to a n y  s p a c e  s t a t l on  des ign .  Two rndependent  p r e s s u r i z e d  volrs~i?es 
w i th  s e p a r a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  and l i fe  s u p p o r t  s y s t e m s  a r e  rec.,uircbcl 
i n  all Space  S ta t ion  d e s i g n s ,  A k e y  p a r a m e t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  the  d e s r e s -  
s u r i z a t i o n  r a t e  f o r  a n  independent  vo lume  whrch  can  con ta in  two decks--fc r 
e x a m p l e ,  i n  the  30. 1 - m - d i a  Space  Station--or one o r  m o r e  m o d u l e s  In ihc 
m o d u l a r  S p a c e  Stat ion.  D i f f e ren t  v o l u m e s  conta in ing  the s a m e  p r e s  s~rr-e arid 
su f f e r ing  iden t i ca l  s r z e  p e n e t r a t i o n s  wi l l  u n d e r g o  d i f f e ren t  p r e s s u r e  decay 
r a t e s .  
T h e  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  r a t e ,  i n  t u r n ,  d e t e r m i n e s  the  ava i l ab l e  c r e w  re acts ,113 
t i m e  i n  t h a t  v o l u m e  l o s i n g  p r e s s u r e  d u e  t o  a l e a k ,  T h i s  r e a c t i o n  t in re  can 
be d e r i v e d  b a s e d  on  the  p r e s s u r i z e d  c o m p a r t m e n t  hole  s i z e  and r e p r e s -  
s u r i z a t i o n  capab i l i t y .  
TYPICAL MODULAR 
SPACE STATION 
BIOSCIENCE 
Figure 2-1. Space Station Configurations 
- 
Any surface a r e a  that i s  vulnerable to overboard leaks m u s t b e  accessrbie LO 
repa i r ,  Penetrations of the p res su re  shell  a r e  obvious sources of poteniiai 
leaks. F o r  example, meteoroid penetrations can  occur anywhere, Whe :e 
equipment cannot be moved in  a shor t  t ime,  e x t r a  p res su re  wall p r o L e : ~ m ~  
(such a s  thickening the wall) can be provided. 
Equipment mounted at  the walls will provide added protection to t h e  ~n(ki3: 12r, 
but the a r e a  hidden mus t  be accessible,  and the equipment must  be ~elsa~raisl- l  
o r  replaceable. Provisions for  swinging the equipment out f rom the ivall a-cid 
other techniques for  acce ssibility add weight to the vehicle, Tradcoii  s f i : a . ~ e ~  
must  be performed ear ly  i n  the design effort to consider the criticalrty eC 
the equipment, additional weight of shielding, and meteoroid puncture 
probabilities. 
Similar considerations apply to onboard leaks in  that access  must  he  p r o v ~ d e c i  
to p res su re  vessels ,  pumps, and pipes to ensure that the lealc can b e  i i lc  aced 
and repaired,  
2. l ACCESSIBILITY WEIGHT ANALYSIS FOR METEOROID HAXAICD 
1'6- *i F i g u r e  2 - 2  p r e s e n t s  a c u r v e  showing the  m i n i m u m  accep tab le  i n c r c , .  
a c c e s s i b l e  a r e a  p e r  k l lograr r ,  of added weight  as a funct ion of m e t e o - o i a  
p e n e t r a t i o n  p robab i l i t y  f o r  a veh ic l e  having a  total v u l n e r a b l e  s u r f a c e  zr a r ; ~  
2 500 m . T h i s  c u r v e  w a s  d e r i v e d  a s  fo l lows .  
A, The requirement for  the probability of no meteoroid penetratmc 12 
established be, g, , 0, 99 over a one-year period),  
a, F r o m  the probability, the allowable r i sk  i s  determined ( I  - 3 ,  9 
0.01 pe r  year ) ,  
6, The minimum value for  the change i n  reliability per  unit of d 2 . d  
weight for  design improvements i s  established be, g, , QR/ AlV ct + w f i  
2 3 3  x l o w 6  p e r  k g ) .  T h e  cutoff  va lue  of AR/AW i s  normal!: 
established in  reliability studies during configuration seBectlor-2, 
The goal i s  to obtain an optimum vehicle based on. a weight ~ I F L J  - 
bution to obtain the grea tes t  vehicle improvement fo r  the least 
weight and cost penalty. The value 33 x l o e 6  per  kg was estaolsi;ec 
f o r  the  P h a s e  B space s t a t i on .  
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METEOROID PENETRATION PROBABILITY PER YEAR 
Figure 2-2. Accessible Area Weight Penalty vs Meteoroid Penetration Probability 
D. The to ta l  weight  allowable f o r  access ib i l i ty  at the  above penetra t ion 
probabil i ty l eve l  i s  der ived  (0.01 133 x 10-6 = 303 kg[665 lb]). 
E. By dividing th i s  l a s t  value into the to ta l  vehicle su r face  a r e a ,  the 
minimum acceptable  access ib le  a r e a  p e r  k i l og ram of added werght  
2 2 i s  obtained. F o r  500-m sur face  a r e a ,  5001303 = 1 . 6 5  m of 
access ib le  a r e a  pe r  k i l og ram would be acceptable  to sa t is fy  the 
re l iabi l i ty  requ i rement .  
The min imum acceptable  access ib le  a r e a  p e r  k i l og ram added weight i r ~ c r e a s e s  
a s  the probabil i ty of penetra t ion d e c r e a s e s .  
2 . 2  INFLUENCE O F  SIGNALS FROM ONBOARD EQUIPMENT 
Onboard noise  o r  s igna l s  which may  influence the se lect ion of DCS can  a r i s e  
f r o m  subsys t ems  (e. g . ,  EC/LS,  communications,  power, and control  man-ent 
gy ros )  o r  exper iments .  
Specific components include venti lat ion fans ,  rotat ing machinery ,  
in te rmi t t en t  mot ion dev ices ,  fluid flow pipes,  and pumps.  A recen t  studv 
to develop improved leakage detect ion methods  f o r  the Space Shuttle 
(Refe rence  6 )  emphasized t he  need fo r  background s igna tures  in o r d e r  to 
a t t empt  to apply u l t rason ic  techniques to detect ion of l eaks  f r o m  pipes and 
tanks.  Even though the noise  level  on a Space Station might  be acceptable  
to the c r ew ,  it could be a significant s o u r c e  of in te r fe rence  f o r  damage  
control  s y s t e m s  based  on acoust ic  d e t e c t i ~ n  pr inciples .  Acoustic signatus-es 
have been obtained fo r  a wide var ie ty  of components a s  pa r t  of a n  effort  L O  
apply acoust ic  s ignature  ana lys i s  to predic t ive  test ing checkout s y s t e m s  
(Refe rences  7 through 9) .  
Mos t  of the s igna tures  not involving impac t  techniques  yield w a v e f o r n ? ~  at 
f requenc ies  l e s s  than  50 kHz wi th  the g r e a t e s t  number  below 10kHz. As an 
example ,  control  moment  gyros  ( C M C ' s )  a r e  a m a j o r  sou rce  of potentla1 
noise.  A s  many  a s  eight CMG's  would be requ i red  aboard  a P h a s e  B 10. 1 rn 
Space Station. Recent acoust ic  measu remen t s  (Reference 10) indicate 
that acoust ic  energy  was  generated over  a bandwidth f r o m  22  Hz to 45 kHz,  
The no l s ies t  f requency range  measu red  contained the fundamental  ro to r  
f requency of 8, 000 rpm.  
Under s epa ra t e  con t rac t  (Refe rence  1 l ) ,  MDAC c a r r i e d  out background 
noise  r r ~ e a s u r e m e n t s  in i t s  Space Station Simulator  to de t e rmine  the ;nE.luei?ce 
of prototype onboard equipment on potential l eak  detection techniques.  IJa r r rc-  
u l a r  emphas i s  was  given to obtaining the acoust ic  s igna tures  of the EC;/Z-S 
sy s t em which had successful ly  completed a 90-day run. 
A gene ra l  conclusion a s  t o  the  influence of s ignals  f r o m  onboard equipmen.: 
i s  tha t  the  noise s p e c t r a  a r e  l ikely  t o  p r e s e n t  considerable  in te r fe rence  to 
acoust ic  l e ak  detect ion s y s t e m s  operating i n  the  f requency range below 100 
kHz, Specific da t a  c a n  be  obtained only by actual  m e a s u r e m e n t s  i n  simulated 
layouts with appropr ia te  shielding. 
2 - 3  SPACE STATION LEAKAGE 
A vital  Space Station parameter  which strongly influences the selection oe' 
overboard leak DCS i s  the leakage of atmosphere f rom pressurized con^~pat~t- 
rnents, Atmospheric los  se  s a r e  of eWo types: planned and unplanned, 
Planped los ses  a r e  lo s ses  f rom a i r  lock evacuation, ullage dumps, and thhe 
Bike. By definition$ allowance i s  made for  this c l a s s  of leaks i n  the 
design of the atmospheric supply and control subsystem. Unplanned losse s 
re  sukt froln leaks through sealed p res su re  shell penetrations (leaks g rea te r  
than mcalecuEar diffusion), cracks,  and meteoroid penetrations. A leakage 
allowance must  also be provided for  unplanned leaks. 
The basrc r e l a t~onsh ip  between equivalent hole s ize and atmospheric mass  
2 - loss  per  unlt of tlrne'for atmospheric p res su re  of 1. 01 x l o 5  N/m (14 : 
ps:a) i s  shown rn Flgure 2-3. Leak r a t e s  represented by molecular d r f lns~  ~1 
through seals  can be expected to be in the range of mi l l igrams/sec  (pounds/ 
day),  Leaks in the viscous flow range, a s  permitted by s t ructural  desrgn Q J *  
produced by unplanned events, can be significant and bear  directly on the  
des:grl of the DCS. For  example, a sonic flow leak equivalent to a hole of 
- 4 draimeler 2. 54  x 10 m (10 m i l s )  will produce an atmospheric weight loss  o, 
-16 mgisec  (3  lb/day) .  A hole of diameter 7. 6 x m (30 mils)  will 
2 produce a weight loss  of -18 mg/ sec  (20 lb/day) .  The figure shows t t i a t  
a small  change in equivalent hole s ize will resul t  in an unacceptable leakas," 
that could not be economically compensated for  by gas r e se rves .  In an 
analysis of the atmospheric overboard leakage of the MDAC 10. 1-m-dia 
Space Station design, Charhut et a1 (Reference 12) concluded that the pianned. 
- 2 - 3 iealcage would be on the order of - 10 mg/sec  ( 2  x 10 lb/day) ,  If Chi: 
actual Space Station planned leak rate i s  close to this value, the probalsiiicy 
- 4  
of detecting leaks in the equivalent PO m-dia hole size is  enhanced. 
2 , 4  MAZ RRD ANALYSIS 
This analysis identified potential mission hazards and failure events leadin3 
to the particular hazard along with their  possible causes and denoted 
controlling features  required to offset these causes.  

This  ana lys i s  was  performed for  the NASA Space Station Phase  B defizlitioxl 
study. Fa i l u r e  modes  and effects ana lyses  w e r e  reviewed for  input as  were 
safety analyses .  Additionally, the Space Station design was  reviewed 
separa te ly  to deterlmine poss ible  damage f r o m  in te rna l  and external  sources,  
F igu re  2 - 4  depic ts  g r o s s  hazardous events that could lead to vehicle loso  o r  
flight c r ew  fatal i ty.  Analyses fo r  these  g r o s s  hazards  a r e  presented in 
Tab les  2-1 through 2-7. F i r s t ,  a  hazard i s  identified, then fa i lu res  which  
could lead to the occur rence  of the hazardous event and thei r  poss ible  course8  
a r e  identified. Finally,  design and procedural  controls  that can  elinrrinate or 
significantly reduce  the fa i lu re  event occu r r ences  a r e  noted. 
2 . 5  DESCRIPTION O F  HAZARDOUS FUNCTIONS 
Solme specific potential hazards  that  have been identified a s  applicable to a 
Space Station type vehicle a r e  fu r ther  d i scussed  below. These  hazards ,  
should they occur ,  can be  expected to t e s t  the effectiveness of damage  control 
sys t ems  and procedures .  
Figure 2-4. Mission Hazard PoteMial 
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Table 2- 1 
LOSS O F  COMPARTMENT PRESSURE 
Controls Recommended 
Fai lure  Event How Occurring o r  Required - 
Dump and relief valves Human e r r o r .  Provide capping o r  fail-safe 
f a i l o p e n o r a r e o p e n e d ,  0-Seal fa i lure .  d e s i g n f o r v a l v e s w h i c b c a n  
exposing compartment Seat contarnina- open to space environnlent, 
to space environment tion. Provide capability to replace 
Fatigued 'pringse embrittled seals. 
Provide contingency procedure 
i n  the event valve s fail open 
(e. g. , seize masks ,  o?er, hatch, 
and ge t  out). 
Propellant p res su re  Relief valve s Provide shielding in  irnrnedrate 
vesse ls  rupture o r  leak fail to open. vicinity of p res su re  vessels  t o  
Burs t  disks absorb impact of shrapnel fralri 
fail to rupture. p res su re  vessel  rupture,  
 re s sure- 
- 
Provide backup for  failure al: 
vesse ls  sc ra -  
relief valves to open, tched o r  dented 
during produc- Reinspect all p re s su re  vessels 
tion te  sting. for  dings, and p res su re  test 
HX fails. p r io r  to launch. 
Lines blocked. Provide capability and accessi-  
'logged* bility to repair  o r  replace 
p res su re  wall. 
Provide for  scheduled replace- 
ment of f i l ters .  Design to  
high safety margin  for  opera-  
ting through bur s t  p res su re .  
Docking collision::: Thrus ter  fail- Fai l -  safe thrus ter  design, 
ure .  Completely independent 
Pilot  e r r o r .  braking th rus t e r s ,  O ~ t i c  s failure. 
- A 
Communication Redundant docking optics, 
failure. Automatic shutoff of propell anz Radar failure.  
c t  LQSli flow to thrus ter  i f  dur-t~ 
exceeded. 
Human engineering review of 
pilot thrus ter  selectiorl to 
eliminate e r r o r .  
--- 
:+Cove red separately. 
Table 2 - 1  
LOSS OF COMPARTMENT PRESSURE (ContimedB 
Failure Event How Occurring 
Docking collision::: 
(Go ntinued) 
Viewport seals ,  Seals degrade 
EVA hatche s and embritt le;  
docking ports,  etc. antennas, solar 
fail  panels, etc,  a re  
knocked off;hatch 
actuating o r  lock- 
ing me chani sm  
j arns. 
Equalization valve to Human e r ro r .  
aislock i s  opened, Seat contarnina- 
fai ls  open, o r  leaks. tion o r  deteri- 
oration. Galling 
o r  solenoid 
failure. 
Controls Recommended 
o r  Required 
Require contingency (backup) 
if communications fail during 
docking, 
Manual override capability, 
Contingent pressure  source,  
Provide redundant seals ,  
Provide for scheduled replace- 
ment of seals,  
Provide contingency procedure 
for closing off compartments 
i n  event of severe leaks, 
Monitor total cabin pressure  
and flow. Provide audible o r  
visual alarm if pressure  
deviates from certain limits,  
Provide sensors to  detect 
leakage of pressure  tlrl-ough 
seal and pressure  shell, 
Monitor N2 usage rule, 
Provide detectors to locate 
puncture. 
Provide patch kit. 
Provide sensor to locate hole, 
Develop contingency procedure 
which enables crew to egress  
rapidly from compartme~lat in  
event of large hole, and rapid 
venting to space. 
Provide fail-safe design, 
Provide redundant valves. 
Provide capability to repiace 
valve. 
:::Covered separately. 
Table 2 - 1  
LOSS O F  COMPARTMENT PRESSURE (Continued) 
Controls Recommended 
Fai lure  Event How Occurring o r  Required 
p - v  
Electr ical  c i rcui t  Short, par t  fail- Provide manual override o r  
failure causing valve ure ,  open, bad bypass capability fo r  all valves 
to open inadvertently connection, o r  associated with p re  s stzrization, 
c i rcui t  tolerance Use voting logic / redundancy drift.  i n  e lectr ical  c i rcui t ry.  
Leakage of cabin 
atmosphere via  
feed-through 
assemblies  
Loss of p res su re  
control fea tures  
so that too rapid 
use of pressurant  
occurs  
Collision with 
space debris::: 
Micrometeoroid 
penetration 
Structur a1 
penetration 
Design to wide tolerances.  
Se a1 embritt le - Provide sufficient backup 
ment o r  degrada- gases .  
Provide sea l  replacerrlent 
capability. 
Use double seals .  
P r e s s u r e  con- Provide fail-safe design, 
trO1 Provide redundancy and 
o r  valves fai l  
m anu a1 b ac kup . 
open (relief 
valve s function Provide overpressure  alarm. 
properly). 
Corr.munications Provide redundant cr i t ical  
f a i l ~ r e .  components. 
Radar failure.  Provide manual overr ide,  
Thruster  fai lure .  
Provide detectors  to locate 
puncture. 
Provide patch kit 
Provide contingency p r o c e r l u r e  
to  enable crev, to egress 
rapidly f rom compartment rn 
event of large hole ant, rapid 
venting to space. 
Hostile action. Provide patching capalsillty-, 
Provide shielding. 
Provide contingency procedure 
for  crew. 
;$Covered separately.  
Table 2-2 
LOSS OF OXYGEN 
---- 
Controls Recommended 
- 
Failure Event How Occurring o r  Required 
----- 
Leakage 
012 tank rupture 
Fittings /valves, Provide shutoff valves 
etc,  leak Redundant 02 storage 
tanks 
Monitor cabin 82 level a r d  
provide alarm when not 
within certain limits 
Relief valves Isolate o r  shield tanks so 
fail rupture of one will not 
Dings in  tank rupture other 
Meteoroid hit 
Excessive usage Regulators fail Provide redundant components 
Leakage which control and regulate 02 pressure  
Table 2-3  
SP_P1GE DEBRIS S;, LARGE METEOROLD COLLISION 
Controls Recommended 
--- * 
Commu-ilications Loss of communi- Provide redundant communic a- 
failure cations with the tions capability 
ground backing 
radar  
Radar failure Component Provide redundant critical 
failure components 
Thruster failure Failure to f i re  Redundant system 
when collision 
course i s  
dete rmined 
Svlultl-wall struc - 
t u r e  farls Lo stop 
m e t e  o r  o i d  
Structural 
penetration 
Locate equipment s o  as  $0 
minimize effects 
Provide repair capability 
including compartment 
evacuation by flight crew 
Table 2-4 
DOCKING COLLISION 
Fallure Event How Occurring 
Controls Recommended 
o r  Required 
Opt'cal failure Optical tracking failure Redundant optical reflectors 
during final docking Redundant angle t racker 
sensors and electronics 
Backup visual and audio 
contact 
High- reliability par ts  
Provide manual over ride 
Thruster failure Fail  to cease o r  s tar t  Fail- safe thruster  design, 
firing, o r  wrong redundancy 
thrus ters  activated Require contingency pro- 
High thruster  f i res  cedure 
prematurely Require crew training 
Require visual backup 
Automatic shutoff of 
propellant flow to thrusters  
if thruster  duration i s  
exceeded 
Manual override by docking 
safety officer up to point o f  
impact 
Gornmunications During final docking Provide active redundancy 
failure maneuvers, a communi- for crit ical components st:-ch 
cations failure could be as  power amplifier, trans- 
catastrophic if rnis- mitte r,  and antenna to  
alignment of docking eliminate re  action time 
ports occurred o r  the Use closed-circuit TV as 
approach velocity i s  too 
great  and dependence b ackup 
on voice contact i s  Provide contingency pro- 
required for  docking cedure i n  event of coimrnuni- 
and latching cation loss during docking 
Table 2-4  
DOCKING GOLEISION (Continued) 
Controls Recommended 
Failure Event Wow Occurring o r  Required 
Pilot e r r o r  Pilot pushes wrong thrus- Provide fail- safe desig~: for 
t e r  selection thruster  selection 
Highly probable, likeli- Require human engiaee rang 
hood increase s as  review of a l l  docking 
number of dockings operations and procedGres 
increases Provide redundant docking 
lights and power source 
Use automatic docking 
Radar failure Very remote, since 
radar  would not likely 
be used as distances 
become relatively 
sundl b e h e e n  Space 
Station and docking 
vehicle 
Not prime during final dock- 
ing maneuvers, E-lo~xre?ier, i:
failure during approach cc;rl it7 
be propagated into a narre-  
coverable collision cou ~ S E  
Provide redundant crit ic a1 
components and contingency 
procedures, Provide ar;s~ai 
or  audible alarm i f  velocltgr 
exceeds certain approach 
limits 
Gyro  failure Gyro failure during Evaluation of vehicle 
final docking maneu- instability i f  gyro failurc 
ver could cause momen- occurs,  examine mass 
tary instability and unbdance of both Space 
impact Station and docking ve2~icJ.e s , 
and provide necessary 
controls 
2,5,1 On-Orbit Equipment Replacement - E V A  and I V A  
Due to  the effects of zero  gravity, provisions must be made to ensure tPa7, 
equipmel?S. being removed and installed does not damage other el.ements by 
collision bumping) during the removal o r  replacement activity, During El La 
repair,  loose equipment must not be allowed to bump into the vehicle o- 
externally mounted equipment, Protection will require thorough rno t i aa i i .~~ ,~  
of the flight crew and proper equipment design. 
Table 2- 5 
EXPLOSION 
Fai lure  Event 
Controls Recommended 
How Occur ring o r  Required 
Rupture o r  b u r s t  of the 
following components 
located i n  Space Station, 
cargo module, o r  
expe r ime nt module 
causing destruction of 
the Space Station s t ruc-  
tura l  integrity: 
Propellant tanks 
P ressu ran t  tanks 
P r e  s su re  l ines  
P r e s s u r e  regulator 
Emergency 0 2  tanks 
F reon  accumulator 
Portable life 
support system 
Premature  activation of 
ordnance devices 
Bat ter ies  o r  black 
boxes rupture 
Thrus ters  explode 
Relief valves fail  
to open 
Ding i n  tanks 
c rea te s  high 
s t r e s s  point 
Human e r r o r -  
crewman hits tank 
with tool during 
EVA o r  mainte- 
nance function 
Docking shock 
Meteoroid 
puncture 
Poor  weld joint 
Metal o r  weld 
fatigue 
Break i n  l ines 
T a d :  he ate r fa i l s  
on 
R F  energy present  
f rom R F  f i l ter  
failure 
Internal short  
resul ts  in  
ove rhe ating 
Thrust  chamber 
ovarheats in  
presence of explo- 
sive mixture 
Establish burst-to-operahng 
p res su re  safety factor irr 
excess  of that requi red 
Use redundant relie:[ devices 
Identification a s  mi  s sion- 
cr i t ical  i tems and subject 
components to ( I )  special 
handling and shipping controlis, 
(2) double inspection, 
(3)  labeling, and (4) t ight  
t e s t  controls 
Shield o r  place p res su re  
vessels  to avoid chain r e a c -  
tion i f  one bur s t s  o r  d e s j g ~ ;  
anti- shrapnel p res su re  
vesse ls  
Locate i n  forward cornpart- 
rnent, design blowout panel 
i n  p res su re  shell 
Provide redundancy and 
manual backup for  he ate .e- 
controls 
Fail-safe fi l ter design 
Minimum use of ordnance 
Provide double s t a i d e  s s 
steel  cases  for  battery and 
relief devices for b l ack  1,oxes 
Monitor thrus ter  teimperature 
Table 2-5 
EXPLOSION (6 ontinued) 
Controls Recommenrcied 
Fai lure  Event How Occurring o r  Required 
W r n - B  sm 
Connbustj.ble gases  o r  Static charge Pro tec t  against any poteir~tia; 
powders i n  presence of builds up on IVA- ignition sources 
ignition source suited crewmen Provide means to cons t a ~ ~ t l v  
and a r c s  to ground ground crewmen during IV.4 
Hydrogen leakage Ensure  that all hazardous f rom fuel cell  plus 
experiments a r e  condu:i,ee the asvaila,bility of in controlled area 
an ignition source 
- 
Provide gas  monitorin? 
capability 
Provide purge capability c i  
any a r e a s  where gas  co~kld 
ac eumul ate 
Structural breakup Hostile action 
Table 2 -6  
FIRE, SMOKE TOXICITY 
C ontrols Recommended 
Fai lure  Event How Occur ring o r  Required 
Bat tery fluid o r  Overhea t ingor in te r -  Require smoke, heat* ~ n d  
gas  leakage nal shorting could f i re  sensors  i n  vicinity af 
cause outgassing and baMerie s 
leakage of KOM b r  Need contingency prsced~.~rc: hydrogen to get rid of KOH i f  leakcage 
occurs  
Electr ical  
ini"ciad;in 
Power distribution Pro tec t  with circui t  b::ezk- 
w i res  shor t  e r s  o r  fuses 
Electronic equipment Design boxes to prevent 
explodes overpressure  
Use f i r e  and smoke dezec- 
t o r s  near  potential f i r e  
sources 
Table 2-6 
FLRE , SMOKE TOXICITY (Continued) 
Controls Recommended 
Fai lure Event How Occurring o r  Required 
Electr ical  
initiation 
(Continued) 
Static 
electricity 
Combustible 
mater ia l  and 
ignition source 
present  together 
Toxic fluid 
leakage 
Provide automatic o s readily 
accessible f i re  extinguishers 
Require contingency proce- 
dure for  f i re  o r  toxicity 
Require redundant cooling 
circui ts  around boxes if 
cooling failure cannot be 
tolerated 
Metal tools, etc. i n  Arc proof tools o r  coated 
contact with equip- tools. Ground all equip- 
ment ment that can a r c  
Charge buildup in  Require procedure to ground. 
clothing crewmen before metid con- 
tac t  
Inadequate grounding 
of equipment 
Hydr azine flow piping Provide shutoff capability 
connection leakage and the capability to purge 
into a pressurized affected a r e a  
a r e  a 
Provide sensors  to detect 
pressu re  of fuels 
Provide f i re  detection sen- 
s o r s  and a f i re  suppressant 
system 
Mimimum use of combus bible 
mater ia ls  
Piping breaks,  piping Provide sensors  a d  warning 
connector leakage devices 
Provide shutoff capability 
and a capability to ,purge 
potentially affected are as 
Exte r nal Hostile action 
explosion 
Table 2 - 7  
CONTAMINATION 
Controls Recommend-ed 
Fai lure  Event How Occurring o r  Required 
High toxicity Materials outgas 
buildup and removal devices 
fail o r  a r e  inadequate 
Caution and warning 
unit fa i ls  to indicate 
buildup 
Propellant leakage Connection leakage 
into cabin where propellant 
t ransfer  piping 
passes  into o r  
through the cabin 
G O 2  buildup 6 0 2  removal device 
fails o r  becomes 
inadequate, and 
monitor and a l a rm 
unit fail to indicate 
buildup 
Provide redundant 
contamination removal 
capability 
Provide escape procederrcs 
and capability 
Provide redundant c autios? 
and warning capabilibie s 
Use s t r i c t  mater ia l s  
control during design 
Provide temporary (~rras 'ke,  
etc. ) emergency pridvnsioas 
Weld all connections 
Provide monitoring and 
a larm capability, and c r e w  
escape procedures  
Provide redundant ~r,.onite~ r 
and a l a rm 
Provide redundant 602 
removal capability 
2 .  5,2 Propellant Storage and Distribution 
.. 
In a Large space vehicle, it frequently i s  necessary to t ransfer  propellznt 
f rom i t s  storage location to i t s  usage point, possibly through different con?- 
par tments  within the vehicle, Vehicle design must  provide protection aga ins t  
potential leaks and breaks i n  the piping and provide damage control features, 
The NASA/MD,~C Space Station uses  hydrazine (N2Hq) f o r  one of its 
propellants. Hydrazine has an auto-ignition temperature of 270  " G 
(518" F). It i s  stored in tanks under p res su re  in the forward end 
of the vehicle and i s  piped to thrusters  at the aft end. The most probable 
source of ignition i s  a spark i n  the vicinity of a leak. To prevent a spark, 
all electrical leads a re  physically separated f rom any propellant l ines, 
Propellant-carrying lines a r e  routed inside of ducts that a re  vented over-  
board and the a r ea  containing the storage tanks i s  vented. AdditionalLyr, 
brazing o r  welding of connections will minimize connection leaks. 
2 ,  5, 3 Experiment Facility Fai lures 
Facilities provided for the performance of potentially hazardous expertments 
should be isolated from the primary vehicle. Protection must be provsdcc 
-2:o shield the primary vehicle from potential experiment-created hazards 
The NASAIMDAG Space Station design provides an isolated facility .ivj.tk 
shielding provisions, Detailed attention i s  given to experiment design s o  
as not to jeopardize the station itself. 
2 ,  5,4 Docking Por t  Collisions 
Low-energy collisions during docking of two space vehicles, especially 
repeatable occurreiices, can cause metal indentations, seal puncture, ai2d 
other minor events that, after a significant period of time, can become leak 
P O I T L ~ S ,  Repair features and docking port isolation capability must be pra-  
vided, Thorough wearout analysis must be incorporated into the design 
activities and periodic inspection of the mating surfaces and seals nmst be 
incorporated into the operational procedures. 
High- ene rgy collisions during docking operations can cause immedrate 
puncture of the vehicle's protection, Procedures must be developed t o  arl~lv 
for  contingency operations. The se could include compartmentization in 
design, the requirement that personnel facing possible vacuum exposure b e  
suited ior  EVA,  and additional protective features.  Surfaces and equ:ilprnent 
exposed to potential collision should be designed for easy repair o r  
replacement. 
2 .  5. 5 Space Debris  o r  Meteoroid Collision 
Space vehic les  with long-duration miss ions  mus t  provide protection a g a l n s c  
coll isions with o ther  space bodies including self-generated debr i s .  The 
haza rds  due to se l f -generated deb r i s  we re  analyzed in  a recen t  study of 
space r e scue  operat ions  (Reference 13). Protect ion can  include col-lisio 7 -  
avoidance f ea tu r e s  and shielding to p r e s e r v e  vehicle integri ty.  Furtkier 
protection includes compartrnentization and a damage control  design,  
2.6 TYPE O F  LEAK OR DAMAGE PRODUCED BY HAZARDS 
Typical  miss ion  haza rds  and the type of leak o r  damage that each  event cars 
cause  a r e  shown in  Table 2-8. 
Table 2-8  
EDENTBFIC ATION AND DESCRIPTION O F  MISSION HAZARDS 
-- - --- - 
Hazardous Event  Gause Damage Eifects 
---- 
Meteoroid penetra t ion Impingement 
o r  pa r t i a l  penetra t ion 
(orbi ta l  deb r i s )  
C r a c k  propagation 
Dimple o r  perioraticxnx? 
F i r e  
Onboard fa i lu res  - s e a l  Deter iora t ion,  Leak ( replace  seal), 
imprope r  instal lat ion,  l eak  ( replace  seal)* 
s c r a t c h  i n  s t r i k e r  l eak  ( r epa i r )  
- inte rna l  
explo s ion 
Relief valve fa i lu re ,  Localized damage,  
fatigue fa i lu re  p r e s  sure -wal l  
perforat ion,  
in jury to personr.~eJ) 
i r r e p a r a b l e ,  leave 
s ta t ion 
Excess ive  vibrat ion of Attitude control  Dis to r t  s ea l  a d  jamb, 
the vehicle malfunction, c r a c k  initiation, 
equipment off abor t  rnis s ion 
balance,  
exce s sive engine 
i r r egu l a r i t y  
Damage of batch se;.l~ 
Coll ision with another Operat ional  e r r o r ,  Hole o r  ding in pres.- 
space vehicle accidental  operat ion sur ized  wal l  
Hostile act ion (Unknown) Hole i n  p r e s s u r e  shell., 
des t ruc t ion  of Space 
Station 
The damage caused by micrometeoro ids  i s  projected a s  a r a r e  expe:rleascr. 
due to protection provided by the micrometeoroid shield about the Space 
Station, This projection i s  based upon a population of s izes  and velocltsi. s ,  
Nevertheless,  the Space Station may be hit by a meteoroid causrng 
a l a rge  hole in the p r e s s u r e  wall. Fo r  example, a hole 5. 08 cm (2 l i i ,  ) 
r i i  d iameter  would be charac te r ized  by a ragged, tear- type opening. Sr?,allc:- 
rnicrorneteoroids that penetrate the shield can cause dimples  and spzlts  )I- 
t h e  Inner surface of the Space Station wall. These will not produce m . r r i  er,?a - 
leaks ,  but could resu l t  in weakening the wall so that sustarned s t r e s s  iir l i t =  
\;gall could clevelop cracli growth result ing in  a leak. Cracks  in this c a t e g c r y  
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a r e  srr~al l ,  berng equivalent to hole s izes  f rom 2. 54  x 10 -m (0- 0 C l - - ~  1 \ i l C 4  
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to 2 ,  54 s 10 -m (0. 010-in. ) dia, causing leakage of a tmosphere  up tc 
-16 m g / s e c  ( 3  Ib/dzy) .  Ea r ly  detection of the c r acks  will permi t  r e [ > ? : :  i c- 
i;ir=\rcnt continued growth. Repairs  of these c r acks  will be f rom t h e  ells (31. 
i ~ f  Space Statron, since the outside of the wall has  thermal  insulatioi-1 a-lc 
m~cro rne t eo ro ld  bumpers  inhibitrng a c c e s s  to the p r e s s u r e  wall. 
The hatch and view por t  sea l s  nominally have ve ry  low leakage resr,ltln&. 
xlom -molecular diffusion through the seal ,  In the hatch i t m a y  be p o s s , i ~ i  r 
LO have damage caused by disorientation of the seal ,  damage to  the sea. :: 
-2 sc ra t ch  in the jamb a t  the sea l  contact region, Leakage f rom these ty;cs 
31 damage can  be f rom miniscule to v e r y  la rge  ( severa l  hundred kg/d2jt.,. 
Tke sea ls  i n  hatches and windows can  de te r iora te  af ter  long periodis d 
.nstalEatron (2 to 5 y e a r s )  resulting f rom shrinkage and cracking, 'flhls 
cond-it-ion 1s progress ive  and minute leakage should be detected ear  E.\r nr? ~ I L F  
deterioraklon cycle,  This deter iorat ion i n  view por t  sea l s  may be i e 5 s  
r a p i d  khan for batches,  due to the protection provided by the metal  ?,=r;i,;. 
abaut the seal  and lack of exercising the seal .  
Onboard leakage f rom equipment can  occur  a t  joints, through c racks  du., -c 
fatigue In tubing, and at  seals  about rotating shafts. Another leak scur i. 
could be c r acks  caused by p r e s s u r e  buildup i n  closed sys tems  f rom ma1 - 
iunction of the p r e s s u r e  regulator o r  blockage i n  the sys tem,  
If the Space Station i s  exposed to excessive vibration, it i s  pos sibEe that 
leaks can be initiated through bolted joints and at seals due to seal darna gel. 
or separation of the seal from metal contact surface. Such excessive 
vibration, if it persis ts ,  could result  in evacuation of the Space Stat~ou: 
because of potential injury to personnel. In this instance, the leakage 
should be sufficiently low so that evacuation can be successfully accom- 
plished. Vibration can also cause cracks to be propagated through the wal l  
of the Space Station, resulting in loss of atmosphere. 
Damage from collision with another space vehicle may occur during dockix~g 
maneuvers. Damage could occur also during buildup i n  orbit of Space 
Station modules. The momentum and location of the collision impact will 
determine the type of damage and the amount of leakage. 
Damage from hostile action can range from small hales to complete demoli-  
tion of the Space Station. Such damage modes cover the complete range fyom 
repairable leaks to catastrophic depressurization. 
2.7' GREW SAFE TLME 
An important parameter i n  damage control i s  identifying the time available 
for the crew to accomplish repairs ,  When atmospheric pressure  decay is 
slow, repairs  can be accomplished without the use of pressure  suits, Con-. 
versely, when leak rates  a re  high and atmospheric pressure  decay i s  rapid, 
personnel should don pressure  suits before attempting any repair of the 
he&. Safe time for the crew depends on vehicle volume, initial and final 
atmospheric pressure ,  and the size of the hole through which the atn?ct.s;ghere 
i s  being lost. The flow rate through a hole i n  a vehicle wall can be 
expressed mathematically i n  two different ways. 
where: 
& = flow rate (kg/min) 
S = sonic velocity (m/sec )  = 344 
2 A = ho le  a r e a  (m ) 
3 P '= g a s  d e n s i t y  ( k g / m  ) 
112 
= 1 . 0  
CG = coef f ic ien t  of f low = C D  
N = 60 (344)  (1)  A = 20640A 
CD = coef f ic ien t  of d i s c h a r g e  ( R e f e r e n c e  14) 
and  
whe r e  : 
0 = t i m e  ( m i n )  
3 V = veh ic l e  v o l u m e  (m ) 
equa t ing  (2-  1) and  (2 -2 )  p r o d u c e s  
dP  VdP N p  = Vde and  d0 = -NP 
s i n c e  P i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  P 
v P1 8 = -  l n -  N P2 
r e t u r n i n g  t o  N:  
D = hole d iamete r  (m) 
substi tut ing fo r  N in equation (2-5) yields:  
-4 2 The no rma l  par t i a l  p r e s s u r e  of oxygen i s  2. 07 x 10 N / m  (155 mnrr Wg)  
2 fo r  a l l  cabin  p r e s s u r e s  between 4.83 x l o 4  N / m  (7  ps ia )  and 1.012 :K 
(14. 7 ps ia) .  This oxygen par t i a l  p r e s s u r e  can  be allowed to dec rea se  to 327saeli; 
4 2 1 .22  x 10 N / m  (91 m m  Hg) before  the cabin occupants will become concerned 
with the ability to  p e r f o r m  tasks .  This  value then becomes  the mini~-nurn 
allowable oxygen par t i a l  p r e s s u r e .  Since the composit ion of the r e  si.dual g a s  
in  the spacecra f t  compar tment  will r ema in  constant  during leakage, the vaities 
155 and 91 may be  substi tuted for  P1 and P2, respect ively  i n  Equation ( 2  - 8). 
Therefore ,  Equation (2- 8) reduces  to: 
U p  to th is  point, a coefficient of flow of 1. 0 ha s  been used. Reference 14 
p r e sen t s  detailed information on exper imenta l  bleed-down determinat ions ,  
Using the data  f r o m  Reference 14, a rea l i s t i c  value of C of 0. 46 wras G 
obtained f r o m  the relat ionship:  
where  
G D  = 0 .67  and V = 1 . 4  
When the rea l i s t i c  value of C i s  applied to Equation (2- 9) , the equation? G 
reduces  to 
F igure  2-5 depic ts  the available c r e w  reac t ion  t ime  for  a var ie ty  of vehicle 
volumes and equivalent hole d i ame te r s .  F igu re  2-6 shows s i m i l a r  infearma- 
t ion fo r  a wider  var ie ty  of conditions in a nomogram format .  Using a s  an  
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example  a Space Station compar tment  of 424 m (15, 000 ft ) and a 2, 54 cnl 
( I  in. ) dia equivalent hole, the c r e w  would have about 45 minutes  to  take c o r -  
rect ive  action before the a tmosphere  in  the vehicle decays  f r o m  1. 01 x I0 5 
2 2 N / m  (14. 7 ps ia )  to 5. 9 x l o 4  ~ / m  (8. 6 ps ia ) .  This i s  probably adequate 
t ime  for  the c r e w  to locate and r e p a i r  a readi ly  access ib le  hole, If, however, 
the hole i s  not access ib le  o r  i f  the safe t ime  i s  sho r t e r ,  the c r e w  would 
r e t i r e  to another  compar tment  of the Space Station, don p r e s s u r e  suits ,  and 
r een t e r  the compar tment  to effect p rope r  r e p a i r s .  
The safe-time calculation presented h e r e  a s s u m e s  that  the leak i s  detected 
a s  soon as i t  s t a r t s .  F o r  l a r g e  l eaks ,  th is  i s  probably a t r ue  condition, 
F o r  s m a l l  l e aks ,  the calculations presented h e r e  a r e  pe s s imi s t i c  because 
the a tmosphere  con t ro l  s y s t e m  will  be  adding gas  a s  leakage occu r s  to main- 
tain p rope r  composit ion and p r e s s u r e s .  P a r t  of the damage control  sy s t em 
function will  be to calcula te  the safe  t ime fo r  the c r e w  to c o r r e c t  leakage 
problems .  When a leak i s  detected,  i t  wi l l  be  moni tored and a gas loss rate 
TIME (MINE 
F~gure 2-5. Safe Ttme for Crew Acxlvirles After Determining Leakage 
Ref.  NASA CR891 
Figure 2-6. Nomogram of Grew Safe Time After Leakage Determinations 
calculated. This can be converted to equivalent hole s ize,  which can the?  be 
converted to safe time. These calculated values can be displayed or t he  
var ious warning and display panels in the vehicle. During the period the 
crew i s  effecting the repa i r ,  the DCS computer can upgrade the calcnlati-sns 
at regular  intervals  to keep the c rew informed of how much time remain& 
before they should leave the compartment and don p res su re  suits to  complete 
the repair .  
Figure 2 - 7  shows atmosphere lost  in  kg/day versus  size of equivalent ovl*r- 
board holes for three nominal design p res su res  considered for space 
vehicles. These plots a r e  independent of the volume of the vehicle. 
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Section 3 
DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR OVERBOARD LEAKS 
3 . 1  DEFINITION O F  OVERBOARD DAMAGE MODES 
AND LEAKS 
The function of damage control  sy s t ems  fo r  overboard leaks  i s  not only the 
detection and location of leaks ,  but a l so  of p r e s s u r e  wall damage and defect 
modes  which can be p r e c u r s o r s  to leaks .  . Such damage modes  include 
dimples ,  bulges, c r acks ,  and spa11 associa ted with meteoro id /orb i ta i  debr i s  
impact  and the genera l  c l a s s  of s ta t ic  and dynamic c r acks .  Continuous s u r -  
veil lance monitoring of the p r e s s u r e  shel l  f o r  both damage o r  defect modes  
and leaks  will enhance the p rospec t s  f o r  safe  life of the Space Station struc- 
t u r e  over  long-duration iz~ iss ions .  
3 . 2  DESCRIPTION O F  SELECTED OVERBOARD DAMAGE 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
A p r i m e  c r i t e r i on  for  an overboard damage control  technique i s  that it 
provide a reinote readout at the command and control  cen te r .  With the 
obvious exception of a portable leak detector ,  th is  c r i t e r ion  ha s  been rmct 
The guidelines s e t  fo r th  in Section 1 recommended four independent sensor 
subsys tems  fo r  max imum flexibility in identifying the p r e sence  and location 
of a l eak  o r  p r e c u r s o r  damage mode. These  a r e :  
A. A sensor  which w i l lmon i to r  the p r e s su r i zed  compar tment  pscssurc 
and s ense  r a t e s  of change of p r e s s u r e  a s  well a s  absolute p r e s s u r e ,  
F o r  an oxygen-nitrogen a tmosphere ,  n i t rogen monitoring is p r e f e r  - 
able to  total  p r e s s u r e  s ince  i t  e l iminates  var ia t ions  due to metabolic 
consumption of oxygen by the crew.  This type of sensor  can detect 
and quantify a leak ,  but not locate  it. 
B. A senso r  a r r a y  which will be mounted on the p r e s s u r e  walls of the 
Space Station. By tr iangulation techniques,  information can be 
obtained a s  to the  p r e sence  and location of a l eak  o r  damage mode, 
Ideally, th is  sy s t em will quantify the damage mode. 
C. A sensor  which will monitor the performance of seals ,  This scr  cior 
can detect ,  locate ,  and quantify the leak r a t e  above the n o r n ~ a i  
molecular  diffusion (planned) r a t e  of 10s s. 
D. A hand-carr ied portable leak detector t o  detect  leaks  to space Craw 
the in te r ior  of the p re s su r i zed  compartment.  
A two-gas atmosphere,  pulse -rate-modulated control ler  was chosen as  tllc 
compartment  p r e s s u r e  sensor  for  monitoring gas  leakage. In additlou: to 1 1  .; 
pr imary  function of regulating the par t ia l  p r e s s u r e s  of oxygen and n i - r o g i  n 
in the compartment ,  the controller supplies nitrogen pulse r a t e  data as  cL 
m e a s u r e  of overboard or onboard leakage. This sys t em has had exic.uzs~v, 
operational experience,  mos t  recently during the 90-day s imulator  tes t  cl i- 
duc ted at  MDAC. 
A t ransducer  a r r a y  mounted on the p r e s s u r e  walls consis ts  of piezoelcl LL i c  
elements  d i spersed  to  ensure  that a damage mode or leak will be de tec tea i  
and located by triangulation techniques. Three modes of operation w e r e  
considered: (1) active ultrasonics (2)  passive ul t rasonics ,  and (3) a c a m -  
bination of both. Active ul t rasonics  involves a pulse -echo technique in wh-icii 
pulses a r e  propagated through the p r e s s u r e  wall and ultrasonic refle: L i c s ~ ,  
f r o m  cracks  o r  holes a r e  detected. This t ransducer  a r r a y  can also p r c v l ~ l c ~  
the function of a passive meteoroid impact gage system.  It ha s  been cier ~1:- 
s t ra ted  a t  MDAC that typical wide-band active ultrasonic t ransducers  suc i *  a s  
P Z T  and lead metaniobate will readily respond to simulated meteoroid ~ r n ~ ~ ~ ~ c t ~  
Conceptually, a pure passive a r r a y  can detect  meteoroid impacts and a c o ~  s f l c  
emissions f r o m  dynamic flaws. In the meteoroid impact  case ,  crack proid-.- 
galion may be direct ly  related to the p r imary  debr i s  impact on the presstrs-e 
wall. Although signal amplitudes differ in magnitude and frequency distrri.hu- 
tions, signal conditioning techniques can handle the dual passive func zlorl, 
Three  senso r  concepts showed promise  for  the s ea l  leak detector :  (I) e iec l ro -  
lytic hygrometry to measu re  moisture ,  ( 2 )  capacitance to measu re  n ? o ~ s t u r e ,  
and ( 3 )  a thermal  conductivity approach based upon the use  of t he rmis to r s ,  
A hand-carr ied portable leak detector based on the thermistor  detection 
principle has  been identified a s  a promising sensor.  Experimentally,  t h e  
thermis tor  sensor  has demonstrated grea t  sensitivity in detecting smal l  
leaks. A portable detector i s  especially useful a s  sensor  to back up the 
damage control sys tem in pinpointing the location of the leak. Fur ther ,  i t  
s e rves  a s  an emergency sensor  i f  the other sys tems fail. 
3 .3  OVERBOARD LEAK DETECTION AND LOCATION 
CONCEPTS 
3. 3. 1 Measure of Overboard Leakage by Two-Gas Atmosphere 
Controller 
Spacecraft  life support sys  tems for extended-duration missions require  I l ~ e  
use of two-gas atmospheres for physiological and safety reasons.  Basically,  
the two-gas sys tem provides the measurement  of oxygen concentration in s 
gas mixture and a method to contr 01 the concentration of the oxygen alnd 
diluent. An evaluation and comparison of severa l  methods of sensing and 
controlling the composition of two-gas space cabin atmospheres is  contained 
in Reference 15. 
The function of the two-gas controller i s  to maintain the co r rec t  oxygen and 
nitrogen part ia l  p res su res  and, therefore ,  total  p res su re  a t  the preset 
level. Oxygen i s  sensed by a par t ia l  p res su re  sensor (i. e . ,  a m a s s  spcc- 
t rometer  or a polarographic sensor) and added when the oxygen p res su re  Is 
low. The nitrogen or  other diluent i s  sensed by the total p res su re  sensor or  
by the m a s s  spectrometer ,  and added only when the oxygen part ia l  p res su re  
i s  within a specified l imit  and the total p res su re  i s  low. Oxygen i s  con- 
sumed by the c rew members  for metabolic functions a s  well a s  lost by leak- 
age overboard. However, nitrogen i s  lost  only by leakage. The nitrogen 
makeup r a t e  can therefore be considered a measure  of the total leak, If the 
vehicle leakage increases  above normal ,  the amount of increased nitrogen 
supplied to  maintain p res su re  levels should be an indication of the size of the 
leak. A decrease  of nitrogen usage could also indicate an onboard leak of 
nitrogen, or with total  p res su re  being monitored, some other s tored gas, 
3. 3 .  1. 1 Pu lse -Rate  Modulated Two-Gas Sys tems  
Severa l  pulse  - r a t e  modulated s y s t e m s  of two-gas a tmosphere  control  ' l a i r #  
been  developed over a per iod of y e a r s  and t e s t ed  in  extended-duration 
manned space  s imulat ions  (References  16 and 17). The advantages oi this  
type of s y s t e m  a r e  (1) the dead-band operation,  which r e su l t s  in a f a ~ r l y  
wide range  of control led va r i ab l e s ,  i s  el iminated;  (2) the  sy s t em r e t a ~ r ~ ~  ihc 
simplici ty inherent  in  p r e s s u r e  regu la to rs  and solenoid valves for the 
mechanical  components;  (3)  the amount of gas  used i s  eas i ly  measureci Izy 
counting pulses ;  and (4) ra te  changes in ga s  makeup, which may be ~ n r i r c a ~ s  
of e i the r  onboard o r  overboard leaks ,  can be detected.  
3. 3. 1. 2 Descr ipt ion of the Flightweight Tw o-Gas Controller  
The two-gas control  sy s t em utilized in the 90-day manned space ~ I I ? I I I ~ , I L I O ~ I  
t e s t  (Reference 18) consisted of the following: 
A. The p r i m a r y  s enso r  - a  m a s s  spec t rome te r  developed under NAS 4 
con t rac t  by P e r k i n - E l m e r ,  Aerospace  Division, Pomona,  
California. This equipment m e a s u r e s  the pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e s  01 i c t i i l -  
gases :  n i t rogen,  oxygen, water  vapor ,  and ca rbon  dioxide, 'The 
pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e s  of i n t e r e s t  in  the two-gas control ler  a r e  Llhosi, - 
oxygen and nitrogen. 
B. Backup s e n s o r s  including a Beckman polarographic  s enso r  \klllcir 
m e a s u r e s  oxygen pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  and a Sta tham tota l  pressure. 
t ransducer .  
C. Oxygen and ni t rogen s to r ed  gas  supply. 
D. Two p r e s s u r e  regu la to rs  (oxygen and ni t rogen) .  
E. Two cont ro l  solenoids. 
F. The supply l ines  and fittings r equ i r ed  to  connect C ,  D ,  and E Ic 
inlet  o r i f i ces  designed to admi t  ga s  a t  sonic flow when the solcbncsrds 
a r e  actuated. 
G. The e lect ronic  control ler .  
The two-gas a tmosphere  con t ro l le r  a s sembly  (F igure  3 - 1) contains thc, r oii - 
t r  01 e lec t ron ics  for  the a tmosphere  con t ro l  sys tem.  The e lec t ron ics  3 ~ \ "  

designed utilizing integrated circui ts  and discrete  components and a r e  
-3 3 
contained in a 2. 85 x 10 m (175 in. 3 ,  package weighing l e s s  than 1. 6 kg 
(3. 56 lb). 
The operation of this sys tem i s  described by the block diagram of 
Figure 3-2. Input signals f rom the m a s s  spectrometer  or f rom the backup 
sensor s  a r e  selected by means  of panel controls. Each input signal selected 
i s  summed with a reference set-point signal a t  the input of an operational 
amplifier integrator circuit .  If the absolute value of the set-point voltage 
exceeds the absolute value of the sensor  signal, the different voltage ( e r r o r  
signal) i s  integrated by the circuit. If the converse occurs ,  the output of the 
integrator i s  clamped to prevent the integrator f rom going to positive 
saturation. When an e r r o r  signal occurs ,  a s  defined above, the output of I he 
integrator c ircui t  i s  compared to  a reference voltage a t  the level detector, 
When the output voltage equals the reference voltage, the detector circuit 
r e se t s  the integrator and provides a pulse output whose repetition r a t e  is 
proportional to the input e r r o r  signal amplitude. These pulses a r e  su,rnmzd 
in a 4-bit binary counter. At the 16th pulse, an output pulse f rom the binary 
counter c i rcu i t ,  called a te rminal  count, i s  used to t r igger  a 10-sec one-s11o-t: 
multivibrator circuit. The 10-sec one-shot c ircui t  in turn  controls the sole- 
noid valve and admits a fixed pulse of gas to the cabin atmosphere. 
The nitrogen and oxygen channels operate in a s imi lar  manner.  The primary 
difference in the two channels i s  that the oxygen channel te rminal  coirnt ih 
also used to r e s e t  the nitrogen binary counter. The reason for this r e s e t  is  
to  prevent the addition of nitrogen (diluent) to the controlled atmosphere 
until mos t  of the oxygen deficiency i s  made up. 
Figure 3 -3 presents  the nitrogen addition during the 90-day manned test ,  
The leaks were due to improper  sealing of various equipment interfacing 
with space vacuum. The nitrogen pulses during these periods were above 
average. The equipment was systematically checked and resea led ,  and tlhe 
pulse count was then monitored t s  ensure  the leak was corrected. Although 
the design of this unit was not optimized for leak detection, i t  i s  apparent 
f rom these data that i t  can be effectively used for this purpose. 


3. 3. 1. 3 Analysis of a Typical Dead-Band Two-Gas Controller (Ideal Case) 
The two-gas controller utilizes a signal f r o m  an oxygen par t ia l -pressure  
sensor  and a to ta l -pressure  sensor  to determine requirements  for gas inputs 
to the cabin. If the oxygen part ia l  p res su re  i s  in the co r rec t  range, a Icw 
total-pre s su re  signal will activate the nitrogen solenoid valve. A specific 
volume of gas will be  admitted to the cabin for each pulse of the nitrogen 
solenoid valve. This i s  accomplished by regulating the supply p res su re  and 
passing the gas to the cabin through a fixed orifice for a se t  solenoid-opcu 
time. The two-gas controller has  a pulse frequency modulator which deter- 
mines the t ime between pulses. The grea ter  the signal e r r o r ,  the marc, 
frequent the pulses. The control character is t ic  assumed for this s tudy es 
shown in Figure 3-4. 
The pulse must  be capable of meeting normal  leakage, yet be large enough to  
make up f o r  an abnormal leak. The s ize of the nitrogen pulse for the recen t  
90-day manned simulator run was 0.00172 kg (0. 0038 lb). The normal  leak 
- 6  
rate of 9 .  6 x 10 kglsec  ( 1 . 8  lb lday)  caused 474 pulses per  day (almost 
20 per  hour). This pulse r a t e  was too sma l l  to keep up with abnormal Iraks,  
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Figure 3-4. Two-Gas Atmosphere Controller Pulse Rate vs Pressure Error Signal 
Therefore,  a pulse s ize l a rge r  by a factor of 10 (i. e. , 0. 0 18 kg 10, 6- ] 
and of 10 -sec  duration was chosen for this study. (The 10- sec durai~:;l-. 
the approximate t ime used on the 90-day run. ) The maximum nitrogr ;; III, 11  
with this design i s  1. 83 x l o e 3  kg l sec  (345 lblday),  two o rde r s  of rnac 7 
above nominal. Figure 3-5 shows average t ime between pulses vcrscx-, 
sL/e for  various leak rates .  
Sensitivity of the total p res su re  signal i s  a significant design p a r a n l ~ . ~  ( r ! 
2 3 3 
a 3 .  54 x 10 m (16,000 ft ) vehicle, for example, a p res su re  decrc 2 4 1  
2 13, 3 N / m  (0. 1 m m  Hg) means that 0. 068 kg (0. 15 lb) of nitrogen 1 - n ~ ~  
added, Figure 3-6 shows the relationship of vehicle volurne to nitra~~lr? 
weight for various e r r o r  sensitivities. This study assumes  a sensit i \  I \  
2 
of 13, 3 N / m  (0. 1 m m  Hg) can be achieved by incorporating the mosr  
accurate  t ransducer  available. Figure 3-7 shows the amount of nitri :( I 
various s ize vehicles for the three design p res su res  used in the stud!,. 
2 NORMAL LEAK RATE 
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Figure 3-5. Pulse Size vs Time Between Pulses 
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Figure 3-6. Error Sensitivity vs N2 Required to Correct Error (Independent of Total Pressure) 
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Figure 3-7. N 2 Weight in Atmosphere vs Pressure and Vehicle Volume 
control function assumed for this portion of the study actuates the gas sole- 
2 
noid valve whenever the p res su re  t ransducer  signal i s  13.3 N / m  l e s s  than 
the prese t  level, and continues to add "pulses" of gas  until the prese t  pres-  
sure  level is  attained. 
The onboard checkout-data maria-gement sys tem can count the number of 
pulses and maintain a continuous r eco rd  of nitrogen usage ve r sus  t ime, 
These data can be displayed continuously or  on c rew demand. The computer 
could subtract  f rom this count the amount of nitrogen lost  overboard v ia  
planned compartment decompression, thereby assuring that only the 
uncontrolled (leakage) nitrogen 10s s e s  a r e  included in the count. More 
counts than normal  in a given t ime would indicate abnormal  leakage. Fewer 
counts than normal  would indicate a leak in the nitrogen o r  oxygen suppdy 
sys tem upstream of the two-gas controller or gas buildup of an unplanaled 
nature, En this case ,  the m a s s  spectrometer  would b e  consulted to  de ter -  
mine atmosphere constituents and their  levels. 
The t imes  required for vehicle p r e s s u r e  to  decay a c r o s s  the dead band for  
various s ize vehicles,  hole s i zes ,  and p r e s s u r e s  a r e  shown in 
Figures  3-8 ,  3-9,  and 3-10. 
Normal Operation P r e s s u r e  Maintenance 
The following assumptions were made in this analysis:  
Vehicle volurne 326 m 3  (11, 500 ft3) 
Nitrogen pulse s ize 0. 0 18 kg (0. 04 lb) 
Pulse  duration 10 sec  
Control character is t ic  a s  in Figure 3-4 
Sensor total  p res su re  sensitivity 2 13. 3 N / m  (0. 1 rnrn Hg) 
Tempera tures  and other atmospheric constituents and p r e s s u r e s  
constant, 
4 2 Case I-Vehicle p res su re  of 4. 82 x 10 N / m  (7. 0 psia). Nominal nitrogen 
leakage i s  0.48 kg/day. The controller will not actuate until the lower 
l imit  i s  reached and will continue to  pulse gas  into the vehicle until 
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2 the 13.3 N / m  dead band i s  reached or exceeded. The mathematical 
expression for this action is: 
(Number of pulses) (pulse size) 2 Dead band ( f rom Figure 3-0.) 
and 
(0. 018 kg)  2 0. 049 kg,  t, = 3 ( 3 -  1.1 
This indicates that each time the p res su re  decays to  the lower l imit ,  tlie 
controller will add three  pulses (0. 054 kg) to  r each  or exceed the prese t  
pressure.  The t ime between control actions i s  then: 
0. 054 kg 
= 1. 125 x 10-' day = 164 min 
0.48 kglday 
The normal  nitrogen makeup will be three  nitrogen pulses or counts occur - 
ing within a 15 -min period followed by an inactive period of 164 min. Any 
significant decrease  in the inactive period would be symptomatic of abncsrrnaQ 
leakage. 
4 Case II-Vehicle p res su re  of 6. 89  x 10 ~ / m ~  (10 psia). Nominal N2 leakage 
i s  0. 59 kg/day. 
Using the same calculation method a s  in Case I, the control action will be 
three  nitrogen pulses or counts occuring within a 15 -min period followed b y  
an inactive period of 132 min. Again, a decrease in the inactive period 
would indicate abnormal leakage. 
2 Case  111-Vehicle p res su re  of 1. 01 x lo5  N / r n  (14. 7 psia)  and a n o r m a l  
leak r a t e  of 0. 695 kg/day. F o r  this case ,  the control charac ter i s t ics  wlS1 
be three nitrogen counts occuring within a 15-min period followed by ,217i 
inactive period of 114 min. 
Abnormal Operation P r e s s u r e  Maintenance and Leakage Detection 
The following cases  a r e  s imilar  to  the three cases  previously described 
except that an additional gas leak i s  considered which i s  equivalent t o  a 
7. 63 x l ~ - ~ r n  (0. 03 in. ) diameter  hole. 
Case  IV-Conditions a r e  s imilar  to  Case I except that total leakage has 
increased because of the hole. The controller character is t ics  for this 
condition a r e  five pulses occurring within a 20-min period, followed by a n  
inactive period of 30 min. Figure 3- 11 presents  a comparison of Cases 1 
and IT. It i s  of in te res t  td note that a significant amount of gas i s  Lclst 
between pulses in the la t te r  case  s o  that an additional two pulses arc: 
required to r a i s e  the vehicle p res su re  above the dead band. Also, the l e a k  
has decreased  the inactive period f rom 164 to 30 min. 
Case V- Conditions a r e  s imilar  to Case 11, except that nitrogen leakage ITELS 
-4 been increased to  0. 55 x 10 kg/sec.  F o r  this condition, the control 
charac ter i s t ics  would be 25 N2 pulses continuously for a 120-min period 
followed by a 15 -min inactive period. A comparison of Cases V and I1 i s  
shown in Figure 3 - 12. 
Case VI-Conditions a r e  s imilar  to  Case 111, but with increased leakage- 
The controller character is t ic  s for this case  a r e  continuous pulses of niLa agerr 
at  periods of l e s s  than 5 min between pulses. Since the leak i s  of a magni- 
tude grea ter  than the controller can supply with the 5-min intervals asset-- 
ated with the dead band, vehicle p res su re  will decrease  causing the puLsc> 
ra t e  to increase ,  a s  shown in Figure 3 -4. P r e s s u r e  stabilization wil l  o c c u r  
a t  a pressu re  level where the leak r a t e  and addition r a t e  a r e  equal, A 
comparison of Cases  V I  and I11 is  shown in Figure 3- 13. 
Table 3 - 1 i s  a summary  of the six cases  described, listing conditions and 
factors  relating to normal and abnormal leakage. This analysis i l lustrates  the" 
change in control character is t ics  a s  afunction of leak ra te ;  however, it d o e s  a ssut-nc 
an unrealist ic measure  of accuracy and sensitivity with regard  to p r e s s u r e  
measurement .  All present  methods of pressure  measurement  such as 
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m a s s  spectrometers  and p res su re  t ransducers  exhibit electronic perforrc- 
ance charac ter i s t ics  of noise and drift. These character is t ics  a r e  random 
in nature,  but a r e  processed by the controller a s  i f  a r e a l  p res su re  transaent 
were occurring. This would resul t  in significant variance of the control 
charac ter i s t ics  previously described. Since variance in control charac ter -  
i s t ics  i s  symptomatic of vehicle leakage, i t  would be difficult to distinguish 
between r e a l  leaks and shor t - t e rm sensor  drift. The next section presents  
an analysis which considers the random cyclic changes in the output of a 
sensor.  
3. 3.1.4 Response of Two-Gas Controller to Vehicle Leaks (Functional Case)  
A number of parameters  and charac ter i s t ics  must  be considered to optimize 
the atmospheric control of a space vehicle. The control must  provide the 
proper par t ia l  p res su re  of oxygen a t  a r a t e  to match  the metabolic demand 
of the c rew over a broad band of activities. In addition, nitrogen mus t  be 
provided and controlled to  maintain a total p res su re  of atmosphere in which 
man can function comfortably. 
Since the sensor  -controller m u s t  continuously analyze the vehicle atmos - 
phere with r ega rd  to the above gases  and make correct ions by adding known 
weight increments  of gas ,  the gas  addition ra te  can be utilized to  detect and 
analyze vehicle leaks. This i s  especially t rue  of nitrogen, because it does 
not undergo any metabolic or sys tem processing. The m a s s  spectrometer 
i s  the bes t  developed sensor  for measuring nitrogen concentrations (par t ia l  
pressure) .  Unfortunately, knowing the part ia l  p res su re  of a gas  in a con- 
tainer does not give complete definition of i t s  m a s s  quantity. This can be 
i l lustrated by considering a fixed volume container of pure gas ,  where the 
part ia l  p res su re  and total  p res su re  a r e  synonymous. If the gas  i s  slowly 
vented a s  the container i s  warmed, the p res su re  can be kept at  a constant 
value. In this case ,  the par t ia l  p res su re  has  not changed but the gas quantity 
has. Therefore,  the par t ia l  p res su re  should be adjusted to compensate lor 
any changes in temperature.  
Another consideration i s  the amount of contr 01 damping for variations caused 
by normal  events. Such events a s  oxygen demand during an exercise  period 
or increased  leakage f rom a malfunctioning sea l  resu l t  in smal l  r a t e s  of 
p res su re  change because of the relatively la rge  s ize of the vehicle. An 
overr  e sponsive controller could cause undesirable oscillation of oxygen 
par t ia l  p r e s s u r e  on both s ides  of the predetermined value without seeming Ca 
approach it. This type of operation would place undue demands on the 
electr  olyzer furnishing the oxygen. In contrast ,  an underreactive contr olker 
will demand only smal l  changes in oxygen output f rom the electrolyzer ,  "raezt 
since the response lags behind the demand, information concerning alcrrrcsrrnaP 
usage can be ser iously delayed. To summarize ,  the controller response. 
should not cause hunting around the control point or  overdemand f rom thc gas 
supply, but should allow a rapid indication of abnormal gas usage. The 
design parameter  of the controller which determines response i s  called i h c  
scale factor. This defines the number of gas pulses per  hour that wil l  bc 
added to the vehicle for each m m  Hg unit of par t ia l  p res su re  of e r r o r  below 
the reference value. 
Since nitrogen i s  usually provided f r o m  high-pressure s torage,  la rge  demand 
r a t e s  do not seriously affect i t s  design. Therefore,  leak detection can bcst  
be accommodated by including i t  in the design of the nitrogen control channel, 
This may  be enhanced by making the nitrogen control channel m o r e  respon- 
sive than the oxygen channel. In this way, the overboard leak can be 
detected before oxygen demand overload conditions a r e  placed on the 
electrolyzer.  The effect of scale  factor on leak detection t ime i s  presented 
3 3 in Figure 3- 14. The bas is  is  a 113 m (4,000 ft ) vehicle having a normal N 2 
leak rate  of 0. 43 kg (0. 95 lb) per  day and the solid line represents  the nor ma^ 
leak pulse count a s  a function of time. The dashed lines represent  the pi13 se 
count of control lers  with scale  factors  of 4 and 40  to an overboard hi leak 2 
of 0. 23 kg (0. 5 lb) per hour occurring a t  t ime 0. Figure 3- 14 i l lustrates [ h a t  
a higher scale factor will allow an ear l ie r  detection of a leak, The oxygen 
scale factor should be about one-fifth that of the nitrogen channel so that rts 
response i s  much slower, thereby protecting the oxygen electrolyzer rn 
case of a leak. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
TIME AFTER LEAK EVENT (MINI 
Figure 3-14. Pulse Count vs Time After Leak Showing Effect of Controller Scale Factor 
Figu re  3-14 i s  an  ideal  c a s e ,  a s  each  count could not b e  expected to  occur at 
prec i s e ly  the  t ime  indicated on the plot. Instead,  the pulse r a t e  would h a w  
a dis t r ibut ion above and below the values  shown. This i s  because  the tran- 
s ient  var ia t ions  in  the  output s ignal  (nitrogen pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e )  of the mass 
spec t rome te r  a r e  not completely counteracted by the  effect of the cont-i-oiler 
in tegrator  in  smoothing the signal. Too much  smoothing by  the in tegrator  
i s  not de s i r ab l e  a s  i t  would delay the con t ro l l e r ' s  r e sponse  to  a leak. 
Data  concerning instanteneous nitrogen par t i a l  p r e s s u r e  e r r o r  and two- 
ga s  control ler  integration r a t e  over  1 second were  taken on an  hourly 
ba s i s  during the 90-day manned t e s t  (Reference 17). These  data  were 
analyzed to  es tabl ish  a significant sample  of points when the chamber  
w a s  a t  a  "normal"  leakage condition with the nitrogen use r a t e  e s s e n -  
t i a l ly  constant  for  long per iods  of t ime .  This  was accomplished blr 
selecting four t e s t  days,  during which the daily to ta l  quantity of nitrogen 
supplied by the two-gas con t ro l l e r  was  approximately  the s ame .  The four 
days  se lected a r e  shown below. 
T e s t  Day Date Kg N2 Pounds N2: 
7-  13-70 0. 65 1. 43 
7-24-70 0. 63 1. 38 
7 -3  1-70 0 .73  1. 60 
8-4-70 0. 65 1. 4 2  
Conditions on the se lected t e s t  days  included: 
A. The total  amount of ni trogen supplied by the two-gas control ler  o n  
e ach  of these  days  was  approximately  the same.  
B. No unusual  p r e s s u r e  excurs ions  occu r r ed  dur ing these  days ,  
C .  No known events  occu r r ed  a t  a p r ec i s e  r a t e  that  would a f f ec t  the 
hour ly  N2 pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  data .  
F r o m  these  conditions, i t  was  a s sumed  that  the hourly da ta  obtained was 2 
represen ta t ive  sample  of the s ta t i s t i ca l  population of values  f o r  the N2 
pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  e r r o r  ( A P )  and the resul t ing 1- s e c  in tegrat ion r a t e s  (R1 ).  
Approximately 90 da ta  points w e r e  used to calculate a m e a n  A P  and RI, r;nd 
resul t ing s tandard  deviat ions (S and SR ) which we re :  A P  1 
- 
A P  = 4 .85  m m  Hg; SAP = 1.03 ( 3 - 3 )  
These  dis t r ibut ions  m u s t  be in  the s a m e  uni ts  fo r  a compar ison.  Thus, 
a ssuming  that  a n  in tegrat ion r a t e  of 0. 0860 r e p r e s e n t s  a n  e r r o r  signal  oi 
4. 85 mm Hg, the s tandard deviat ion of the 1-second ave rage  integration 
r a t e  (S  ) becomes :  
Comparing this value to S indicates that if one assumes  the difference AP 
between 1. 01 and 1. 03 to be significant, a slight smoothing of the signal w a s  
accomplished by the integration over one second. The question which now 
becomes of interest  is  the effect integrations over longer periods of tirme 
will have on smoothing the data. 
Another important assumption was made: a group of values obtained by 
averaging a number of one-sec values,  taken a t  different t imes ,  were 
assumed to have approximately the same degree of scat ter  (standard 
deviation) a s  a se t  of r a t e s  taken over the same number of seconds. In other 
words,  i t  i s  assumed that a group of points obtained by averaging 
five 1- sec  points will have the same standard deviation a s  a group of points 
representing r a t e s  calculated over 5 sec. Carrying out this process ,  the 
mean ra t e ,  of course,  i s  the same since the same data a r e  being averaged, 
However, the standard deviation for the 5-sec average i s  0. 0 145 and that for 
a 15-sec average i s  0. 0134 v/sec.  Converting these to equivalent par t ia l  
p res su re  units yields 0. 816 and 0. 755 m m  Hg, respectively. This shows, 
a s  expected, that measuring the r a t e  of change over a longer period of time 
yields a m o r e  prec ise  value. 
Carrying this philosophy fur ther ,  the daily nitrogen usage during days 40 
through 80 of the 90-day tes t  was examined, a s  shown in Figure 3-3. T h e s e  
data indicate that no significant perturbations occurred during this per iod,  
and the s tandard deviation of a "normal" e r r o r  signal calculated f rom these 
data should be even smal le r  than the 1, 5,  and 15-sec averages since these 
a r e  24-hr average rates .  The resulting standard deviations of these 40 da;a 
points is  0. 115 kg (0. 25 lb) pe r  day. Converting this to par t ia l  p res su re  error 
units resu l t s  in 0. 356 rnrn Hg. One may observe f rom Figure 3-3 that "he 
total nitrogen usage on the original four days was approximately 1. 56 kg 
(3.44 lb) per  day. The values shown ear l ie r  which were  used to select the 
four days were for nitrogen added by the two-gas controller only, and did not 
include other sources  such a s  the solid amine valve actuators. 
A plot of standard deviations reduced to nitrogen part ia l  p res su re  e r r o r  t i n i t s  
versus  averaging t ime i s  shown in Figure 3-15. F o r  purposes of leak 
detection, i t  i s  desired to  have a sample with a minimum standard deviaLF03.n; 
however, the t ime required to  obtain the sample must  a lso be reascbnablt., If 
one hour i s  chosen for  an averaging t ime,  the order  of magnitude of the 
resulting standard deviation may  be estimated f rom Figure 3 - 15. 
An interesting i l lustration of the effect of sample t ime,  as  represented by 
normal  distributions around the mean,  derived f rom the standard deviations 
calculated above i s  shown in Figure 3 - 16. The two extremes-the instan-a- 
neous values and the one-day average s-are based on reasonably large 
samples of experimental data,  90 and 40 points, respectively,  and tl-ius a r c  
good representat ives  of r e a l  behavior. The intermediate curves ,  aLthclu$:S~ 
based on a few assumptions,  appear to  be representative of the precision one 
would expect f rom averaging rate-of-change data over increasingly longer  
periods of time. 
- 
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Figure 3-15. Standard Deviation vs Sample Averaging Time 
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These  dis t r ibut ions  can  be  ex t r eme ly  useful  in the  des ign of a l eak  detection 
system.  They show the expected s c a t t e r  of da ta  one can expect  f r o m  a 
"normal"  o r  base l ine  signal. The question now a r i s e s  a s  t o  where  one 
wishes  t o  p lace  the l e ak  indication points ,  o r  how much  sensi t iv i ty  one i s  
willing t o  s ac r i f i c e  t o  min imize  fa l se  a l a r m s .  F o r  example ,  a reading 
of 7. 0 m m  Hg f r o m  a one hour o r  one day  average  signal  would indicate 
approximately  99  + percen t  chance of leak;  however,  i f  it comes  f r o m  a n  
instantaneous or 15- s e c  average ,  t he r e  would be fa l se  a l a r m s  approxirim.tety 
5 pe r  cent of the t ime .  
To e l iminate  fa l se  a l a r m s ,  the e r r o r  s ignal  m u s t  deviate f r o m  a mean 
by  30- o r  g r e a t e r ,  pe rmi t t ing  a l a r m  points t o  be  es tabl ished t o  identify a l e ak  
fo r  the di f ferent  signals.  The t i m e ,  however ,  depends on the vehicle 
The measu rab l e  pa rame te r  which i s  t o  be  used to  detect  l eaks  i s  the part ia l  
p r e s s u r e  of n i t rogen in  the cabin. Likewise ,  the s i ze  of the l eak  may be 
es t imated  by the t ime  r equ i r ed  fo r  the par t i a l  p r e s s u r e  of nitrogen t o  decay  
a given AP .  The following express ion  was der ived f r o m  the  m a s s  balance of 
the  MDAC 90-day manned operating and p r e s s u r i z e d  chamber  t e s t  and  g w e s  
the  dynamics of the  sys tem,  including the effects of addition by the two-gas 
control ler .  
where  
r = N i t r o g e n l e a k r a t e  
P = Init ial  ni trogen p r e s s u r e  
0 
M = Init ial  m a s s  ni t rogen a t  P 
0 0 
AP = Change in nitrogen p r e s s u r e  
K = Two- gas control ler  addition ra te  
( k g  N /min,  mm Hs) 2 
t  = Time r equ i r ed  to r e a c h  QP 
A plot showing the t ime  requ i red  f o r  the nitrogen par t i a l  p r e s su re  t o  drc-p 
v e r s u s  l eak  r a t e  i s  presented in Figure  3 -  17. As shown, the addition rate 
fac tor ,  K ,  i s  quite important  for ve ry  sma l l  l eaks ,  and i f  i t  i s  l a rge  enough, 
the p r e s s u r e  will not d rop  a t  all. This m a y  be s e e n  by examining tile abovc 
express ion.  As K A P  approaches  r ,  t  m u s t  become infinitely l a rge ,  At  be 
- x  
other e s t r e m e ,  when r becomes ve ry  l a r g e ,  e approaches  1. However,  111 
- X - X 
expanding e in a Taylor  s e r i e s  for  v e r y  s m a l l  x ,  e becomes equal to i -x, 
Thus ,  the express ion  reduces  to  
which i s  the c a s e  with no  addition. A s imi l a r  t r e a tmen t  assuming K b e c o ~ m c  .: 
z e r o  yie lds  the s a m e  resul t .  

These figures and calculations provide a method to select  the two-gas 
-4 . 
control addition r a t e  factor for a given vehicle. One may  see  that I 0  r s  
the la rges t  factor which will allow detection of leaks l e s s  than 0 .45  kg 
(1 lb) of a i r  per  day. Thus, this i s  the la rges t  pract ical  factor for this s ize 
vehicle i f  leak detection i s  desired. However, this factor provides an 
equilibrium pressure  e r r o r  of 5. 5 mm Hg for a one pound per  day air leak, 
This means  that a leak much l a rge r  than one pound per  day would produce a 
proportionately l a rge r  equilibrium pressu re  e r r o r  i f  not corrected. Thus, 
i t  may  be concluded that a nitrogen addition factor smal l  enough for smal l  
leak detection i s  unsatisfactory for long-term p ressu re  control with 
significant changes in leak rate.  
The leak detection and s ize estimation procedure may  be  explained by the 
representat ion shown in Figure 3 - 18. Since the nitrogen part ia l  p res su re  
signal i s  known to have a ZIC 3. 09  m m  Hg variation for a 30- certainty,  a ane-  
hour average signal with a 30- variation of & 1. 5 mm Hg i s  a rb i t ra r i ly  selected 
for leak detection purposes.  This signal is  represented a s  the shaded hand ,  
with the shading intensity corresponding to increasing probability of occurrence. 
A C 
TIME 
Figure 3-18. Decay of I-Hour Average Signal Through Alarm Points 
Normal conditions were then assumed up to t ime A, when a leak occurs ,  The 
p res su re  signal (using a I -h r  average)  now begins to decay along a path dcs-  
cribed by the previously presented expression. If the leak detector ctcllnptlter 
has a level discr iminator  se t  at 2 .  25 m m  Hg e r r o r ,  this a l a r m  will be setcxf i '  
between t ime B and t ime D. In any case,  this will a le r t  the crew to a leak sie- 
uation. -4 second discr iminator  set  at  3 .  1 m m  Hg will now be activated between 
t lme C and t ~ m e  E. The computer may now assume that the t ime between the 
f i r s t  and second a l a rms  actually represents  the nitrogen part ia l  p res su re  
decay r a t e ,  and calculate the mos t  probable leak rate.  It m a y  a lso  calculate 
the uncertainty of the calculated value. The leak r a t e  calculation will be 
based on Figure  3-  17, i. e. , the difference in t imes  required to  decay Erom 
2, 25 m m  Hg and 3.  1 m m  Kg e r r o r .  Although the l ines a r e  paral le l ,  one 
must  r emember  that the scale  i s  logarithmic, thus producing increasing 
t imes for smal le r  leaks. 
The preceding development, providing a method of e stimating the actual. 
leak size,  permi ts  a modification of the two-gas control design for 
detection of smal l  leaks without sacrificing sys tem control a t  relatively large 
"normal" leak rates .  This concept can be  i l lustrated by the sys tem behavior 
during a hypothetical situation, shown in F igure  3 -  19. Begin by assuming 
the fanciful case  of a vehicle with a z e r o  leak rate.  At t ime to,  a leak 
occurs,  The nitrogen part ia l  p res su re  decays a s  s h o w  in the figure with 
the 2. 25 m m  Hg a l a r m  being se t  off, followed by the 3. 1 m Hg a larm,  
If nothing i s  done at  this point, the p res su re  would decay a s  shown b y  the 
r dashed line to the equilibrium e r r o r .  (This i s  defined by- .) However, K 
from Figure 3-  17, the t ime between the f i rs t  and second a l a r m s  i~?dicatcs 
the estimated leak r a t e  and consequently the equilibrium AP, Increasing the 
se t  point of the controller by an increment equal to  equilibrium AP wil l  cause 
the sys tem to r e tu rn  to  P along a readily predictable route. This sequence 
0 
may now be repeated for any s ize leak (within l imits)  without changing K and 
thus retains  good resolution. The limit  to this process  i s  determined b y  
saturation of the two-gas controller or  m o r e  specifically by the length si 1,he 
nitrogen pulse. Since it has  been determined that a 10-sec pulse i s  about rlne 
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Figure 3-19. Effect of Set Point Adjustment When Leak Size Established 
v- 
min imum solenoid valve pulse  that  i s  r easonab ly  reproducible ,  3 60 pulsi\s 
pe r  hour would co r r e spond  to  con t ro l l e r  sa tura t ion,  If 10 pulses  per  hoilv 
a r e  a r b i t r a r i l y  se lec ted  t o  co r r e spond  t o  a  0.454 k g  (1 lb) pe r  day l eak ,  w e  
find that  the s y s t e m  can  handle up to  a  16.4 k g  (36 lb) pe r  day l eak  with less 
than 0 ,454 k g  (1 lb)  pe r  day resolution.  When sa tu ra t ion  i s  r eached ,  M 7.5 
i n c r ea sed  (probably by a  fac to r  of 5), which would then i nc r ea se  the reah 
il L ~1113.1 s ize  capabil i ty of the s y s t e m  with a  somewhat reduced  resolut ion (max4-- 
of 77 k g  (170 lb) pe r  day l eak  with 2, 3 k g  (5 lb) pe r  day resolut ion) ,  A 
m a j o r  advantage of th is  modif ica t ion i s  that  the "normal"  o r  base l ine  leal< 
r a t e  of the vehicle need not be known ahead of t ime ,  and the s y s t e m  f i n d c  r ~ s  
own base l ine  with the appropr ia te  K. In addition, the s y s t e m  always 
approaches  P r e g a r d l e s s  of the l eak  ra te .  
0 
F igu re  3 - 1 7  conf i rms that a  l a rge  leak can be found much quicker thdn  
s m a l l  one. Another useful  i t em which m a y  be deduced f r o m  F igu re  3 -  i :  is 
that the amount of gas los t  p r i o r  t o  detection of the leak i s  near ly  c n n s t c i l ~ t  
f o r  a l l  leak s izes .  Th is  indicates a  detection sensi t iv i ty  of 0, 9 1  k g  12 il?\ :n 
340  k g  (750  Ib) o r  0 . 3  percent .  
Translating this concept into hardware i s  the next logical step of devclopn z n ~  
a s  the concept includes p res su re  e r r o r  integration circui t ry with a wc l i -  
tested background. Four  additional c i rcui t  functions a r e  required, Thesi  
a re :  
A. A temperature compensator t o v a r y  the p res su re  e r r o r  integrat;on 
r a t e  inversely with temperature.  
B. A bilevel integration l imit  check to allow the p res su re  decay or 
r i s e  r a t e  to be measured  between two discrete  levels. The upper 
l imit  tripout actuates a leak warning device, 
C. A clock circui t  to determine the t ime interval between the p r e s s n r r  
l imit  levels. 
D. A function generator to  synthesize a set  point feedback vol tage  
ZS AP(1imit) / ( t ime interval) (K).  This voltage rese ts  the inlej i r ,vLo:  
set  point s o  that the gas addition rate  i s  equal to the leak rate,  41- 1 
the vehicle p res su re  will equalize at  P 
0' 
The principle of operation i s  more  completely illustrated in Figure 3 -  20, 
which i s  a plot of nitrogen partial  p res su re  vs t ime. An overboard  lea^ 
event is  experienced at  t ime A. The nitrogen part ia l  pressure  falls Lo the 
upper integration l imit  (point C)  which actuates a leak warning and s t a r t s  
an electronic clock. 
The crew i s  now aware that an overboard leak exists and can initiate eak 
searching procedures.  If the impact gages, for example, have ind ic~ t , . c  a 7  
impact event pr ior  to the leak warning, the combined information could 
sirnplify the searching effort. The p res su re  continues to fall until. the Lovr I 
level integration l imit  i s  reached (point D) ,  which stops the electronic tical I .  
The function generator based on the t ime interval between the l imit  e'ilrnii, 
f i r s t  computes -Figure 3 - 19 i l lustrates  this computation-and then diiL31a\- 
an est imate of the leak r a t e ,  which gives the c rew information a s  to t i l e  . i : 
of the hole to be found. In addition, the function generator computes t r i -  
pressu re  level a t  which equilibrium will occur. This level i s  relateel ; c  ih 
control scale  factor and the m a s s  of gas added per  pulse, The func l rcn  
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Figure 3-20. Two-Gas Control ILeak Detection Principle 
genera to r  i s s u e s  a b ias  s ignal  Lo the con t ro l l e r ,  which effectively incref>-sses 
the p r e s e t  p r e s s u r e  l eve l  and i n c r e a s e s  the gas  addition by the arnouct oi tl-te 
leak,  Since an e r r o r  s ignal  a l s o  ex i s t s  because  of the p r e s s u r e  differri-,<c. 
t o  the p r e s e t  l eve l ,  the ac tual  ga s  addition i s  s l ightly higher than the led.; and 
the vehic le  p r e s s u r e  s t a r t s  to  i n c r e a s e ,  a s  shown in F igu re  3 -  20, P. s L!JC 
p r e s s u r e  approaches  the p r e s e t  l eve l ,  the p r e s s u r e  e r r o r  and the addlt:=n 
r a t e  r e a c h  an  equi l ibr ium so  that  the addition r a t e  and l eak  r a t e  art: C~L,'I 
To fu r t he r  i l lus t ra te  ac tual  events ,  a s s u m e  that  the hole i s  r e p a i r e d  a t  
t ime  B, Vehicle p r e s s u r e  wil l  i n c r e a s e  above the p r e s e t  l eve l  and cvenltrni%ly 
r e a c h  the lower  onboard in tegrat ion l imi t ,  which will ac tuate  the e lec t ro--c  
t i m e r  and i s sue  an  onboard l eak  warning. Since the c r e w  i s  previous1 y 
aware  of the l eak  event ,  the onboard l e ak  warning s e r v e s  a s  confiri-nat~c>n 
that  the r e p a i r  act ivi ty ha s  been effective. The vehicle p r e s s u r e  ~viI.1 cow  - 
tinue t o  i n c r e a s e  until  the upper onboard integration l eve l  limit i s  rcackt(ad, 
At this  point,  the function genera to r  again computes  the l e ak  r a t e  and dl;- 
plays it. This quantity can  be  compared  with the ini t ial  l eak  valve L Q  
evaluate the success  of the repa i r  activity. The function generator ther 
decreases  the bias level of the controller set-point to decrease  the gas 
addition r a t e  by an amount equal to the effective onboard leak ra te ,  T l ~ c  
p re s su re  e r r o r  i s  now negative and inherent leakage will cause the v e h l z l c  
p res su re  to slowly decrease  to the prese t  level. A major  advantage of +r r l ik  
application i s  that the "inherent" or baseline leak r a t e  of the vehicle ne:d rr> 
be known ahead of t ime a s  the sys tem will adjust to  any leak r a t e  betwczr 
0,45 and 45 kg ( 1  and 100 lb) pe r  day and maintain a near  constant presZ.i;l-c 
level. 
3, 3. 1, 5 Two-Gas Controller Design to  Accommodate Darnage 
Control Function 
The key to vehicle leakage detection i s  the control and management of t%.ta 
vehicle nitrogen inventory. The single function of nitrogen i s  t o  c o n t r o h B 7 ,  
maintain vehicle p res su re ,  and any change in cabin inventory I T I U S ~  re r>[  
f r o m  onboard or overboard leakage. This inventory exists in the storai; .  
containers and in the vehicle. In the case  of high-pressure gas  storage 
storage p res su re  and temperature need to be measured,  These paravrz~ cej-; 
call be processed by a computer utilizing s tored cornpressihiLity data I c  
nlonitor s tored inventory with acceptable accuracy, The r en~a inde r  oi ? r e  
nitrogen inventory exists a s  a complex mixed cabin atmosphere,  R e s  
the 60- and 90-day manned tes t s  conducted for NASA by MDAC indica 
major  species of vehicle atmosphere gases  to be oxygen, nitrogen, c ~ - c ~  - 
dioxide, and water vapor. While other gas species exist  in trace qua~l L I I L - . ;  
(e, g, , hydrocarbons,  NH3, NOZ, and GO), their  concentrations do 
at a r a t e  to warrant  real- t ime monitoring, 
To monitor the quantity of nitrogen in the vehicle, thc parameters  wni- I;
must  be measured  a r e  nitrogen concentration, tempera ture ,  and p r c c i ~ , ~  c 
Nitrogen concentration can be measured  by severa l  methods,  i n c l : ~ d ~ n s  1 )  - 
spectrometer  and gas  chromatograph, and indirectly by detes-minan,: t 3,. 
c o ~ f e n t r a t i o n s  of GO2,  HZO, and O2 and subtracting these f rom the i o t ~ l  
pressu re ,  The indirect method has been utilizedby-NASA (Reference h5% 
develop a flight-type sensor  system with a maximum theoretical c r r o r  
of 5 percent,  While no set c r i t e r i a  regarding accuracy requiremel.s~s I L - \ /  
been  es tab l i shed ,  a  5 pe r cen t  e r r o r  i s  cons idered  t o  be  somewhat e.iccs.;lve, 
F ive  pe r cen t  of the cabin  ni t rogen in  the previous  example  would amount to a 
possible  uncer ta inty  of 8. 6 k g  (19 lb) of nitrogen. Gas  chromatography 
p o s s e s s e s  acceptable  accuracy ,  but  ha s  d isadvantages  with r e g a r d  t o  r c , ~ i -  
t i m e  informat ion and flight development. Flightweight m a s s  spect rom?l i ,  r s 
have been  developed and tested.  The unit developed by NASA was success- 
fully used t o  moni tor  and con t ro l  the  a tmosphe re  during the 90-day r~lannci? 
t e s t  and i s  r ecommended  fo r  applicat ion t o  l e ak  detection. The r epo r i ed  
accu racy  of th i s  ins t rument  i s  .~t 1 pe r cen t  fo r  N and 02. 2 
To de t e rmine  the cabin ga s  quanti t ies accura te ly ,  the t e m p e r a t u r e   nus st a l s c  
be  determined.  Since var ious  locat ions  within the  cabin  ex i s t  a t  signif lc n n s y  
di f ferent  t e m p e r a t u r e s ,  mul t ip le  t e m p e r a t u r e  m e a s u r e m e n t s  a r e  rcquzrc\d, 
Two methods  of accomplishment  a r e  possible.  One i s  t o  ins ta l l  a  para i i i l  
ne twork of thermocouples  a t  p r e se l ec t ed  locations s o  that  the singular  ci i i  pnr 
r e p r e s e n t s  a pseudo ave rage  t empera tu re .  The second method i s  t o  ~ ~ t i l  
c e r t a i n  o ther  t e m p e r a t u r e  t r an sduce r s  ins ta l led  a t  va r ious  locations in : h c  
vehicle t o  moni tor  cabin t h e r m a l  con t ro l  s y s t e m s  and operating e q u i p n r i ~ ~ t ,  
The compute r  can  in te r roga te  the t r an sduce r s  and p r o c e s s  th is  infarsr?,a:sor~ 
into an  equivalent t empe ra tu r e .  The remain ing  p a r a m e t e r  which m u s t  be 
m e a s u r e d  i s  p r e s s u r e .  T h e r e  1s a n  absolute  p r e s s u r e  t r an sduce r  a s  an 
in tegral  component of the four  -gas m a s s  spec t rome te r  which functions t~ 
b ias  the individual sensor  amp l i f i e r s  s o  that  the sum of the s ignals  represent. 
total  p r e s s u r e .  In addition to th is  p r e s s u r e  represen ta t ion ,  a  differentral 
p r e s s u r e  t r a n s d u c e r ,  one l eg  of which i s  r e fe renced  to  a r e s e r v o i r  prehsuv - 
ized to  the de s i r ed  cabin l eve l ,  i s  recommended.  This  should al low rne,ts - 
u remen t  of cabin p r e s s u r e  changes  with a n  e r r o r  l imi t  of *O. 1  mrn Hg, 
To complete  this  l eak  detection s y s t e m ,  t he se  s e n s o r s  a r e  in tegrated by use  
of the computer .  The computer  in te r roga tes  the s e n s o r s ,  computes  the gas 
quanti t ies,  and compare s  these  quanti t ies with previous  values and Ic st* T\ir 
excess ive  depletion. The computer  i s s u e s  warnings  i f  depletion exceeds 
budgeted r a t e s  and displays  the equivalent hole s i z e  causing the excessxi e 
r a t e ,  Because  the computer  moni to rs  the s t o r age  amount and the ~rnaei-.,l 31 
gas issued to the cabin, any shortage between storage depletion r a t e  and 
cabin feed ra te  would be symptomatic of a gas leak in the s torage vesse l  or  
the plumbing to the gas feeding device. The above discussion i s  applicable 
to both oxygen and nitrogen control and management. In addition, the 
product of O2 use r a t e  and GO concentration i s  an interesting parameter- 2 
because of the possibility of i t s  use in detecting a vehicle fire.  The upper 
l imit  of this parameter  may be character ized during normal  manned 
activit ies;  any value above this could resu l t  f rom inadvertent combustion, 
The control function of the computer monitors any discrepancy in cabin 
oxygen and nitrogen levels and when a discrepancy reaches a preselected 
amount, commands a solenoid valve in the respective gas supply to open for 
a fixed length of time. The quantity of gas flows through a sonic orifice C L ~  a
regulated upstream pressure .  In this way, known fixed quantities of gas arc 
withdrawn f rom storage and added to the cabin. This allows cross-auditing 
of the gas  quantities between s torage and the cabin. The quantity added per 
"pulse" i s  selected depending on vehicle volurne and fixed leakage. In 
pract ice,  i t  has  been customary to  adjust the pulse s ize s o  that 10 pulses pe:- 
hour will accommodate normal  usage including leaks. A block diagran? 
showing the relationship of the various components of the two-gas controller 
i s  presented in Figure 3-2. 
Cabin atmosphere content changes with crew activity. For  example, change:: 
i n t h e  levels of CO 02, a n d N  p a r t i a l p r e s s u r e ,  dewpoint, andtempera tur?  2' 2 
will occur in a spacecraft cabin occupied by eight personnel, two of whom srl.  
exercising, one i s  taking a sponge bath, and the others a r e  engaged in ie s s  
strenuous activities. The system described above would react  under these 
conditions in the initial and final gas inventories shown below: 
Initial Final  Net Change 
kg Clb) kg (lb) kg (lb) - 
O2 86. 2 (190. 0) 85.4 (188. 2) -0. 8 ( -1 .  8) (apparent) 
C02 4.4 (9. 7) 5. 1 (11. 2) t o .  7 ($1. 5) 
M2° 3. 04 (6. 7) 4.4 (9. 7 )  t1. 36 (t3.  0) 
Total 267. 24 (588. 6 )  266. i (586. 0) - 1. 2 (-2. 6) 
The m o s t  significant change in  inventory i s  the 2.4 kg  (5. 3 lb)  l o s s  of nitro- 
gen which would signal  that  ni trogen leakage has  occur red .  The Law 
apparent  l o s s  of oxygen i s  somewhat mis leading a s  i t  does not consider  tiia: 
oxygen f eed  ra te .  Using the above information,  the oxygen feed m a y  be 
es t imated.  The oxygen l o s t  with the ni t rogen amounts  to  49 percen t  of LXle 
ni t rogen on a weight ba s i s  or  1. 2 kg (2. 6'lb). In addition, 0. 59 kg  $l, 3 113) 
of oxygen has  been  used by metabol ic  functioning of the c r e w  t o  f o r m  the 
0. 68 kg (1, 5 lb) of CO in the cabin. Actually, m o r e  oxygen than this bas 2 
been used by  the c r e w ,  a s  during th is  per iod the EC/LS s y s t e m  would have 
been removing carbon  dioxide f r o m  the cabin a t  an  unknown ra te .  D i s r e q a r d -  
ing th is  amount,  the oxygen addition would be  the to ta l  of the amounf s 
or  2. 6 kg  (5. 7 lb). This again i l l u s t r a t e s  that  n i t rogen inventory i s  the m o s t  
convenient method of l eak  detection. Assuming the rt 1 percen t  accuracy for 
the ni t rogen channel of the m a s s  spec t rome te r ,  a l eak  signal  would be 
generated af ter  a 3. 5 nim Hg lo s s  in nitrogen par t i a l  p r e s s u r e ,  whrch in t a ~ s  
c a s e  would be  1. 5 kg (3. 3 lb) of nitrogen o r  a 2. 22 kg (4. 9 lb)  l o s s  of caxzr 
gas. 
The  conclusion f r o m  this analysis  i s  that  the two-gas con t ro l le r  utilizing a 
four-gas  m a s s  spec t rome te r  s e n s o r  would be capable of generating a lcl-c.ic 
warning a t  a point in t ime  a f te r  approximately 2. 3 kg (5  lb)  of gas had h e e n  
l o s t  f r o m  the cabin, Paramet r ica l ly ,  the min imum detectable gas q u a q t ~ t y  
can be developed a s  follows: 
The quantity of gas  in the cabin can be  exp re s sed  a s :  
n (moles)  = P~ 
RT 
where:  
PT = Cabin p r e s s u r e  (m Hg) 
3 V = Cabin volume, m3 ( i t  ) 
T = Average cabin t empera ture ,  OK (OR) 
R = Gas constant ,  62. 3 (mm) m3 / k g  mole  OK (554. 5 (mm) 
ft3 / lb  mo le  O R )  
P The pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  of n i t rogen in  the cabin i s  P ~ 2 /  T but  f o r  cabin a u n o - -  
phe re s  operat ing between 1 / 2  and 1 a tmosphe re s  p r e s s u r e ,  the exprcssicn LS 
Combining these  gives the mo le s  of n i t rogen in the cabin: 
Fac to r ing  in the accu racy  of the nitrogen s e n s o r  wil l  now define the " r n l n  n - i r i ~  ' 
change in ni trogen quantity detectable  a s :  
0.01 (P, - 155) V (28) 
With the above equation, the  m in imum detectable change in quantity of n l t l - n -  
gen can be calcula ted f o r  any s i z e  vehicle. Assuming a vehicle with a vo;ur?e 
3 
of 125 rn3 (4, 420 f t  ), the  calculated quanti t ies a r e  0. 96 kg (2. 12 lb)  '11 
5 2 4 2 1. 0 1 x 10 N / m  (14. 7 ps ia) ,  0. 69 kg ( 1 .  52 l h )  a t  6. 89 x 10 N / n l  ( 1  0 ~ ~ I C L ) ~  
4 2 
and 0. 432 kg (0. 9 5  lb )  a t  5. 17 x 10 N / m  (7. 5 ps ia ) .  
This  equation shows that the main p a r a m e t e r s  which influence the minimum 
detectable  quantity a r e  s enso r  accuracy ,  cabin p r e s s u r e ,  and cabin volwne,  
The m o r e  accu ra t e  the  s enso r  and the sma l l e r  the  cabin volume,  the  g r e a t e r  
i s  the potential  for detecting s m a l l  leaks.  
F igu re  3 - 2  1 p r e sen t s  a logic schemat ic  of the computer  p rocess ing  of gas  
s enso r  s ignals  to  i s sue  warnings and a l a r m s ,  a s  well  a s  t o  control  the 
injection of s to red  ga se s  into the  cabin. The flow d i ag ram i s  p re l iminary ,  
and can be ref ined to  include such fea tures  a s  comparing previous  and 
p re sen t  s t o r ed  quanti t ies to  detect  overboard l e aks  of the gas  s t o r age  
bottles. The type of data  process ing i l lus t ra ted  i s  applicable fo r  both 
ni t rogen and oxygen. The process ing method ut i l izes  a subroutine t o  s e t  
the inheren t  cabin leakage and compare  i t  with the depletion ra te .  
The explanation of the computer flow d l ag ram (F igu re3 -21 )  utilizing t h e  four- 
gas m a s s  spec t romete r  lo r  leak detection of space vehicles i s  presented 
below. The t e r m s  used in the f igure  a r e :  
R = Gas  constant  
v c  = Volume of vehicle 
Vs = Volume of gas  s t o r age  containers  
8 = Time ,  minutes  
K A q  = Number of gas  addition pulses  
Lad  = Amount of admiss ib le  l eak ,  m o l e s  
Lab  = Amount of absolute admiss ib le  leak,  m o l e s ,  a s sumed  to  be 
l a r g e r  value than Lad  
?la-  l = Moles  of N2 previously in vehicle 
I)a = Moles  of N2 presen t ly  in  vehicle 
P ~ 2 ~  = P r e s s u r e  of N in s t o r age ,  rnm Hg 2 
T N2S = Tempera tu r e  of N2 in  s to rage  
Z = Compress ib i l i ty  f ac to r ,  a  function of s t o r age  p r e s s u r e  and 
tempera tur  e 
?S = Moles  of gas  p resen t ly  in s to rage  
P ~ Z ~  = P r e s s u r e  of N in vehic le ,  m q  Hg 2 
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T = Average temperature of gas in vehicle 
C 
Y = Number of "yellow" a l a rms  
n 
The s tar tup block (upper left)  in Figure 3 -21 supplies the initial values c xtd 
constants required for the f i r s t  execution cycle. The second and third 
blocks r ead  in storage p res su re  and temperature,  respectively. Iri the next 
operation, the computer en ters  a s tored  table of compressibil i ty facl,or s 
using the p res su re  and temperature to select  the proper  factor. The nu~-iliPer 
of moles  of storage gas a r e  then computed. Next, mission t ime i s  cl;ar-ir(sr:l ec 
using the s tored amounts and the addition rates .  This value i s  then printcd 
out. The computer i s  instructed to  read  in the value of the nitrogen par~ia; 
pressu re  f r o m  the four-gas m a s s  spectrometer  and cabin temperatrnsc ~1-i I h c  
next two blocks. The number of moles  of N in the cabin (qa) i s  then 2 
calculated, and compared with the value calculated in the previous cycle, IS 
the present  value i s  l a rge r  than the previous value, an onboard leak alarm 
i s  actuated and the present  value replaces the previous value for the Ixe\,r 
cycle. I£ the present  and previous values a r e  equal, no leakage has occitrred 
and the cycle continues; the present  inventory i s  compared with a lower Ikism-hl 
to a s s u r e  minimum cabin pressure.  If inventory i s  low, the two-gas 
controller i s  actuated and a known quantity of nitrogen i s  added to the c a b i n ,  
and the computer adds the gas addition (Aq) to the cabin inventory and 
recycles.  
If the present  gas inventory i s  l e s s  than the previous inventory by the 
admissible amount (Lad),  the difference i s  compared with the m a x i n i u ~ ~  
leak (Lab). Lf the difference exceeds or equals Lab, a "red a la rm" 
(overboard leak) i s  actuated. A leak of this nature would cal l  for iim.mediaI;e 
use of p res su re  suits pr ior  to leak location and repair ,  Gas has not bet n 
added to  the cabin during this period by the computer to avoid g ross  depletion 
of s tored gas inventory. The manual intervention and r e s t a r t  block ailow. 
override to manually add gas and to r e s t a r t  computer control after the leak 
has been repaired. 
If the difference i s  l e s s  than Lab, a "yellow a larm" (overboard leak) 1s 
actuated and the event recorded;  the two-gas controller i s  actuated and R 
known quantity of N2 i s  added to the cabin. The number of "yelloai a la r~ l ixs  
i s  counted and if i t  exceeds  five ( a r b i t r a r y ) ,  the computer  i n c r e a s e s  Lad l> , /  
a fixed i nc r emen t  and r e s e t s  the number  of "yellow a l a r m s "  t o  ze ro ,  2'131 5 
operat ion al lows the computer  t o  "learn" and al lows the computer  conir ol 
to be u sed  on va r i ous  vehic les  having different  unknown leak  r a t e s .  Eat-I? 
t ime  the two-gas  con t ro l l e r  i s  ac tuated,  the p r e sen t  ga s  inventory i s  
i nc r ea sed  by  the amount added and becomes  the yards t i ck  value for  tl-rc 121,* 
computer  cycle.  
3 .  3 ,  2 Pass ive  Ul t rasonics  
One of the f i r s t  approaches  t o  the detection of overboard leakage o! 
nlinosphere through discontinczlt;n.: i n  the space  cabin wall was  the a p p i l c  .,I ,or 
of the u l t rason ic  t r a n s l a t o r  l eak  detector  technique. This  technique 1s baz.:~, 
on the detection of the u l t rason ic  no i se  generated by a gas  a s  i t  p a s s e s  
through an or i f ice .  
The  s tandard  commerc i a l  u l t rason ic  l eak  de tec to rs  a r e  general ly  d e s i p n ~ o  
to detect  leakage of gas  f r o m  a higher  than a tmospher ic  p r e s s u r e  regron I;A:O 
3. region of a tmosphe r i c  p r e s s u r e ,  with a l eak  dctector  located on r l l ~ ,  
low p r e s s u r e  o r  downs t ream s ide  of the leak.  The ul t rasonic  nolse  gcAnc. r~ CCL 
by  such l e aks  genera l ly  h a s  a broad maximum of intensity around 40  h t J 7 ,  
The l eak  de tec to r  can employ a contact  p robe  o r  an  a i rbo rne  probe a s  1112 
noise-detecting t r ansduce r .  
Recently,  exper imenta l  s tudies  have been c a r r i e d  out t o  de te rmine  the 
feas ibi l i ty  of detecting a l eak  of cabin a tmosphe re  into ou te r  space  va cr iurn 
f r o m  the  ups t r eam s ide  of the l eak  using an ul t rasonic  t r an s l a to r  detecicxr 
(Refe rence  19). A sy s t ema t i c  investigation ha s  been c a r r i e d  out a t  
NASA- LaRC. The NASA- LaRC study employed a vacuum systenl  cap,)b e o 
sustaining a p r e s s u r e  below 0.  5 t o r r  on the  low p r e s s u r e  s ide  of sma l l  l L a a l L ; ,  
0 .  89 x (0 .  035  in.  ) dia o r  sma l l e r .  While these  holes  represen l  ] a r c  
l e aks  f r o m  an  a tmosphe r i c  l o s s  point of view, such l e aks  w e r e  not de"c~c:it '~lc- 
w i t h  an  u l t rason ic  detector  when the p r e s s u r e  on t he  vacuum side w a s  
about 1. 0 t o r r .  Some examples  of the NASA-LaRC r e su l t s  a r e  shown LII 
F i g u r e  3 - 2 2 .  In these  measu remen t s ,  both single-  and double-wall space  
cabin s t r u c t u r e s  w e r e  s imulated.  
f i x  ,-- 
NO SECOND WALL 
OUTER WALL 1.27 cm (912 IN.) CLEARANCE FROM SPOKES 
OUTER WALL 3.71 cm (1-112 IN.) CLEARANCE FROM SPOKES 
19,i cm (7-112 IN.) DIA DISC USED AS OUTER WALL 
7 cm (2-314 IN.) DIA DISC USED AS OUTER WALL 
NO. 65 DRILL = 0.089 cm (0.035 IN. DIA)  
0 0.5 1 .O 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4 0 
CHAMBER PRESSURE (mm) 
Figure 3-22. Effect of Double-Wall Configuration-Ultrasonic Leak Translator Measurements 
- -" 
T h e  f o l l o ~ \  Ins obse rva t ions  can be  m a d e  on the b a s i s  of the  double-  aind 
single-n a l l  ~xeasureu-nents  a t  NASA-LaRC. In the  e s p e r i n ~ e n t s ,  1101 s e  v, 3'1 
above the  background l eve l  a p p e a r e d  only a f t e r  the  p r e s s u r e  on the ic-v 
131.c" s ~ i r < '  siclt' ~ O S C  t o  abotlt 1 .  O nini H q .  It appeal-s  tha t  t h i s  a i i~ount  o !  ~ i ( > i i  1-1- 
s t r c a n l  p r c x s s ~ ~ r c ,  i s  r cq t~ i rc~r l  t o ~ - ; L L L S C  sufi'icicnt gcXncratir)il anti c o ~ ~ p l i n g  0 1  
sound into the s t r u c t u r e  f o r  the  u l t r a son ic  l e a k  t r a n s l a t o r  to de tec t  t h e  icl-tk. 
In a l l  the  esperi lments,  the h igh- level  de tec table  no i se  did not  a p p e a r  
ins tantaneously  upon opening the  leak .  Th i s  effect  indicated tha t  the l l , l i h e  
g e n e r a t e d  in the  o r i f i c e  I t se l f  i s  e i t h e r  e x t r e m e l y  weak o r  f a r  out o f  tbe  
r ange  of the  i n s t r u m e n t ' s  f r equency  r e s p o n s e ,  o r  both. Also ,  the  no r se  
l e v e l  de tec ted  in the  doub le -~va l l  m e a s u r e m e n t s  did not a p p e a r  i n s t a n t a n c o ~ ~ s l q  
upon openlng the  l eak ,  s o  the  poss lb l l l ty  of the  no l se  belng genera ted  by !^re 
je t  of a l r  str-rklng the  second \ \a l l  can  be  cons-rdered t o  be  unllkely F z r ~ - . L l y ,  
the  s l rn l l a r l ty  of a l l  of the m e a s u r e m e n t s  (1. e. , the  amount  of no l se )  a,i, 
the  necess-rty of a  vacuum s ide  p r e s s u r e  of a t  l e a s t  1 . 0  m m  o r  g r e a t e s  
su2:ests tha t  t h c .  nolsc slqnal  b e i n q  de tec ted  i s  i n  the f r inge  of s o n v  broa-1 
f 1 - c ~ ~ ~ ~ c n c y  ci~dtl-ll~ution c e n t c , r e d  away iro1-1i t h e  40-]<Hz cen te r  f requci~i -y  0 1  
the u l t r a son ic  t r a n s l a t o r .  
Results to  date for ultrasonic overboard leak detection using commer cia1 
instruments  have not been promising. A conventional t ranslator  may be 
the cor rec t  type of sensor  (ultrasonic detector),  but simply does not operate 
in the cor rec t  frequency range. 
The details of the noise generated by a leak where a i r  a t  o r  near  a tmc~spheric  
p res su re  passes  through a small  orifice into a ra ref ied  gas a r e  not yet fu l ly  
understood. The processes  of noise generation mer i t  fur ther  investigation, 
A pre l iminary  analysis of possible noise -generation mechanisms (Appendix A )  
suggests that small  holes and cracks will generate some noise at high u l t r a -  
sonic frequencies. For  such orifices,  the flow through the leak i s  cxpectea t o  
be unstable, giving r i se  to  turbulence and consequent noise generation. 
Pre l iminary  resu l t s  indicate that an expression such a s  f = - may govern 
the dominant noise frequency generated, where f = frequency, S = coefficlcnt  
which may be dependent on the Reynolds number, U = velocity of flow after 
the f r e e  shear  layer  of gas becomes turbulent af ter  separation, and d = diarn- 
e ter  of hole. For  example, for a 1-mm hole, the dominant frequency i s  of 
the order  of 300 kHz. This analysis suggests that, except for gross  h:>ies, 
an ultrasonic t ranslator  i s  simply not sensitive in the high frequency raiigr 
character is t ic  of typical holes on the order  of 60 mils  or less .  To understand 
the process  of the noise generation, some experimental work will be 
required to determine the frequencies and parameters  involved. A more 
detailed discussion of possible noise generation mechanisms involved In 
producing noise f r o m  a leaking orifice o r  crack i s  found in Appendix A. 
3 .  3. 3 Active Ultrasonics 
The concept of an adtive ultrasonic inspection sys tem using permanently 
mounted t ransducers  appears  promising fo r  inclusion in a damage control 
sys tem f o r  Space Station applications. The basic operation of an active 
ultrasonic inspection sys tem involves sending pulses of ultrasonic energy 
through a s t ructure,  and then detecting the ultrasonic signals reflected f rorn 
flaws (holes o r  c racks)  in the s t ruc ture  by employing severa l  t ransducers .  
Triangulation techniques can be applied to locate the flaws. 
Such a s y s t e m  has  s e v e r a l  a t t r a c t i ve  fea tu res .  Ul t rasonic  techniques c a n  
detect  s m a l l  flaws and c r acks .  An act ive  pulsed u l t rason ic  damage cont-ol  
s y s t e m  would detect  l eaks  by remote ly  detecting and locating the cracks o r  
holes  through which gas  i s  escaping.  As p a r t  of an independent r e sea rck  
and development p r o g r a m  a t  MDAG, a s e r i e s  of su r f ace  wave pulse  echo 
m e a s u r e m e n t s  was  pe r fo rmed  to  de t e rmine  the  r emo te  f law detection. 
capabi l i t ies  of su r f ace  waves  in  a luminum.  Sur face  waves  of 2. 25 MHz were 
used  to study s m a l l  s imulated f laws of approximately  0. 762 m m  (0. 030-1n, ) 
width. A f law of d imensions  7. 6 x lo'* x 7. 6 x x 3. 8 x l o e 5  rn 
(0. 030 x 0. 003 x 0. 015 in. ) could be  detected up to  2. 53 rn (100 in, ) f rom the 
u l t rason ic  t r an sduce r .  Resu l t s  of s o m e  of these  m e a s u r e m e n t s  a r e  showri  
in  F i g u r e  3-23. Some examples  of the u l t rason ic  echo s ignals  rece lved  a t  
va r ious  points between the  t r an sduce r  and f law a r e  shown in F i g u r e  3-24 ,  
Since  a space  cabin can be  thought of a s  a p r e s s u r e  ve s se l ,  such ar* 
inspection s y s t e m  could a l s o  be  designed t o  look f o r  weldment f l aws  o r  
c r a c k s  in  pa r en t  m a t e r i a l  that  could develop and become leaky a f te r  exteaded 
s e r v i c e  in  space .  
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Figure 3-23. Surface Wave Pulse-Echo Signal vs Distance from Defect DISTANCE FROM TRANSDUCER TO DEf ECT (EN 1 
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Ult rason ic  t r a n s d u c e r s  could be  permanent ly  mounted and then scanned 
automat ical ly  and t he i r  output analyzed by r e m o t e  control .  F i g u r e  3 - 2 5  
shows a poss ible  configuration of a permanent ly  mounted u l t rason ic  
inspection sys tem.  Each  t r an sduce r  in  the  a r r a y  can  be  used  a s  a 
t r a n s m i t t e r  and a r e ce ive r  f o r  the u l t rason ic  pu l ses ,  and i s  expected to 3i: 
omnidirect ional  In i t s  r e spon se  so  a s  to  moni to r  a wide a r e a  of the paneL, 
In the  f igure ,  t r an sduce r  No. I sends  an  u l t rason ic  pulse  which i s  ref lec ted 
by a flaw. The  flaw re f lec t s  a signal  into t r ansducers  No. 2 and No, s ,  
Knowing the sound velocity and the  t ime  delay between sending the  pulse and 
the reception of a ref lec t ion f r o m  a flaw, the  to ta l  d is tance  t r a v e r s e d  b) Lhe 
re f l ec ted  energy  can b e  determined.  F r o m  the definition of an  el lrpse .be 
locus  of a point f o r  which the s u m  of the  undirected d i s tances  to two f ~ x c d  
p c ~ i n t s  c a l l cd  thc fo r i  (here, a p a i r  of t r a n s d u c e r s )  is a constant gri.ati.1 i h d l r  
the  d i s tance  between the foci  ( t r an sduce r s ) ,  the  to ta l  d is tance  t r a v e r s e d  
de t e rmines  an  e l l ipse  about any p a i r  of t r an sduce r s .  This  e l l ipse  1s the 
locus  of a l l  poss ible  locat ions  f o r  the flaw. Taking a second pa i r  o.l 
t r an sduce r s ,  a second e l l ipse  i s  determined.  The  in te r sec t ion  of the two 
- 
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Figure 3-25. Permanently Mounted Active Ultrasonic Inspection System 
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e l l ipses  gives the location of the  flaw. F o r  such an  u l t rason ic  sy s t em to bc 
const ructed,  r e s e a r c h  and development ef for ts  m u s t  be  expended to d e ~  el op 
omnidirect ional  t r a n s d u c e r s  and to  opt imize  techniques f o r  sending 
u l t rason ic  energy  through s t r u c t u r e s  pas t  s t r uc tu r a l  ribbing at tachmenl 
points ,  
A pulsed u l t rason ic  inspection s y s t e m  could be  used to c lass i fy  f laws a s  to 
t h e i r  s i ze ,  and thus the magnitude of a l e ak  could be  de te rmined  ~ n d i r c c t l y  
Broad  bandwidth u l t rason ic  t r ansducers  a r e  available f o r  use  in nondest ruc-  
t ive  flaw detection applicat ions.  T h e s e  t r a n s d u c e r s  a r e  capable of t ra i~s~r . i , t -  
ting shor t -dura t ion  pulses  ( l e s s  than two cycles  ) of u l t rason ic  energy w h l c r ~  
e n a b l e  good flaw resolution.  These  t r an sduce r s  a l s o  give a high deg ree  ol 
uniformity  of the sound b e a m  intensity in the n e a r  f ield of the t r an sduce r ,  
Th is  b e a m  uniformity enhances the  t r a n s d u c e r s '  abil i ty to  detect  f l aws  ehaf 
may  develop in the n e a r  field of the t r an sduce r .  
3. 3. 4 Acoustic Emis s ion  
Acoust ic  emi s s ion  can be  defined a s  the  s t r e s s  waves  genera ted  in a soird 
m a t e r i a l  by energy  r e l ea sed  a s  the m a t e r i a l  i s  de formed  o r  f r a c tu r ed .  
These  waves  can be  detected at the su r f ace  of a p r e s s u r e  v e s s e l  mall b y  
p iezoe lec t r i c  t r an sduce r s .  The  detection technique i s  l imi ted  to dynarmac 
s t r a i n  o r  f law modes .  Sta t ic  f laws do not genera te  acoust ic  waves .  For  
detection of s t a t i c  f laws,  the act ive  u l t rason ic  method d i scussed  In the 
previous  sect ion is indicated. 
The  bas ic  phenomenon in acoust ic  emiss ion  i s  the  generat ion of a s i g n a l  v.. 1 1  k 
a v e r y  sho r t  t ime  per iod  over  a f requency spec t rum f r o m  l e s s  t h a n  1 ICCH;: 
to  50 MHz. A s  usually measu red ,  the  signal  i s  only an analog of the triie 
s ignal  in  the  s e n s e  that  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  the t r an sduce r  response  char act err st,^ 
(Refe rence  2 0).  
F o r  continuous s t r uc tu r a l  in tegr i ty  monitoring of Space Station p r e s s u r e  
walls ,  the  f requency band to  detect  acoust ic  emi s s ion  should he chosc3n t o  ili 
above the no i se  background of the Space Station. A typical  f requency rang(. 
would extend f r o m  a few hundred kHz t o  1. 5 MHz. 
By applying a t ransducer  a r r a y  to the Space Station p res su re  wall arid 
utilizing triangulation techniques, a growing crack  could be detected and 
located. The acoustic emission monitoring technique would extend the 
capability of the overboard damage control systems to ensure safe  lrfe of 
the s t ructure by detecting real-t ime dynamic flaws bcforc they cul~~?i:?atc 
in a leak o r  rupture. 
Continuous acoustic emission monitoring systems a r e  in an ear ly stage of 
development. Considerable effort has  been directed toward developing such 
systems for  nuclear reactor  p res su re  vessels  and for  p res su re  vessels  a i l  
the petroleum industry. 
As par t  of an independent r e sea rch  and development program a t  MDAG, 
acoustic emission studies have been ca r r i ed  out on cryogenic p res su re  
vesse ls .  F igure  3 -26  shows the resul t  of a cryogenic burs t  test .  Durnng 
the test ,  the vesse l  was monitored by two acoustic emission sensors .  
Analysis of the difference in t ime a r r iva l  of the acoustic emission s ~ g n a l  at 
each t ransducer  yielded a prediction of the line on which the f rac ture  was 
initiated. A third t ransducer  would be necessary  to locate the actudl point 
of f r ac tu re  initiation. F igure  3 -27  i l lustrates  cumulative acoustic erniss~csr? 
signal count f o r  a t ransducer  a s  a function of applied load. The onset of a 
significant increase in cumulative count was obtained well before the Sa:E A i3+re 
load was applied. 
An acoustic emission monitoring system and a meteoroid impact gage ( s e e  
next section) have a number of elements in common. Both use s imilar  
t ransducers  in a r r a y s  and both detect and locate a dynamic damage rnode by  
triangulation techniques. Meteoroid impacts on the p res su re  wall a r e  l ikely 
to generate c racks  in the impacted a rea .  F o r  this event, there  would be a 
t ime relationship between the meteoroid impact signal and the acoustic 
emissions.  The major  difference in the two systems l i e s  in the signal 
conditioning requirements.  A meteoroid impact i s  likely to produce a la rge  
signal, whereas acoustic emissions pulse a r e  small  in magnitude. A d u a i  
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Figure 3-27. Cumulative Count of Acoustic Emissions as a Function of Applied Load for Pressure Vessel Burst Test 
function s y s t e m  1s cons idered  feas ib le  and would offer considerable  proimlse 
f o r  extending the potential of a pass ive  u l t rason ic  damage control  s ) r s t e ~ l ~ ,  
3. 3 .  5 I \ / l c ' t c ' o i - o i c i  I n ~ p a c - t  (;aye 
Meteoroid  impac t s  m a y  occur  anywhere  on the Space Station s t r u c t u r e ,  
Meteoroid  o r  bumper  deb r i s  impacting the ma in  p r e s s u r e  wall can csusc 
damage  modes  ranging f r o m  dimples  and spa11 to m a s s i v e  penetra t ions .  A 
t r an sduce r  a r r a y  mounted on the p r e s s u r e  wall will s e r v e  to locate  the ;#Tea 
of impac t .  Signal ana lys i s  m a y  yield a quanti tat ive m e a s u r e  of the darna2e 
mode .  
3 .  3 .  5. 1 1111pact (;act. Concepts 
Two Impact  gage concepts w e r e  identified. One I S  based  on sensing  he 
~ n ~ p a c t - g e n e r a t e d  wave a r r l v a l  t imes  a t  t h r ee  widely spaced locations. i n e  
second 1s based  on senslng the wave direction vector  a t  two locatlorrs, 
A. The f l r s t  1s a detection s y s t e m  employing t h r e e  omnldirecilona,  
nonlinear s e n s o r s  that  a r e  widely spaced over  the sur face  of t l ~ c  
s t r u c t u r e  belng moni tored.  A schemat ic  of such a sy s t em i s  siao\kfi 
in F igure  3-28. Since this i s  a passive system and must  be excited 
by an impact, the sys tem measures  the differences in the t ime of 
a r r iva l  a t  the t ransducers  of the s t r e s s  waves excited by the impact. 
The difference in the a r r iva l  t ime can be related to the differences 
in distance of the impact point with respect  to the various t rans-  
ducers  if  the velocity of the s t r e s s  wave i s  known. F r o m  the 
definition of a hyperbola: the locus of a point f o r  which the absolute 
value of the difference of the undirected distances to two fixed 
points called the foci (here,  the distance between a pair of t r ans -  
ducers)  i s  a constant which i s  l e s s  than the distance between the 
foci ( t ransducers) ,  the difference in t ime of a r r iva l  between two 
t ransducers  can be used to determine a hyperbola upon which the 
impact point l ies .  The f i r s t  transducer excited distinguishes 
between the two branches of the hyperbola to select  the branch on 
which the impact point l ies .  B y  considering another pair  of 
t ransducers ,  another hyperbola and the branch on which the impact 
point l i e s  a r e  determined. The point of intersection of the two 
Figure 3-28. Impact Gage for Damage Control System 
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~ V ~ ~ P I I I  to b c x  Siinc t lonal ,  thc vclocity of propagation ol tI2c 
s t r c 1 s i  wavc  must  bc a known constant .  
13. A scc ont i  dct(.ction systcrn can locate the region of Impact 
without ~ - t % c l i ~ i  I - i n t  Iinowlcdgc of the vclocity of pr  opagatl o n  0' 
the s t r e s s  wave resul t ing f r o m  the  impact .  Th is  would provrtic CAI? 
advantage ove r  the f i r s t  sy s t em if the velocity of propagalrovl o i  tile 
s t r e s s  wave depends upon the na tu r e  of the impact ,  1. e . ,  ripon r!-c 
type of s t r e s s  wave generated.  In th is  second detection and loc a' I C - J I  
s y s t em ,  two s e t s  of t h r e e  c losely  spaced,  non-colinear secs t l r  a r c  
used.  The  s lmp le s t  configuration f o r  th is  s e t  i s  a  s enso r  oc chc;: 
ve r t ex  of ail equi la tera l  t r iangle .  F i g u r e  3-29  shows one of the 
s e t s  of t h r e e  s e n s o r s .  The  separa t ion  of the  t r a n s d u c e r s  can ii*i 
the o r d e r  of one o r  two ~ n c h e s .  In th is  a r r a y ,  a  posit lve X-axAk i n  
dellned a s  a lrne originating a t  the l a s t  t r an sduce r  s t r uck  b) a 
s t r e s s  \Lave, and pass ing through the f i r s t  t r an sduce r  esc~lcc! ,  
The t lnie delay between the a r r i v a l  of the s t r e s s  wave at the s i r s t  
t u o  t r an sduce r s  excited i s  taken a s  t l ,  and the t i m e  delay bcVhecr  
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Figure 3-29. Closely Spaced Three-Transducer Array 
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the second and third t ransducers  excited by t The slope of the 2' 
l ine in the direction of the incoming wave i s  given by: 
By measuring these t ime delays, the position of the X-axis with respect  to 
the three  t ransducers  on the plate and the slope of the direction of the 
incoming wave can be determined. This information determines a line on 
the panel along which the s t r e s s  wave s t ruck the sensor  a r r ay .  By 
employing a second se t  of three  closely spaced t ransducers  that i s  widely 
separated f r o m  the f i r s t  set, a s  shown in F igure  3-30, a second line i s  
determined. The intersection of the l ines gives the point of impact. The 
operation of this system depends on the incident wave f ront  being well 
defined and approximately planar, and upon the sensors  in the a r r a y  having 
a fas t  response t ime to give good definition of the t ime delays. 
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Figure 3-30. Damage Control System Using Two Three-Transducer Arrays 
T l i l s  ~ y s t ( ~ i i ~  c 0111~1 c,niploy s t r a i n  gages  fo r  the sensing c>lcmcnts. L t ( ~ ~ t ~ t t ~ ~  
01- 111ut~1,illy PC-I-pc~ntlicular s t r a i n  gages  would be used (F igure  3 -  3 1 ). 
A Rose t te  s t r a i n  gage contains t h r e e  unidirectional  gages  or iented a t  
120  d e g r e e s  with r e spec t  to  each other .  The  re la t ive  ampli tude of the 
s t r a i n s  in each  a r m  of the gage de t e rmines  a l ine of poss ible  impac t  points .  
I11 the s y s t e m  d i s cus sed  above in  -4, s t r a i n  gages  could be  employee'. 
S t ra in  gages  offer  the advantages  of having v e r y  low m a s s  and v e r y  short 
tralzsient r e sponse  t imes .  The  low m a s s  will lower  the  weight penalty drxi: 
to  a permanent ly  mounted damage control  sy s t em used f o r  detectiord of 
meteoro id  impac t s .  If, however,  a permanent ly  mounted act ive  u l t rason ic  
darnage detection sy s t em i s  a l s o  envisioned f o r  the s t r uc tu r e ,  the t r a n s -  
d u c e r s  used in  the u l t rason ic  s y s t e m  m a y  a l s o  be  suitable f o r  u se  a s  
nzeteoroid impac t  detection devices .  The  in tensi ty  and par t i c le  d isplace-  
men t s  of the s t r e s s  waves m u s t  be  cons idered  in the se lect ion of t r a n s -  
duce r s .  M o r e  esper imenta l  data  on the s t r e s s  waves  resul t ing f rorn  an 
i lnpact  m u s t  be  avai lable  before  the usefulness  of the above approaches  La12 
be de te rmined .  
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Figure 3-31. Rosette Strain Gage Array 
3 .  3 .  5. 2 Experiment Results 
To evaluate the feasibility of any impact gage system, i t  i s  necessary  to 
determine the acoustic signature of the meteoroid impacts and establish the 
t ransmission charac ter i s t ics  of the resulting p res su re  waves within the 
s t ructure.  Results obtained f r o m  an MDAC independent research  and 
development program on impact physics in 1970 a r e  relevant to gage 
requirements.  A s e r i e s  of hypervelocity simulated meteoroid impacts on 
single- and multi-wall s t ruc tures  were  car r ied  out. These tes t s  ( see  
Appendix B)  resulted in the following conclusions: 
e The signature of a meteoroid impact contains high-frequency 
components not generated by other likely impacts. The presence 
of these components can serve  a s  the foundation for  a meteroid 
impact detection system. 
s Impact location by a wave a r r iva l  t ime technique using a t ransducer  
a r r a y  has  been proven on a l imited scale test. 
e The influence of s t ructural  i r regular i t ies  on impact location was 
l e s s  than originally predicted. 
3 .  3 .  6 Sensors  for Seal Leak Detection 
The objective is  to  develop simple, rugged, long-lived sensors  for the 
detection of overboard leaks past static and dynamic seals  of manned space- 
- 4  
craft with a detection sensitivity of 10 a tm-cc / sec  or better for cabin 
5 2 
atmospheres f r o m  4. 8 x l o 4  to 1. 0 1 x 10 N/m (7 to 14. 7 psia) .  The 
sensors  must  furnish an electr ical  signal that can be eas i ly  integrated into 
a central  damage control system. 
The main constituents of space cabin stmosphere,  in decreasing 
concentration, a r e  N2, 0 2 ,  H20, and GO2. These gases  can be considered 
a s  individual t r a c e r  gases.  The measurement  of any ( o r  all)  of these gases 
by a sensor  can be related to the total leakage ra te  when the relative concen- 
trations of each in the cabin atmosphere a r e  known. However, a basic 
differentiation must  be made between permeation and leaks past seals ,  
While each of the cabin atmosphere gases  will have a specific permeation 
through an ela s tomeric  (O-ring) seal, there  is no significant difference In 
leakage ra te  among the gases  when the leak i s  in the low2  to lo s5  a tm-cc /sec  
range. The sensor  may detect permeation ra tes  if i t  i s  sufficiently sensitive, 
but the p r i m a r y  concern i s  t o  detect  and m e a s u r e  the  l a r g e r  f lows assocra ted  
with a s e a l  fa i lure .  T o  accura te ly  m e a s u r e  the  leakage r a t e  and to i n c r e a s e  
the sensi t iv i ty  of detection, a l l  of the escaping g a s e s  m u s t  be tempo)-ari1.i. 
confined by a secondary  s e a l  and pa s sed  through the  s enso r .  
Severa l  c r i t e r i a  w e r e  invoked to  choose s enso r  concepts f o r  evaluatron: 
A. The  s e n s o r  m u s t  be  inherent ly  sensi t ive ,  s imple ,  lightweight, 
rugged, and long-lived. 
B. The  s enso r  m u s t  be  at tached to  the  moni to red  s ea l  with only 
e l ec t r i c a l  l e ads  which can ea s i l y  be  pa s sed  through the cabs wai l  
and potted in place. (Pneuma t i c  tubing t o  a cen t ra l  analytical  
ins t rument  in t roduces  addit ional  complexit ies of valving, tubrng , 
and weight. ) 
C The  e l ec t r i c a l  s ignal  output m u s t  b e  capable of in tegra t ion rnto o~ 
damage control  sy s t em.  
Based  upon the  foregoing, t h r e e  s e n s o r  concepts w e r e  chosen f o r  f u r l h e r  
evaluation.  
A. E lec t ro ly t i c  hyg rome t ry  to  m e a s u r e  mois tu re .  
B. Capacitance to  m e a s u r e  mo i s tu r e .  
C .  T h e r m a l  conductivity to  m e a s u r e  a l l  gases .  
3 .  3 ,  6. 1 Elect rolyt ic  Hygrometry  
Gabin a tmosphe re  mo i s tu r e  i s  e s t imated  f o r  the  Skylab a t  approximately  
2, 000 to 04, 000 ppm. F u t u r e  manned mi s s ions  m a y  b e  up to  16,000 ppm -- 
2 i. e . ,  50 pe rcen t  RH a t  1. 01 x l o5  N / m  (14 .7  ps ia)  and 2 5 ° C .  Two 
s e n s o r  va r ia t ions  a r e  considered:  
A. Mois tu r e  p a s s e s  through a tube whose inner  su r f ace  i s  coated w:th 
a  thin l a y e r  of phosphorous pentoxide (P205) which abso rbs  
mo i s tu r e .  Embedded within the P205 a r e  two helical ly wo~n~dl  \ \ i r e  
e lec t rodes  with an  applied potential.  The p r e sence  of mo i s tu r e  
p e r m i t s  a c u r r e n t  to flow which i s  propor t ional  to the amount aT 
mois tu r e  e lec t rolyzed.  The phenomenon of recombination (Hz a n d  
0 2 )  m a y  enhance the  signal  by controlling the r a t e  of passage  
through the s enso r  to  vacuum o r  space ,  F i g u r e  3-32 (A) .  
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B. A var ia t ion  of the  e lc t ro ly t i c  hygromete r  i s  the  u se  of a porous 
insula tor  coated on two s i de s  with a conductive (gold) f i lm .  
Mo i s tu r e  penetra t ing through the porous  insula tor  i s  e lec t rolyzed to 
HZ and 02,  resul t ing in  a c u r r e n t  flow between the  conductive 
f i lms .  While s imp le r  than the  previous  concept, it might  not be as 
sensi t ive ,  F i g u r e  3-32 (B) .  
3 .  3. 6. 2 Cclpacitance 
Sil icone rubbe r  i s  v e r y  pe rmeab l e  to mo i s tu r e  a s  well  a s  o ther  ga se s  such 
a s  02,  NZ"nd do2. The d ie lec t r i c  constant  of wa te r  i s  approximately  
25 t i m e s  that  of s i l icone rubbe r ,  The di f ference in capaci tance  i s  r eg i s t e r ed  
on a capaci tor  with s i l icone rubber  a s  the  d ie lec t r i c  pe rmea t ed  by moisture,  
An improvement  in s ignal  would r e s u l t  if the capaci tance  between the plates 
could be  reduced.  F o r  example,  using a porous  cel lu lose  d ie lec t r i c  between 
the  p la tes  would reduce  the  in i t ia l  capaci tance  b y  approximately  a f a c to r  o f  
3, thus  increasing the s ignal  d i f ferent ia l  when rnoisture p e r r l ~ e a t e s  
( F i g u l - c  3 - 3  3 ). 
3 .  3 .  6. 3 Thc r~ma l  Conductivity 
Gas  leaking pas t  a s ea l  i s  vented to space  via  a sma l l -d i ame te r  tube wl-iich 
contains a t he rmi s to r .  Another the r rn i s to r  exposed to  space  i s  used as 
r e f e r ence  ( F i g u r e  3-34).  The di f ferences  in  signal  a r e  balanced with a 
modified Wheatstone br idge.  The l eak  r a t e  i s  equivalent t o  the surnma"hjon 
of a l l  the  d i f ferences  in t h e r m a l  conductivity of the  leaking g a s e s  v e r s u s  
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Figure 3-33. Moisture Measurement-Silicone Elastomer Capacitor 
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t ha t  of a  vacuum r e f e r e n c e ,  R e s p o n s e  i s  d i r e c t l y  p ropor t iona l  t o  the  1ea.k 
r a t e  in the t r u e  cabin a t m o s p h e r e .  This  concept  in in i t ia l  l a b o r a t o r y  t e s t ing  
b a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  capabi l i t ies  of de tec t ing  and m e a s u r i n g  space  cabin a t m a s  -- 
- 8 p h e r e  l e a k  r a t e s  f r o m  10 t o  l o - '  a t r n - c c l s e c .  
A s e a l  l eak  d e t e c t o r  des ign  concept b a s e d  on the  t h e r m i s t o r  pr inc ip le  fo r  2 
Space Station ha tch  c losure  i s  shown in F i g u r e  3-35.  
3. 3.  7 P o r t a b l e  Overboard  Leak  Detec tor  
A por table  hand-held  l e a k  de tec to r  i s  needed fo r  de tec t ing  overboard  l e a k s  
f r o m  within a  gas  p r e s s u r i z e d  c o m p a r t m e n t ,  The handheld t r i g g e r  gage 
l e a k  d e t e c t o r  developed by the  M a r s h a l l  Space Fl ight  Center  (Refe rence  215 
i s  des igned t o  de tec t  ove rboard  l e a k s  f r o m  outside the space  vehicle.  
T h r e e  methods  fo r  de tec t ing  l e a k s  into a  vacuum based  on the  pr inc ip le  of 
a i r  flow m e a s u r e m e n t  have been  identif ied.  These  a r e  (1 )  ion deflect ion 
a i r  flow s e n s o r ,  ( 2 )  fluidic veloci ty s e n s o r ,  and ( 3 )  t h e r m a l  conductivity 
t h e r m i s t o r  s e n s o r ,  
TO OPEN HATCH 
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Figure 3-35. Location of Sensors Used t o  Detect Match Seal Leaks 
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An instr111nc.nt based on an  ion-dr i f t  pr inciple  h a s  been found capahii. of 
mcasur ln t .  a i r  vcloci t les  down Lo .L-alucs a s  srrlall a s  30 c m / m l n  (Reitrr 2 ~ ) .  
All- vclocity 1s scnscd by  an  c lcc t ron ic  control  c i rcui t  w h ~ c h  transtiiric.;  h= 
a ~ i d l  dr l f t  of a positive Ion cloild gcncratcd b y  a corona d i scharge .  51gr1 8 1 
output i s  11nc.arl y propor t ional  t o  t h c  total  m a s s  flux through tllc i rarisciui PI- 
A fluidic velocity s e n s o r  h a s  been de sc r i bed  f o r  measu r ing  low a i r  r'lou7 
veloci t ies  such a s  might  ex i s t  a t  holes  exhausting to space  (Refe rence  2 ' )  
The pr inciple  invoies the deflection of a jet by a t r a n s v e r s e  flow of gas or 
liquid. 
A je t  of fluid f rom a nozzle  impinges  upon two r ece ive r  tubes  which a r e  
connected to a differential  p r e s s u r e  gage. The two r ece ive r  tubes a r e  so 
placed that  the A P  i s  z e r o  when the fluid jet  i s  not deflected b y  a c r o s s -  
flowing fluid. However,  when the jet  encounters  a cross-flowing flurd, i h c  
jet i s  slightly displaced, causing an unequal distr ibution of the jet velocity 
prof i le  between the two r ece ive r  tubes and result ing in a total p r e s s u r e  
change which i s  proportional to the c r o s  s-flowing velocity s t r e a m  and 
reg is te red  a s  a change in differential p r e s s u r e  between the two receiving 
tubes. The sys tem i s  s imple  and quite sensit ive to smal l  a i r  flow c r o s s  
velocit ies.  This concept has  utilized a dif ferent ia l  p r e s s u r e  sensing me ch- 
an ism.  The potential exis ts  to great ly  increase  i t s  sensit ivity by using 
the rmis to r s  or hot w i re s  a s  s enso r s  in the two receiving tubes. 
The third  concept which i s  under study a t  MDAC is based on thermis tor  sens-  
ing of a i r  flow. F igure  3-36 shows a vers ion of a portable digital leak de tec-  
t o r  based on the the rmis to r  thermal  conductivity principle.  A slight, reduced 
p r e s s u r e  exists in the vicinity of an overboard leak and i s  sufficient t o  ir?duce 
an a i r  flow in  a sensing tube in which a t he rmis to r  i s  mounted. The the rm-  
i s to r  i s  self-heated and yields a change in res i s tance  with flow. The sensing 
the rmis to r  is  balanced via a Wheatstone bridge ci rcui t  with a matched 
reference the rmis to r  in a non-flow (diffusion) configuration. The s ignai is  
proportional t o  the induced flow rate  in the sensing tube which in turn c o r r e -  
sponds t o  the leak rate. The detector  configuration shown in  Figure  3 - 3 6  
allows rapid scanning of a space station wall with one-hand operation. 
Channels built into the scan surface of the detector  a r e  connected via a  multi- 
port switching valve to  the  cen t ra l  sensing tube probe and facil i tate checking 
a la rge  a r e a  in a single sweep ac ros s  the wall. 
Laboratory setup tes t  resul ts  have been encouraging, even in the simulated 
presence  of typical ventilation a i r  flow rates.  
3 . 4  HIDDEN OVERBOARD LEAKS 
Midden leaks  can be defined as :  
A. A leak located in an inaccessible  par t  of the space vehicle; a s  lor 
example, behind equipment o r  ventilation ducts. 
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Figure 3-36. Rortable Digital Leak Detector 
B. A leak that  ha s  been detected but not readl ly  located b y  a  d a r n a : , ~  
control  sys tem.  This  type of l eak  could be a l a r g e  numbel- oT \.cry 
sma l l  l e aks  which add up to  a detectable level ,  yet each individrral 
l eak  1s below the resolut ion l im l t  of the  location capability of t h e  
damage control  sy s t em.  
C .  A leak too s ~ n a l l  to be  detected by a s t andard  damage controi  
sy s t em,  but amenable  to detection by a specia l  high-resoirition 
de tec to r .  
A leak  that  1s readi ly  detected and located but i s  inaccess ib le  (Type A) ca: 
b e s t  be handled by designing access ib i l i ty  into the vehicle, a s  detaried I,] 
Section 6. Without built-in access ibi l i ty ,  the s t ra tegy  of coping wst11 Ihc 
l e ak  will depend on the s i z e  of the leak.  F o r  a sma l l  leak,  the time r e q u i r e r l  
to move  the e q u ~ p m e ~ i t  i s  justified a s  no haza rd  i s  presented.  F o r  a l a r ~ e r  
c l a s s  of holes,  th i s  would depend 011 some  m e a s u r e  of hole s i z e  an6 r a t e  1-4i 
change of p r e s s u r e .  F o r  this  purpose ,  the two-gas con t ro l l e r  would prcriJc? 
invaluable by providing safe-t ime data  a s  a ba s i s  f o r  decision-malzlng, 
Type B and Type C leaks ,  even  though genera l ly  smal l ,  a r e  not t o  be 
d i smi s sed  a s  having a negligible overa l l  effect  on the  operat ion of the space  
vchicle,  Such leaks  m a y  grow with t ime .  Causes  of such  l e aks  a r e  d ive r s e  
ranging f r o m  human e r r o r  t o  fatigue c racks ,  impac t  c r acks ,  o r  faulty repa i r  
te chnique s .  
Two examples  of l e aks  caused by human e r r o r  dur ing  the recen t  90-day 
manned t e s t b y  MDAC that  a r e  represen ta t ive  of hidden l e aks  occu r r ed  wlxen 
the vent valve on the commode w a s  not closed t ightly and when the d r y  waste  
s to rage  container lid was  not p rop e r ly  seated.  In both ca se s ,  cabin a tmos -  
phere  was  los t  and the two-gas con t ro l l e r  indicated a n  i nc r ea sed  r a t e  of  gas 
consun2ption. These  hidden leaks  we re  located by r e f e r r i n g  back t o  the 
t imel ine  of c rew act iv i t ies  t o  de t e rmine  the sequence of even t s  a t  the approxr-  
ma t e  t ime  the inc reased  gas  r a t e  occu r r ed .  Hence, it i s  evident  that  locating 
bidden leaks  m a y  be facil i tated by using accu ra t e  informat ion on c r ew  a c t i v i ~ r e s  
together  with the data  f r o m  the damage control  sys tem.  All l eaks  hidden o r  
o therwise  should be considered potential ly dangerous  until quantified, located,  
and repa i red .  
A tentat ive p rocedure  for  handling hidden leaks  is shown in  F igure  3-37.  
3,5 ANALYSIS O F  SMALLEST D E T E C T A B L E  OVERBOARD LEAK 
3. 5. 1 Two-Gas Controller  
The two-gas con t ro l l e r  norl-nally suppl ies  about 10 pu l ses  of gas  p e r  hour  
2 
a t  nominal  a tmosphe r i c  conditions of 1. 01 x lo5 N / m  (14. 7 p s i a )  a t  
21 pe rcen t  0 2  and 79 percen t  N2. Smal l  hole detection i s  accomplished 
through an  i nc r ea sed  pulse  r a t e ,  which shi f ts  to resupply  the new gas  
consumption (i, e. , leakage)  requ i rements .  Deta i ls  of how th i s  i s  accon1- 
p l ished i s  explained in Section 3. 3. 1 of th is  r epor t .  
F i g u r e s  3 - 3  through 3-10 display the t i m e  t o  detect  a leak-equivalent  hole 
4 2 s i z e  f o r  p r e s s u r e s  of 4.82, 6.89, and 10. 12 x 10 N / m  . The  t i m e  to 
de tec t  a given s i z e  hole d e c r e a s e s  with inc reas ing  p r e s s u r e .  In  the  ideal  
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ease ,  without onboard p r e s s u r e  per turbat ions ,  holes  of 2. 5 x 10 m (1  mil) 
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-~" 
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or  s m a l l e r  could be detected by accumulat ing enough pulse data.  Functioanallif, 
a i r l ock  operat ions ,  t empe ra tu r e  var ia t ions ,  life suppor t  s y s t e m  per formance ,  
and c r e w  ac t iv i t i e s  in  the space  vehicle can produce per tu rba t ions  in  the 
a tmosphe re  tha t  over  shadow the  sma l l  changes assoc ia ted  with hole s i z e s  
that  a r e  l e s s  than the basel ine  l eak  r a t e  of 0. 45 kg (1 l b )  p e r  day  f o r  a n  
independent compar tment .  Long-run monitoring,  however,  wil l  identify thesc  
l eaks ,  a s  the pe r tu rba t ions  a r e  averaged  out. Using a pN decay  of 2. 25 Y Y E L ~  2  
Hg, a s  explained i n  Section 3 .  3 .  1, a 0. 45 kg (1  lb)  p e r  day a tmosphe re  g a s  
l eak  r a t e  can  b e  detected in  about t h r e e  days and quantified i n  approximately 
5 2 
one week.  F o r  1. 0 1 x 10 N / m  (14. 7 p s i a )  cabin a tmosphere ,  th i s  l eak  r a t e  
i s  indicative of an equivalent hole s i z e  of 0. 0 15 c m  (0. 006 in.  ) d i ame te r .  
Although th i s  r e sponse  t i m e  i s  modera te ly  long, t he  to ta l  ga s  los t  a s  a result 
of the  leak i s  1. 36  kg  ( 3  lb)  before  identif icat ion.  This  ana lys i s  i s  based on 3 
3 3 
vehic le  volume of 283 m (10, 000 ft ) .  If the  volume i s  decreased  t o  141 rn 3 
3 (5, 000 ft ), the detection t i m e  for  the  0 .  45 kg (1  lb )  p e r  day leak r a t e ,  0 .  015 
crn (0.  006 In.  ) d i ame te r  equivalent hole s i z e  i s  only one day and quant i f ica t iar~ 
would take  p lace  in l e s s  than two days.  Thus,  only 0. 45 k g  ( 1  lb)  of atrnos- 
pher ic  ga se s  would be  l o s t  before  leak identification. 
Table 3 - 2  i l l u s t r a t e s  the t ime  t o  locate and quantify a leak r a t e  equivalent t o  
3 
a n  0. 015-cm-dia  hole a s  a function of cabin p r e s s u r e  fo r  a 283-m volul?ne 
compar tment .  
Table 3-2 
TIME T O  DETECT LEAKS 
Compartment  Volume 
283 m 3  (10, 000 cu f t )  
Quantity 
of Gas T ime  
Compartment  Leak Rate T ime  Lost  before  t o  
P r e s s u r e  f o r 0 . 0 1 5 c m d i a H o l e  t o d e t e c t  Detection Quanitif y 
( ~ / m ~ )  (kg /day)  (days )  (kg)  (days  ) 
p- 
3. 5. 2 Act ive  U l t r a s o n i c s  
-- 
T h i s  s y s t e m  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  d e t e c t  c r a c k s  o r  f l a w s  w h e t h e r  o r  not t h e y  ic ~ l i ,  
S ens i t i v i ty  wh ich  i s  independent  of cab in  p r e s s u r e  i s  t en t a t ive  a t  p r c  : ,ent ,  
An e s t i m a t e  b a s e d  on MDAC e x p e r i m e n t a l  d a t a  i nd ica t e s  a f law 0, 76 .r 0, 0076 
x 0. 038  mm d e e p  c a n  b e  d e t e c t e d  a t  d i s t a n c e  a s  g r e a t  a s  2. 5  m. E x p e r i -  
m e n t a l  d a t a  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a m o r e  p r e c i s e  m e a s u r e m e n t  ol  s e n s r t e v -  
i t y  a s  a  func t ion  of d i s t a n c e  a n d  f l aw  s i z e .  
3. 5. 3 Acous t i c  E m i s s i o n  
P a s s i v e  m o n i t o r i n g  i s  des igned  t o  d e t e c t  a  g rowing  f law be fo re  i t  ~ ~ 1 1 1 n l r :  t r  
i n  a  l e a k  o r  r u p t u r e .  Sens i t i v i ty  of de t ec t ion  i s  independent  of cabin  pr-c: ssi ; r tb 
Acous t i c  e m i s s i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  a r e  capable  of d e t e c t i n g  c r a c k  growtl? incrLt  - 
- 6  2 
m e n t s  a s  s m a l l  a s  6. 5  x 10 c m  a t  d i s t a n c e s  r a n g i n g  up t o  abou t  6 nl, 
3,  5. 4 I m p a c t  Gagc 
I lnpac t  gage r e s p o n s e  i s  g e n c r a t e d  by the  i m p u l s e  i m p a r t e d  t o  the  pi-essi11 I. 
w a l l  w h e t h e r  o r  not a  l e a k  i s  p roduced .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m o s t  meaningfu l  
m e a s u r e n ~ e n t  of t hc  s m a l l e s t  e v e n t  d e t e c t e d  can  be  e x p r e s s e d  in  t e r ~ m s  c v i  l 1 i c  
i m p u l s e  i ~ m p a r t e d  t o  t h e  wal l .  An e s t i m a t e  of s e n s i t i v i t y  b a s e d  on MDAC 
- 2 
w o r k  i s  t h a t  i m p u l s e s  g r e a t e r  1,han 1 x 10 d y n e - s e c  can  be d e t e c t e d  at , 
d i s t a n c e  of up t o  6 m. The  l a r g e r  t he  m o m e n t u m  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  p r e s s t ~ r i  
wal l ,  t he  g r e a t e r  t he  r a n g e  of de t ec t ion .  T h e  r e s p o n s e  of t h i s  systcru? L L  
i ndependen t  of cab in  p r e s s u r e .  
3. 5. 5 Sea l  Leak  De tec to r  
The  t h e r m i s t o r  l e a k  d e t e c t o r  h a s  e x p e r i m e n t a l 1  y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  tlzc capai,r i ~ t y  
-6 t o  d e t e c t  lcalr r a t e s  i n  t he  4. 54 x t o  4. 5 4  x kg (10 t o  l0*- '  !b~ 1i.r 
d a y  r a n g e .  T h i s  s e n s i t i v i t y  wo uld e s t e n d  o v e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  r a n g e  froi-i? 
4  2 4. 8 2  t o  10. 1 x  10 N / m  . Such l e a k  r a t e s  a r e  wi th in  t h e  n o r m a l  diffusron 
r a t e s  of a  s e a l .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t he  t h e r m i s t o r  d e t e c t o r  would p rov ide  s S l ~ ' ~ 1 1  
e v e n  unde r  n o r i ~ i a l  s e a l  ope ra t ion .  L e a k  r a t e  s ens i t i v i ty  d a t a  f o r  elcc:ror;iL 
h y g r o m e t r y  and c a p a c i t o r  t e  chnique s  have  not b e e n  d e t e r m i n e d ,  h u t  both 
m e t h o d s  a r e  expec ted  t o  yield l o w e r  s e n s i t i v i t y  t h a n  the  t h e r m i s t o r  typc 
3 .  5,6 Por tab le  Leak Detector-Thermistor Type 
The data in Table 3 - 3  w e r e  der ived f r o m  exper iments  conducted during the 
cou r se  of th is  p r o g r a m  (constant-flow-rate conditions). 
These  r e su l t s  a r e  based on ideal l abora tory  conditions with the sensor  r ight  
over the l eak ,  The actual  operation of a por table  ins t rument  i s  not l ikely t o  
y ie ld  such optimum re su l t s .  
Table  3-3 
SENSITIVITY O F  PORTABLE LEAK DETECTOR 
P r e s s u r e  Leak  Rate  Equivalent Hole Size  (d ia l  - 
N / m  2 p s i a  kg lday  l b /day  cm in. 
- 
Section 4 
DA-MAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR ONBOARD LEAKS 
Befo re  an  analysis  of onboard leaks  can be conducted, it  i s  n e c e s s a r y  ec; 
define the  l imi t s  of fluids to be investigated.  In any closed environment  
containing people and operat ing equipment, numerous  contaminants w i l l  
accumulate  in the a tmosphere .  Some of these  will be outgassing f r c~ rn  
m a t e r i a l s  of const ruct ion and habitability, o the r s  would be byproducts oi 
chemica l  reac t ions  and metabolic p roces  s e s .  Still  othe r s  will be Los s e s  
of logist ic f luids by leakage.  Selecting a l l  ca tegor ies  fo r  investigatscn 
would enta i l  the selection of different  equipment fo r  m o r e  than 100  clrlferent 
chemica l  compounds and e lements ,  and not a l l  contaminants could he in-  
cluded in  the  ana lys i s .  This analysis  concentrated on se lect ing leak 
detection equipment fo r  f luids commonly found in  E C / L S  sys tems .  T y p ~ a l  
p r o c e s s e s  of these  sy s t ems  a r e  the Sabat ier  react ion fo r  carbon dioxrde 
reduction,  which produces  wate r  and methane and wate r  e lec t ro lys i s ,  u ; i i ~ i ~ I ~  
p roduces  oxygen and hydrogen and u se s  po tass ium hydroxide a s  an electxrcj- 
lyte. The analysis  a l s o  includes consideration of equipment fo r  detcactang leaits 
f r o m  logist ics s t o r e s  such a s  water ,  oxygen, hydrogen, freon,  o r  other i oo 'an t ,  
I t  has  been a s sumed  that  the m a t e r i a l s  of construction and habitabil-ity u5ed 
in the  spacecra f t  have been se lected with c a r e .  Thus,  outgassing of  
m a t e r i a l s  will produce minute quanti t ies of t r a c e  contaminants whereas a 
leak f r o m  operating equipment o r  logist ic s t o r e s  wil l  produce quantitses 
f a r  i n  exces s  of the levels  descr ibed  for outgassing.  This does  not mean 
that  the  equipment studied cannot detect  m ~ n u t e  quanti t ies ( pa r t s  per mi i l  ]on 
l eve l s )  nor  does  i t  e l iminate  equipment suitable for outgas detect1012 
bejng used for  logis t ic  fluid leak detection.  In many  ca se s ,  the best  p l e i r  of 
detection equipment available will p c r f o r m  both functions. 
4.  1 SOURCES O F  QNBOARD LEAKS 
The mater ia l s  to be monitored by the onboard leakage subsystem were  
selected utilizing the following c r i te r ia :  
A.  Vehicle and logistical supplies s imi l a r  t o  those identifi-d in the 
10, 1-m-dia Space Station Phase  B definition study. 
B General  consideration to the fa i lure  modes and effects analyses  
and safety analysis .  
G Detailed analysis  of the possible fa i lure  or  se r ious  degrading of 
subsystems contained in the EC/LS sys t em based on 90-day 
manned tes t  experience.  
Prel l rnrnary review of the available data indicated that the mos t  c r i t i ca l  
functlon of the onboard leakage sys tem i s  to avoid contamination of the c rew 
c ompartn2ent and to detect  incipient  degradation of E C  / LS system.  Another 
a r e a  requir ing attention i s  the stabilization and attitude control  ( S / A C )  
13 1-opellant s to rage  tanks, lines, and valves, The propellant for  the l a rge r  
Ik rus t e r s  1s co i~s ide red  to be N L--i used a s  a monopropellant (catalytically 2 4 
t-:ecorr,posed). The propellants for the srrlall t h rus t e r s  a r e  CO and CH4 2 
f rom the Sabatier reac tor ,  While fa i lure  of propellant components will not 
1:keEy coz~tarninate the crew compartment,  leakage would degrade the attitude 
c ontro'i capability, 
Gonsideration of the E C / L S  system i s  dependent upon the specific p roces ses  
utilized to recover  metabolic waste .  The EG/LS sys t em for the Space 
Station provides cabin a tmosphere  control  and purification, water  and waste 
management,  p r e s s u r e  suit support, and thermal  control. P r i m a r y  
characterast ic  s  of the EC / LS sys tem include the following: 
A .  The atmosphere  i s  nearly sea  level. I-fowever, in accordance 
with the guidelines and constra ints ,  the sys tem i s  designed to  
2 
operate in a variable a tmosphere  of 4. 8 x l o 4  N / m  (7 .  0 ps ia)  
5 2 to 1, 0 l  x EO N / m  ( 14. 7 ps i ) ,  with a par t ia l  p r e s s u r e  
4 2 
oi: oxygen constant at  2. 16 x 10 N / m  (3.  1 psi ) .  
B. Two 12-man  subsys t ems  a r e  provided,  one fo r  the comparrnien 
(defined a s  a volume of space  ei?closedby p r e s s u r e - r e s l s t a n l  
s t r u c t u r e )  which includes Det h s  1 and 2, and one fo r  fhc ( oi??lpcl f - 
ment  which includes Decks  3 and 4 .  The tunnel  can  be r e l c r e r , c ~ : ~ * ~  
to e i t he r  subsys t em,  
6 .  The subsys t em provided ha s  full wa te r  rc.covcry; that I s ,  21 \I  c 
w a t e r  i s  r ecovered  in the Space Station than i s  required for 
drinking and washing.  The subsys tem a l s o  ha s  pa r t i a l  O2 -ccc?- i*!-y 
the  shor tage  i s  made  up by wa t e r  contained in the food. 
D. The E C / L S  s y s t e m  provrdes methane and unreacted G O 2  to  'hi: 
p r o p u l s ~ o n  system w l ~ l c h  u se s  these  gases  a s  propel lants  i( r nr1>1 i  
k e e p ~ n g  and CMG desatura i lon 
E. The to ta l  hea t  generated In the Space Station i s  r e jec ted  tc spac. 
through a segmented rad la to r  Integrated with the mic ron~c l eo : i~  
shield independent of the heat  d is t r ibut ion between comparttnerilz 
-4 total  m a s s  balance for  the E C  /LS s y s t e m  i s  shown in F i g u r e  4 -  I .  Inp t~ is  
a r e  food, wa t e r  contained in the food, and gaseous  nitrogen malieup.. O i  L F L I ~ ~  
a r e  leakage g a s e s ,  f eca l  wa t e r ,  mrscel laneous  sol ids  assoc ia ted  wit]- th 
metabol ic  p r o c e s  s ,  nonrecoverab le  wa te r  f r o m  ur ine  purlf icat lon,  t1~~~117 VC: 
and unreac ted  ca rbon  dioxide utilrzed by the propulsion subsys tem,  anti - 
wate r  su rp lus  p a r t  of which i s  used fo r  E V A  cooling. 
The wash  wa t e r  and condensate r e cove ry  a s semb ly  pur i f i es  80 per\cenr: o! 
the  condensate  and wash  w a t e r ,  the 2 0  pe rcen t  res idue  i s  cycled to the u I--c" 
w a t e r  r e cove ry  a s semb ly .  The re ,  the res rdue ,  the ur ine ,  and the i,i-*mi, 
f lush  wate r  a r e  pur i f ied  a t  a  99 pe rcen t  eff iciency;  the  only wa t e r  I r5t rs f rzLz 
contained i n  the rep laceab le  wicks ,  The ca rbon  dioxide i s  conve r t e~ i  r : i t \  
wa t e r  by the  Saba t ie r  r e a c t o r .  The purrfled wa t e r  f r o m  the v7ate.r rec,,.i/i>rjr 
units  and the  Sabat ier  wa te r  provide wa t e r  for e lec t ro lys i s  and the ~ a : c - -  
consumed by the c r e w  In exces s  of that  provlded in the food. The , - iecL 
r o ly s i s  a s s emb ly  p rov ides  the oxygen requ i red  fo r  breathing and tie a ~ ?  il~L:t 
los t  because  of leakage.  The G H  and unreacted ca rbon  dioxide a r c  LraxE - 4 
£ e r r e d  to  the propulsion sys tem where  they a r e  used a s  propellantc, 131" 

orbit  -keeping and CMG de saturation. The total sys tem provides exce s s 
water ,  most  of which i s  used for  cooling during E V A  events. A srnallel- 
surplus  provides a contingency that can be used for experiments and a n  
allowance for uneaten food or  water  lost  in  t r a sh  disposal. 
The gaseous nitrogen i s  provided to make up fo r  nitrogen lost due to  leakage 
and to other miscellaneous losses  (e.  g . ,  60 conversion and fecal wasle 2 
collection). 
The water lost  due to t r a s h  disposals i s  not shown on this m a s s  balance 
because the amount actually lost  by the Space Station i s  not known. If I.[: 
develops that this amount i s  beyond the surplus shown, then additional water 
for  producing gaseous oxygen would have to be ~ r o v i d e d  or  water recovery 
f r o m  t r a s h  could be considered. 
The assemblies  provided on Decks 1 and 2 and Decks 3 and 4 each have the 
capability to support 12 men.  The tunnel atmosphere can be interchanged 
with either sys tem through the valving and interconnecting ducting; however, 
the atmosphere for  Decks 1 and 2 and for Decks 3 and 4 a r e  not intermixed 
normally through the ventilation system. Cross-linking between asserr,k>iies 
i s  provided, however, to allow one assembly to serve  a s  an installed spare 
for  the other. 
With this  concept, i f  a major emergency occurs  such a s  a f i r e ,  d e c o n ~ p r e s -  
sion, o r  massive contamination, i t  will affect only the atmosphere in  haif 
of the Space Station. The crew will always be able to live in the other 
compartment within the t ime limit  established by the amount of consurr~abie s 
onboard a t  the t ime of the emergency. This concept a lso easily accarnr-rio- 
dates the 24-man crew during the overlap period. The thermal  controX 
circui ts  a r e  a l so  designed to be completely independent so that if f r r e  drsabkes 
the heat- t ransport  loops in either compartment,  i t  does not affect the entire 
Space Station. 
4 . 2  DESCRIPTION O F  SELECTED ONBOARD LEAK 
DETE43TICPN SYSTEMS 
The onboard leak detection sy s t ems  moni tor  leakage of the following 
EC /LS  ma te r i a l s  f r o m  the sou rce s  indicated, 
A. Hydrogen ( f r o m  e lec t ro lyzer ) .  
B . Alnmonia ( f r o m  ur ine  and waste  collection and recovery  subsys tems  1, 
61;. Carbon monoxide ( f rom overheated equipment o r  spontaneous 
combustion).  
f;BS Total  hydrocarbons (CH f r o m  Sabatier  r eac to r ) .  4 
E. Water  ( t he rma l  control  loop, potable wa te r ,  e lec t ro lyzer ,  Sabat ier  
product wa t e r ,  u r ine  collection subsys tem) .  
F.  Po t a s s ium hydroxide (e lec t ro lyzer ) .  
G. F r o n s  ( f r o m  GO2-  cleaned components). 
PI, Oxygen ( f rom ups t r eam of two-gas).  
I, Nitrogen ( f r o m  u p s t r e a m  of two-gas). 
I t ems  A, D, and H represen t  explosion o r  combustion hazards .  I t em C 
r ep re sen t s  a poisoning hazard ,  I tem F represen ts  a caust ic  burn  hazard ,  
I tems R, E, and G r ep re sen t  potential operational  degradation of specific 
subsys tems ,  I t em I represen ts  potential leakage of a tmosphere .  
The logic flow d i ag rams  f o r  each  of the above ma te r i a l s  a r e  presented In 
F i g u r e s  4 - 2  through 4 - 10. The d i ag rams  define information and decisiorns 
requ i red  to de tec t  and troubleshoot l eaks .  The logic d i ag rams  a s s u m e  a 
vehicle configuration s i m i l a r  to  the Space Station wherein  t he r e  a r e  twa com- 
pa r tmen t s ,  each  with a separa te  EC/LS. The ventilation c i rcula t ion of i:he 
compar tments  i s  not normal ly  in termixed.  However, cross- l inking between 
t hem i s  provided to allow one assembly  to ac t  a s  an  instal led spa re  fo r  the 
o the r ,  This  al lows flexibility in  ca se  leakage si tuations a r i s e  in  which the 
t ime  to  find and r epa i r  the  leak would allow excess ive  contarnination of the 
com~par tment  a tmosphere .  In such a situation, i t  would be prudent to secure 
the leaking subsystem and t r ans f e r  operat ions  to the standby unit. The l ea l<  
YES 
IS THE RE A 
KOH LEAK IN 
ELECTROLYZER 
LEAK I N  AN ELECTROLVZER MODULE. RECOMMEND MODULE BE SECURED WITHIN NEXT 30 MtNUBES TO @ AVOID EXPLMiYE MIXTURES OF HYDROGEN. MEAN TIME TO REPLACE MODULE IS 0.5 HR (REFERENCE 
APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE). 
LEAK IN ELECTROLYZER PLUMBING. RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE SECURING OF ELECTROLYZER TO AVOID 
EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE. RECOMMEND STARTING STANDBY UNIT. MEAN TIME TO FIND AND REPAIR LEAK 
IS 2.7 HR (REFERENCE APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE). 
@ LEAK IN SABATIER PLUMBING. RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE SECURING OF UNIT TO AVOID EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES OF Hz. RECOMMENDSTARTING STANDBY UNIT. MEAN TIME TO FIND AND REPAIR LEAK 1% 
1.8 HR PER APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
LEAK I N  H2 LINE BETWEEN ELECTROLVZER AND SABATIER ON DECKS 1 AND 2. CABIN H2 WILL  APPROACH 
EXPLOSlON HAZARD IN 72 HR. MEAN TIME TO FIND AND REPAIR LEAK IS 5.3 HR PER AWLICABLE 
MAlNTENANCE PROCEDURE. EXPECT DEGRADED OPERATION OF SABATIER REACTOR. 
Figure 4-2. Hydrogen Leak Logic 
I NO ACTION I 
IS THERE A LEAK IN 
1, URINE COLLECTOR 
2. HOLDING TANKS (2) 
3, FEED LINE TO WICK 
@ THERE 15 A LEAK IN THE CLOSED-CYCLE EVAPORATOR. RECOMMEND REPAIR WITHIN 100 HR TO 
AVOID BUIL.DUP OF NH3 AND N,Oy MEAN TIME TO LOCATE AND REPAIR IS 2.7 HR PER 
APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
@ THERE IS A LEAK. RECOMMEND REPAIR WITHIN 4 HR TO MAINTAIN SANITARY CONDITIONS. LEAK IS X METERS DOWNSTREAM FROM DRAIN. MEAN TIME TO FIND AND REPAIR LEAK IS 0,8 MA P f  R 
APPLICABLE MAlNTE NANCE PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-3. Ammonia Leak Logic 
CH4 GREATER THAN 900 rng/m3 I 
a WARNING - C0 AND CH4 CONCENTRATIONS INDICATE UNPLANNED COMBUSTION ON DECK " r O W  2, RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE SEARCH OF AREA TO AVOID TOXIC LEVEL OF CO. 
@ WARNING - CO CONCENTRATION ON DECKS 1 AND 2 IS CONTAMINATING ATMOSPHERE. BRn@IN UNKNOWN, CHECK FOR MOT EQUIPMENT, AND CHECK FOR PROPER OPERATION OF CATALYTIC 
OXIDIZER. 
Figure 4-4. Carbon Monoxide Leak Logic 
-- 
) CH4 GREATER THAN 1,000 mg/rn3 1 
YES 
I CO GREATER THAN 17.5 rng/rn3 I 
a WARNING - CHq AND CO CONCENTRATIONS INDICATE UNPLANNED COMBUSTION ON DECKS I AND 2. RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE SEARCH OF AREA TO AVOID ATMOSPHERE CONTAMINATION; ALSO CHECK 
CATALYTIC OXIDIZER FOR PROPER TEMPERATURE LEVEL OF 650'~. 
@ WARNING - LEAK IN SABATIER EXHAUST LINE. RECOMMEND SECURING UNIT WITHIN NEXT 0.1 dR TO AVOID TOXIC LEVEL OF HYDROCARBONS. RECOMMEND STARTING STANDBY UNIT. MEAN TIME 
TO LOCATE AND REPAIR LEAK IS 4.2 HR PER APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-5. Methane (Combustion) Leak Logic 
points can  then be  pursued  without t ime  constra ints .  Since the  range of 
potential  l eaks  and the r e p a i r  requ i rements  a r e  so  d ive r se ,  the  leak 
detection subsys  t e m  can provide only a fixed level  of information r e g a r c ~ i n g  
l eak  location and what action should be taken to r epa i r  the leak.  Operataon 
and act ion to de t e rmine  the  exact  location and r epa i r  p rocedure  mus t  be 
done by a c rewman.  F o r  onboard leaks ,  the leak detection subsys tem tar-oug11. 
the  mul t ip rocessor  should provide information defining the leaking f l u i d  a 
graphic  display of what l ines  c a r r y  t h i s  f luid,  including line routing locnticsi? 
and which por t ions  of the l ine a r e  access ib le ,  and an es t imate  of t ime  rc- 
quired to locate and r epa i r  the  leak. In addition, the mul t ip rocessor  should 
provide informat ion a s  to expected consequences of operation withont repair ,  
With th is  informat ion,  the c rewmen could make  decis ions  a s  to use of sta~lidbgr 
a s sembl i e s ,  p r i o r i t y  of r e p a i r  ac t iv i t ies ,  e t c .  The determinat ion of leak 
location would enta i l  s eve ra l  p rocedu re s .  
IS CURRENT FLOWING I N  FOLLOWING 
WATER LEAK DETECTORS? 
NO YES 
WASTE CONTROL 
SUBSYSTEM 
H WATER 
P 
- .. - . . - . . . . . . . .- I 
POTABLE WATER 
SUBSYSTEM 
CON DENSATE 
COLLECTOR 
ELECTROLYZER 
H z 0  LINES 
1 (OHMS) 1 1- 
SABATlER 
H z 0  LINES 
@ WATER LEAK I N  SUBSYSTEM. LOCATION IS X METER DOWNSTREAM OF REFERENCE POINT. FAlLLll iE TC REPAIR LEAK COULD CAUSE SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF SUBSYSTEM. MEAN TIME TO LOCATE AND 
REPAIR LEAK IS 2.7 HR PER APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE, 
Figure 4-6. Water Leak Logic 
-m7-m%m-m 
IS CURRENT FLOWING IN KOH LEAK DETECTOR ON DECKS 1 AND 2 7  
IS CURRENT FLOWING IN KOH LEAK DETECTOR ON DECKS 3 AND 4? 
WHICH MODULE? 
1 THROUGH 12 
THAN THAT IN THERMAL 
CONDITIONING DUCT? 
LEAK IN  ELECTROLYZER MODULE. RECOMMEND MODULE BE SECURED WITHIN NEXT 30 MINUTES To AVOID 
EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES OF HYDROGEN. MEAN TIME TO REPLACE MODULE IS 0.5 HR PER APPLICABLE 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
LEAK IN ELECTROLYZER MODULE. RECOMMEND INSPECTION OF MODULE TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF KOH 
LEAK. KOH WILL CAUSE SEVERE SKIN BURNS. MEAN TIME TO REPLACE MODULE IS 0.5 HR PER APPLICABLE 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-7. Potassium Hydroxide Leak Logic 
DISPLAY 9 
(7-J FREON IS INDICATED IN C O ~  FEED TO M B A T i E R  REACTOR. THE ALTERNATE CHARCOAL FILTER :rns 8rF.r PLACED I N  SERVICE. RECOMMEND THAT EXPENDED FILTER BE REPLACED WITHIN 3 DAYS TO AVOlD  
DEGRADING REACTOR OPERATION. MEAN TIME TO REPLACE FILTER IS 0.4 HR PER APPLICABLE 
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-8. Freon Leak Logic 
44 
IS TOTAL 0 2  PULSE COUNT FOR 
PAST 24 HR LESS TI-IAN X? 
I NO ACTION I 
/ DISPLAY I 
LEAK I N  0 2  LINE TO ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM. RECOMMEND REPAIR WITHIN 24 MR 7 0  4VOi  1 @ SERIOUS ERRORS I N  GAS STORAGE INVENTORY. MEAN TlME TO LOCATE AND REPAIR LEAK IS 4.5 
PER APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-9. Oxygen Leak Logic 
--*- ----* s 
IS TOTAL N 2  PULSE COUNT FOR 
PAST 24 HR LESS THAN Y? 
YES 
- 
@ LEAK I N  N2 LINE TO ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM. OVERBOARD LEAK DETECTION CAPYSILITY IS DEGRADED. MEAN TIME TO LOCATE AND REPAIR LEAK IS 4.5 HR PER APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE 
PROCEDURE. 
Figure 4-10. Nitrogen Leak Logic 
The ma in  methods  a r e :  
A. Scanning the  suspected a s s e m b l i e s ,  l ines ,  and f i t t ings with a 
d i rec t iona l  u l t ra  sonic t r an s l a to r  operat ing a t  about 4 0  kHz p a ~ ' \ ~ l g e c ,  
a s  a por table  leak de tec to r .  This i s  a rapid  and convenient rr~ethsd 
of leak location,  but i t  i s  suscept ib le  to noise  generat ion by r o a r 1 7  
dev ices  i n  nearby  a r e a s .  
B .  P r e s s u r i z i n g  the  suspected a s semb ly  with a working f l u i d  and 
s c a n n l n ~  wi th  a portable dcvice specif ical ly sensi t ive  to  t h ~  prc.7- 
su t - i z~ng  rnc,tiitz~ri. One pract ica l  inediuin i s  carbon t i ~ o s i d c .  S-ini~cc~ 
t hc  g a s  i s  gcnmatcrl  by nian, it is  continuously a~ra i l ab lc  withoiaL ;. 
wc~iglzt pcxnalty. It possc  s s c  s  unique chcmica l  and physical p ~ - o p c  r- t  1 ( - +  
suitcti t o  portablc gas  phasc dctcction, does  not contributtx t o  ,-i!i31 j 5 -  
phcr lc  cont,jn1inat~on, and 1s continuously rcrnovcd  fro^?^ thc ~ L ! I ? : : S -  
phc I-(, by thc EC/ 1,s systelm. 
In addition, the gas i s  considered to be relatively iner t  and the only 
fluid indentified in the Space Station with which i t  would reac t  rs 
potas s ium hydroxide contained in the electrolyzer . Since KOH 
leakage i s  monitored by a separate  scheme which provides leakage 
location information, a l l  situations a r e  considered. 
The liquid leak monitoring t ransducers  utilize two layers  of resis t ive tape 
separated by a thin layer of porous insulative paper. One external surface 
of the tape i s  coated with pressure-sensi t ive adhesive. The tape i s  applied 
along the plumbing containing water ,  urine,  o r  KOH solution. A small  
e lec t r ica l  potential i s  applied a c r o s s  the resis t ive tapes.  As long a s  the 
tape remains  d ry ,  cur rent  will not flow. If a leak occurs ,  however, the 
insulation i s  wetted and cur rent  will flow. The multiprocessor is  notified by 
the cur rent  flow and measures  the apparent resis tance which will vary w:th 
the distance along the tape to the wetted segment. The multiprocessor 
displays data a s  to which segment of the tape network i s  shorted and the 
distance f r o m  some reference point to the leak. 
It i s  of interest  to note that with the exception of the liquid leak transducer::, 
a l l  gas t ransducers  a r e  presently defined a s  par t  of the t race  contaminants 
subsystem. This i s  a logical case  of using a t ransducer  to  warn the c r e w -  
man that his atmosphere i s  being contaminated and utilizing the capability 
of the mult iprocessor  to provide additional information concerning leak 
location and correct ive action required. 
The onboard leakage subsystem described above meets the following 
requirements  : 
A. The subsystem monitors leakage of a l l  common and cr i t ical  gases  
and fluids associated with Space Station E C  /LS sys tems.  
B, The subsystem utilizes a multiproces sor  only when an out-of - 
tolerance event (leak) occurs .  
C. The subsystem produces a maximum of essential  information in a 
minimum of t ime ,  
D. The subsys  t e m  ut i l izes  exis t ing gas  ana lys i s  t r an sduce r s ,  the rel?y 
minimizing weight penalty and maximizing s impl ic i ty .  
Leak detect ion of the  propulsion tankage i s  made difficult because  i t  i s  
influenced by the location of the tanks in the unp re s su r i z ed  compar tment ,  
Th is  tank bay contains N IEI p r e s s u r i z e d  by he l ium (He) and s epa ra t e  2 4 
a ccumula to r s  containing methane (CH4 ), CO and wate r .  The c o ~ ~ ~ p a r t r n e n i  2 ' 
vent can be c losed and the  compar tment  p r e s s u r i z e d  fo r  maintonance pui*xj:-us t i 
in  the event  of extended c r e w  attention.  In the c a s e  of a n  N2H4 o r  CE i e a h  4 
requ i r ing  c r e w  maintenance,  EVA su i t s  would be  advisable  to avoid t o x i c  
ef fec t s .  In addition, i t  i s  questionable that  any of the p r e s su r i z ing  a t~xios-  
phere  could he salvaged (pumped into the c r e w  compar tment )  if it 1s ~011- 
t a m ~ n a t e d  to  any extent  with N 2 H 4  Leaks  in the  tankage compar tment  i v x i  ~ i .  
diff icult  t o  detect  if  the vent a r e a  i s  l a rge .  Th is  i s  because  the l e a k t n g  ~ic ,d i ,~mi  
will vapor ize  and vent t o  space  before i t  i s  detected. F o r  maximurn s e ~ s r ~ z v i c y ,  
the leak s e n s o r  should be configured a s  a n  in tegral  p a r t  within the apprarii-11 
sect ion of the  vented opening. A m a s s  s p e c t r o m e t e r  i s  a suitable detector PG- 
this  application. T h e r e  i s  a  commonal i ty  of m a s s  peaks  assoc ia ted  wit17 N 2 -  4" 
CH4, and C O Z .  However, resolution of the  m a s s  12, 14, and 16 peaks bhorxl i  
allow determinat ion of the leaking compound, After  p ressur iza t ion ,  
could be located with flow visualizat ion techniques,  F o r  example,  a jet  o l  
mois t  C 0 2  could be impinged along the hyrazine  l ines  and the reac.tron d t  t r e  
leak point would f o r m  a white fog of (NH ) C03.  NH40H could likcwisc 13c 3 2 
used t o  find GO2 leaks ,  
4 . 3  ONBOARD L E A K  DETECTION AND LOCATION CONCEPTS 
4. 3. 1 M a s s  Spec t rome te r  /Gas  Chromatograph /Gas  F r a c t o  m e t e r s  
The f luids d i s cus sed  in  the p rev ious  section a r e  commonly found in space 
vehic les  and a r e  diff icult  t o  detect  by u se  of pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  s e n s c r s ,  Tlqc 
organic  hea t  t r a n s f e r  fluids genera l ly  have v e r y  low vapor  p r e s s u r e s  
and spec la l  sample  concentra t ion (absorpt ion)  columns a r e  requ i red  to ciezect 
t h e m  in c losed a tmosphe re s .  P r e s e n t  p r ac t i c e  h a s  been to  pump atrncrrs- 
phe r i c  g a s  s amp le s  through the column for  a per iod of 30 to 45 mir,utes 
and then to thermal-vacuum desorb the column into a vapor fractorneter nac 
m a s s  spectrometer  in se r i e s .  This portion of the determination requires 
about 30 minutes. The whole procedure requires  a sizable amount of equip-  
ment  and an hour delay for  data acquisition. This method does not a p p e a r  
useful f o r  space vehicles at  i ts  present state of development. 
Mass  spec t rometers  for  monitoring vehicle atmospheres  have been under 
development for over 10 years .  The principle of operation involves the 
electronic ionization of a continuous gas sample s t r e a m  expanded to a 
low p ressu re ;  e lectrostat ic  acceleration of the ions which then unde rg:a 
magnetic field deflection to separate  masses .  The ion-current mea sur enla; lt 
a t  strategically located electrodes i s  used to establish species concentratror 
A newer method called "time -of -flight1' utilizes pulse techniques to acce ie r  - 
a te  ion bunches into a drift  chamber and m a s s  separation i s  determine6 lay 
the relative a r r iva l  t ime at  the single ion collector.  
Instrument vacuum may be obtained by two means.  One i s  to vent the 
chamber to space vacuum. The second i s  by use of an ion pump placed a s  
an integral par t  of the detector chamber.  Sample gas loss  typically a r n o u n r s  
to l e s s  than 0. I g / h r .  F o r  space application, instrument design problems 
re la te  to sensitivity and resolution of higher m a s s  numbers a s  well a s  
weight and power. F o r  example, to increase  resolution for  the higher 
m a s s e s  ( 2 5 0 )  requi res  a large increase in the magnetic field (weight) an6 
l a rge r  detection chamber,  resulting in significant increases  in i n s t r u m e ~ t  
weight and size.  The time-of -fl ighttype of m a s s  spectrometer  can handie 
high m a s s  compounds, but tends to fragment them into s impler  compounds 
and computer techniques a r e  required to determine the original compound 
by  mat r ix  methods of the fragment signals. All of this adds complexity to 
the system. Until more  knowledge i s  produced defining specific high-;x--as 5 
compounds associated with impending f i r e ,  toxic, o r  other malfunction 
events, there  seems  little justification in  designing and using m a s s  
spec t rometers  for  anything but pr imary  gases  (0 N , GO2, and HZO)* 2" 
Continued development of flight- type m a s s  s p e c t r o m e t e r s  w11 1 2 tlob, 
m e a s u r e m e n t s  of h igher  m a s s  (n2olecular weights of 15 0 to 2 5 0 )  c o i ? ~ p o u n d i ,  
Dur ing the 90-day  manned t e s t ,  about 100 compounds w e r e  identified rn rile 
a tmosphe re ;  fortunately,  mos t  of the m a t e r i a l s  w e r e  t h e r e  only in  t r a ce  
concentra t lons .  The p r e sence  of many of t he se  compounds ha s  been atCr r -  
buted to the va s t  use  of cleaning f lu ids ,  solvents ,  and p l a s t i c i z e r s  in the 
fabr ica t ion of components ,  w i r e  insulat ion,  and potting compounds.  Thzc 
compl ica tes  the  p rob l em of obtaining damage  control  informat ion f r o m  
ana lys i s  of compounds in  the c losed a tmosphe re ,  s ince  the " s igna tures  o i  
i n t e r e s t  wil l  v a r y  with the components used to fabr ica te  the vehic le .  
Work r e m a i n s  to be done in this  a r e a  and valuable informat ion can be ghined 
uti l izing a Space Station damage  control  s imula to r .  This wil l  r equ l r e  tl-e 
capabil i ty to  p e r f o r m  var ious  types  of gas  ana lys i s .  Methods should rnc IblC;e 
vapor  f r a c tome te r s ,  m a s s  spec t rome te r s ,  and wet chemis t ry .  Suc11 eq..111,- 
men t  c an  be  located within the  s imula to r  o r  in  a l abora to ry  n e a r  the s ~ r r ~ x : a t o r  
s o  that  a tmosphe re  s amp le s  can be conveniently taken and analyzed,  " r k e  
~ n s t r u m e n t s  may  be the  c o m m e r c i a l  configuration,  s ince  t he i r  purposz  to 
define the analytic r equ i r emen t s  of fu tu re  - generat ion flight i n s t ru r r~en t s ,  
Any discuss ion of onboard l eaks  and the i r  detect ion by use  of vapor a n a h  z ~ s  
m u s t  in ce r t a i n  a s p e c t s  ut i l ize o r  ove r l ap  the discipline of t r a c e  contarry-na- 
tion detection and control .  To provide a m o r e  reasonab le  scope fo r  thi5 
Investigation,  t r a c e  contamination detection wil l  be defined a s  m o n ~ t o r l n g  "he 
vehicle fo r  vapor  spec i e s  which a r e  known to be  physiologically ha r~mf tJ  tc 
c r ewmen .  The damage  control  a spec t  of vapor  ana lys i s  i s  concerned wstl, 
inventory deplet ion and s y s t e m  f a i l u r e  prevent ion e f fo r t s .  As a n  exanlp le ,  a 
l eak  in a cooling wate r  l ine to the t h e r m a l  con t ro l  s y s t e m  might not be c ; E  
i n t e r e s t  in a t r a c e  contamination study, but would be  of g r ea t  i n t e r e s h n  3 
damage  control  s tudy a s  l o s s  of cooling wate r  could cause  the therrna* con- 
t r o l  s y s t e m  to fa i l .  
F r e o n s ,  such a s  T F  o r  12 ,  a r e  another  family  of compounds often Eounec 1.1 
c losed a t m o s p h e r e s .  Their  p r e sence  in  vehicle a tmosphe re s  s t e m s  f ~ o l r  
thei r  use  i n  cleaning fluids used on many mechnical  components of the 
vehicle.  These  compounds can be detected down to l e s s  than 5 ppm by use c i 
ord ina ry  vapor  f r ac tome te r  techniques.  The i n t e r e s t  i n  F r e o n  t r a c e s  11s 
cabin a tmosphe re s  i s  based on exper ience gained dur ing the recen t  90-day 
manned tes t .  The Sabat ier  r eac to r  cata lys t  was  poisoned during the i n ~ ~ i a :  
per iod of the t e s t .  The source  of poisoning was  suspected to be Freorr 'TF 
an agent  commonly used i n  cleaning many space cabin components.  The 
F r e o n  was  removed along with the carbon dioxide by the  a tmo spher lc  contr  
s y s t e m  and was  discharged along with carbon dioxide to the  Sabat ier  u n ~ f ,  
causing the r eac to r  to become disabled.  The p r cb l em was resolved by. 
placing a charcoa l  absorpt ion unit in the carbon dioxide feedline to the 
Sabat ier  unit to r emove  the F r e o n .  I t  i s  f u r t he r  suspected that  the H o p e a i i ~ e  
ca ta lys t  used in  the toxin bu rne r  was  adverse ly  affected by Freon- 
A sample  of white powder found by t h e  c r e w  on the toxin burner  discharge 
was  collected and passed  out f o r  chemical  ana lys i s .  Resul ts  indicate #be 
m a t e r i a l  was  mainly meta l l i c  ch lor ides .  I t  would appear  that the rnaterlal 
resu l ted  f r o m  the t h e r m a l  decomposit ion of F r e o n  in  the toxin burner  io 
f o r m  chlor ides  and probably f luor ides  with the Hopcalite ca ta lys t  and the 
s ta in less  s t e e l  and a luminum components of the unit.  I t  can be c o n c l ~ ~ d e c  
that  F r e o n  coming in  contact with hot components decomposes ,  allow~ipg 
the halogen f ragments  t o  reac t  with catalytic ma te r i a l s  to  the extent t r r ~ ~  
subsys tem fa i lu res  can resu l t .  
A f lame -ionization hydrocarbon detector  i s  recommended to rnoaitar - / c > i ~  c J 
which uti l ize Sabat ier  oxygen recovery  units a s  the r eac to r  exhaust  conrais, 
significant quanti t ies of methane.  An exhaust  leak rnto the vehicle repre- 
sen ts  both an explosive and a toxic haza rd .  During the 90-day t e s t ,  s t r c s e  
cor ros ion  of the exhaust line occurred-it i s  suspected the cor ros ion  rc s u ' r r  -1 
f r o m  F r e o n  decomposition-allowing exhaust  to escape  jnto the simrulaio r 
The event was  detected by a rapid i nc r ea se  in the a tmospher ic  h y d r o c ~ - b o i  
concentra t ion.  The c r ewmen  were  ins t ructed to find the leak by paln:ing 
the exhaust  f i t t ings with a bubble fluid. This e f f o r t w a s  unsuccessful ,  z n r  
the r eac to r  had t o  be secured.  The r eac to r  and plulnbing were  the^ 
p r e s s u r i z e d  with ca rbon  dioxide.  A flexible l ine was  connected to h e  
sampl ing  po r t  of a C02 ana lyzer  and used by the c r e w  to  sniff along the 
exhaust  line with the  r e s u l t  that  the leak was  quickly and eas i ly  found, even  
though the l eak  was  covered with t h e r m a l  insulat ion.  The CO anaiyrzel- vvas 2 
a Luft-type in f ra red  unit used to backup the four -gas  m a s s  spectr~r?:i.ic-r. ,  
Techniques  using C O  a r e  feas ib le  a s  a leak location medium f ~ r  ~ p z t  c 2 
vehicle plumbing.  Logist ical ly,  GO2 i s  continuously generated by rnaa it 
can  be  continuously removed f r o m  the vehicle a tmosphe re  by the  a l r nc?s -  
phe r i c  con t ro l  subsys tem.  Any l ine (liquid o r  g a s )  suspected of a leak t-ocid 
be p r e s s u r i z e d  f r o m  the CO s to rage  tank and sniffed using a porta Sic 2 
de t ec to r .  This  method ha s  some  l imi ta t ions .  While C02 i s  used a s  
f i re-ext inguishing agen t  f o r  many m a t e r i a l s ,  i t  will  chemical ly  r e a c t  w TI? 
a number  of reducing agen ts  and should not  be  used in l ines  c o n t a i r ~ ~ n g  the 
following m a t e r i a l s :  d iborane,  pentaborane,  decaborane ,  UDMM, N2H,. rzna 
NH3. 
i- QWC T A space vehicle using an  oxygen regenera t ion  s y s t e m  o r  a fuel  ce l l  9 
supply impl ies  the use  of hydrcgen and assoc ia ted  plumbing within iihe 
vehicle.  Leakage of hydrogen because  of i t s  unusual  cha r ac t e r i s t r c s  r e -  
p r e s e n t s  a significant  explosion haza rd .  This  ga s  ha s  a wide f l am~nab r i i t v  
l im i t  (4  to 94 pe r cen t )  and a low ignition t empe ra tu r e  (580°C). Ignitron zari 
be  ini t iated by ve ry  low energy  s o u r c e s .  F o r  example ,  a  spa rk  whlC7 s 
invisible to the naked eye cf only 20 micro jou les  of energy  wi l l  c ae~se  
ignit ion.  Detonations a r e  likely in a tmosphe r i c  m ix tu r e s  containing 18 59 
percen t  hydrogen in confined space s .  In detonations,  r eac t ion  propaga:scin 
i s  aided by a shock wave moving ahead of the reac t ion  zone. The shot-I\ w a  vc 
c o m p r e s s e s  and hea t s  the reac tan t  ga se s  to the ignition t empe ra tu r e .  T h ~ s  
effect  i s  great ly  re inforced by ref lec t ion of the shock wave f r o m  walls  a n d  
o ther  s t r u c t u r e s .  The resul t ing p r e s s u r e s ,  though of sho r t  durat ron,  c .zn 
produce des t ruc t ive  effects  on the confining wal ls .  Hydrogen wil l  d ~ f f t ~ s e  
through minute holes  and c r a c k s  a t  an impre s s ive  r a t e  due to i t s  low 
molecu la r  weight .  To p reven t  combustible m ix tu r e s  occu r r i ng  wlkhln t1.e 
vehicle,  combustible gas de t ec to r s  can be  used to give a n  a l a r m  and s e i  J r e  
the e lec t ro lys i s  unit before  a hazardous  level  occurs .  
The gas f r a c t o m e t e r s  should be f lexible enough to pe rmi t  utilization sf 
seve ra l  column m a t e r i a l s  and types of de t ec to r s .  The advice of exper--  
ienced labora tory  w o r k e r s  and the ins t rument  manufacturer  can be utzlized 
before  the  f inal  selection of ins t ruments  to obtain the bes t  fit  of equipinenr 
Wet chemis t ry  ha s  been utilized on the 60-and 90-day manned t e s t s  for  the 
determinat ion of NH N 0 SOZ, HCN, HZS, C lZ, and HC 1 .  3' x y" 
A p rope r  approach  to obtaining meaningful  data  i s  to build up the cornpnunc 
"s ignatures"  in  a s tep-wise  manne r .  This  can be accomplished by closing 
the s imula tor  p r i o r  to the instal lat ion of any equipment and taking gas  
s amp le s ;  the ini t ial  sample  would likely contain solvents and other  v o l a t ~ i e  
components of the i n t e r i o r  paint. Sampling would be accomplished a s  each 
subsys tem o r  component i s  added to the s imula tor .  Each  compound forxnd 
may  be cataloged a s  to i t s  subsys tem and location by document o r  coinpure * 
In addition, m a t e r i a l s  such a s  insulated w i r e  may  be placed i n  a bel l  jar aTcr 
an  over load condition applied. 
4, 3 . 2  Resis t ive  Tape Leak Detector and Locator  
The four -gas  m a s s  spec t rome te r  can be used for  OZ, N2, HZO, and CC 2 
l eaks .  Due to the  d ive r se  sou rce s  of H 0 in  a space vehicle,  cabin b1iii2dlcixty 2 
i s  not a useful p a r a m e t e r  for  monitoring water  line leaks .  The low sigrizS- 
to-noise  ra t io  of cabin humidity defeats  th is  approach.  In addition, ~ k e  
humidity control  unit will r emove  s i g n i f i c a n t r a t e s  of wate r  f r o m  the ~ ~ c l r ~ c ' c  
a tmosphere ,  f u r t h e r  complicating wate r  leak detection.  The detection a r f J  
location of other liquids leaking f r o m  plumbing and hardware  present ly  
r e l i e s  upon the detection of a l o s s  in liquid inventory,  v isual  appearan cc 
of the liquid, o r  detection of the vapors  by odor o r  ins t rumentat ion.  "?he 
pre sence  of insulation makes  the above methods m o r e  difficult and d e i d y s  
the appearance of the symptoms,  
A number  of tape methods have been considered fo r  the detection and wocai L O T  
of leaks.  One type i s  the visual  indicator tape which operates  by a co lo r  c:, ~ 1 - , ~ i i .  i- 
induced by a react ion with the leaking gas  o r  fluid, Commerc ia l  ceslo~ - c h ; : - l g ~ n ~  
tapes  a r e  available f o r  such fluids a s  hydrocarbons,  hydrazine,  and ~ir:,rr;c I" 
F o r  hydrogen, heat  f r o m  a palladium-hydrogen react ion changes the c ~ i  ,*- 
of a the rmo-chromic  paint impregnated in the tape (Reference  2 4 ) .  A s i  col-ta 
method involving an  e l ec t r i c a l  readout  based on a capaci tor  principle "la; 
been descr ibed  fo r  detecting micro leaks  in tankage (Reference 2 5 ) ,  !~ID1"167 
i s  p resen t ly  consider ing a concept utilizing two l a y e r s  of res i s t ive  lape 
separa ted  by a l aye r  of porous  insulating pape r .  This tape can be used  l e i  
provide an e l ec t r i c a l  signal  when a leak occu r s  and an indication of " c h c  
genera l  location. 
A. Conducting F lu ids  
I .  Individual Detec tors  
In c a s e s  where  a few potential leak s i t e s  may  be p r e d ~ c t e d  
such a s  nea r  valves ,  f i t t ings ,  o r  pumps,  a sma l l  detector  
instal led n e a r  the s i t e .  The detector  i s  a sma l l  foil e lec t rode ,  
faced with a wicking ma te r i a l  which i s  applied to the hardware 
nea r  the potential leak s i t e .  The plumbing i s  used a s  a grtliAl?a 
and a ve ry  sma l l  e l ec t r i c a l  potential i s  applied to the eEecr rode 
When a leak occu r s ,  the wicking ma te r i a l  becomes conduc,:ve, 
thus allowing a sma l l  cu r r en t  to flow which i s  then anrtpl~fic~~l 
and ac t iva tes  an a l a r m  o r  indicator .  There  i s  no cu r r en t  d r a ~ n  
until a  leak occurs .  F o r  safety considerat ions ,  voltage and 
cur ren t - l lmi t ing  r e s i s t o r s  can be used to prevent f l r e s  
2 .  Sys tem Detec tors  
A tota l  s y s t e m  detector  involves h igh- res i s tance  w i r e  o r  f i l ~ ~  
with an untreated fabr ic  Insulation that ac t s  as  wicklng 
ma te r i a l .  This w i r e  o r  f i lm i s  applied along the surface  01 
plumbing and hardware .  A galvanometer c i rcu i t  continui?i~ sl) 
o r  occasionally moni to rs  the r e s i s t ance  of the c i rcu i t  (no 
c u r r e n t  flow). A leak will  cause  conduction between tne wire 
and ground, thus changing the apparent  res i s tance  of the ci rctzl:, 
By measur ing  the new r e s i s t ance ,  the location along the wire 
and thus the s y s t e m  may be  approximated.  Complex s y s t c w s  
would r equ i r e  s eve ra l  w i r e s ;  however,  the change in T I F S L S I ~ I J C C  
of two o r  m o r e  de t ec to r s  could be used to compute exact  T c  &k 
locat ions .  
A var ia t ion of the above would involve coating the wi re  cr f iLnl:  
with an insulation m a t e r i a l  that i s  soluble i n  the fluid and righily 
applying i t  to the plumbing sur faces .  A leak would dissolve  Ci:e 
insulation, thus providing contact. These  sy s t ems  could be  
modified f o r  plast ic plumbing by using double wi re  o r  f i lrns,  
B. Nonconducting Fluids  
Essen t ia l ly  the s a m e  elect rode configuration a s  descr ibed  for 
the conductor individual de tec tors  i s  applicable,  except a 
high-frequency a l ternat ing potential i s  applied. The e lect rode 
a c t s  a s  a capaci tor  and the d ie lec t r i c  constant  d i f ference 
between a i r  and the leaking fluid will  produce a detectable 
change in capacitance when the  wick becomes  sa tu ra ted .  
A s y s t e m  detector  involving a soluble w i r e  insulation a s  
descr ibed  fo r  conducting f lu ids  i s  a l so  applicable to naa-  
conducting fluids with p rope r  choice of ma te r i a l s .  
Some of the advantages and unique fea tures  of the res i s t ive  tape are 
A,  Prov ides  a n  immedia te  e l ec t r i c a l  signal  when contacted by l e a k ~ n ~  
f luid.  
B, Uses  no power until actuated by leak.  
C By prope r  instal lat ion,  leaks  a r e  detected and the c h a r a c t e r ~ s k c  
of the  e l ec t r i c  signal  can be utilized to denote the location o r  
a r e a  of the leak.  
D,  Prov ides  e l ec t r i c a l  s ignals  upon being wetted by a nonconduci~ve 
fluid . 
F i g u r e s  4 -11A and 4-1 1B show some of the var ious  configurations the 
device may  a s s u m e .  F igu re  4 - 1 1 A  shows a c r o s s  section of e i ther  the 
spot detector  o r  an end view of the tape. F igu re  4 - 1  1B shows the seglnenl i: 
of longitudinal views of the two vers ions  of the tape. The devices a r e  
attached to the fitting, pipe, o r  ves se l  surface (1)  by the adhesive layer  $ 2 ) -  
The conductive f i lm ( 3 )  i s  then separated f r o m  the perforated cover 
conductive f i l m  (4)  by ei ther  an absorbent  wicking ma te r i a l  ( 5 )  (used with 
conducting fluids and a res i s tance  measuring device,  o r  a capacitance 
detector  with nonconducting fluids) , o r  a ma te r i a l  ( 6 )  which i s  soluble 
in the leaking fluid. 
Figure 3- 1 2  shows thv nlanner in which the tape. version can be used t o  c.~ltc,cC 
1t.aks in pipc%s ( I ) ,  flttings ( 2 ) ,  pumps ( 3 ) ,  or  valves (3), by placing thc iapc 
ill c lose  prc)xin~ity t o  t h e  suspclcted 1c.ak s i te ,  o r  placing the tap(. along * l ~ c  
plpe and relying on capil lary action t o  get the fluid between the c o n c i u c t l c ( ,  
laycrs  a n d  causv a signal i n  thc detector ( 5 ) .  Individual spot detectors  c o.uild 
l ~ e  placcxd at  locations ( 1 )  through (1). 
1. PIPE OR FITTING SURFACE 
2. ADHESIVE LAYER 
3. CONDUCTIVE FlLM 
4. PERFORATED COVER CONDUCTIVE FlLM 
5. WlCKlNG MATERIAL 
6. SOLUBLE MATERIAL 
Figure 4-1 1. Liquid Leak Detector Cross Sections 
4 VALVE PACKING 
ALARWAS ETC, 
3 PUMP PACKING 
Figure 4-1 2. Typical Liquid Leak Detector l nstallations 
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4. 3. 3 Solid-state Po lymer i c  Gas  Detector 
An unconventional detection technique i s  based on the applicat ion of polymei-ic 
organic  semiconductors .  Such a sol id-s ta te  s e n s o r  has  low weight, no m0.c xng 
p a r t s ,  and r equ i r e s  v e r y  l i t t le  power  f o r  i t s  operation. Substituted p04yacec.~~- 
lenes  have been used a s  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  the sol id-s ta te  sensor .  Po lymer  i'rlnls 
can be chemical ly  modified s o  that  the  effects  of substi tuents on t he i r  i ondis-- 
t ion and complexing capabil i ty can be observed.  Resis t iv i ty  measurements 
a r e  genera l ly  made  a s  they yield the g r ea t e s t  numer ica l  change with i n p u  o: 
contaminant,  Sensor  geomet ry  involves a lock-and-key me ta l  e lec t rode  on a 
g lass  subs t r a t e  with the po lymer  f i lm  a c r o s s  it. MDAC has  conducted a nuni- 
b c r  of pro jec t s  an the  synthes is  and cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of semiconducting ~rliiht"- 
r i a l s  and  t h e i r  r e la t i an  t o  contaminant detectors .  A recen t  contract  effort mas 
the work  pe r fo rmed  f a r  the NASA Elec t ron ics  Resea r ch  Center ,  Cambridge, 
Mass ,  (Refe rence  2 6 ) .  
One  output  of t h i s  p r o g r a i l l  w a s  the f a b r i c a t i o n  of a  p ro to type  po r t ab l e  gas 
d e t e c t o r .  F i g u r e  4 - 1 3  i s  a  s c h e n l a t i c  of the  input  s t a g e  and  F i g u r e  -4- 14 
i s  a  block d i a g r a m  of t he  e n t i r e  un i t .  One  s e n s o r  i s  connec ted  to  tach 
s i d e  of a  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a i n p l i f i e r  and a  vol tage  appl ied  to the s e n s o r .  Tile 
a i l lp l i f le r  d e t e c t s  t h e  c u r r e n t s  flo~s.1ng th rough  the  s e n s o r s  and  u n d e r  
s t a n d a r d  a t n l o s p l l e r e  conditions, t h e  d l f f e r e n t l a l  output i s  ad ius t ed  t o  z e r o  
Jlihen a  contan1lnant 1s p r e s e n t  In t he  at i -nosphere,  e a c h  s e n s o r  respo~?c!s 
according to the ex t en t  of i t s  interaction wl th  the  contanl inant .  The, r e s p  11s~. 
I S  s e n s e d  by- a n ~ p l i l y i n p  c h a n g e s  in c u r r e n t  flourlnp th rough  the s e n s c r s  
S lnce  ~ t  o p e r a t e s  on a  d i f fe ren t la1  b a s i s ,  the  d i f f e r e n c e  of the  c h a n g e s  ap , c  c, 1.. 
a t  tile output  a s  e l t h e r  a  positive o r  nega t lve  vo l t age ,  t he  p o l a r ~ t y  d e p e n d l n ~  
on ~ v h i c h  s e n s o r  c h a n g e s  the  i l lost .  A z e r o  c e n t e r  pane l  m e t e r  m~l~icl i  ser .ces 
a s  a n  l n d l c a t o r  I S  connec ted  a c r o s s  t he  output ,  and  the ai l lpl l tude of tile 
output  vo l tage  i s  dependen t  o n  the  r e l a t i v e  magn i tude  of t he  changes  Ti. 
LII-LI~ a l s o  ~ n c o r p o r a t e s  a  siim.ple a d l u s t a b l e  t h r e s h o l d  log ic  c i r c u l t  that 'cur 13 
on o n e  of a  p a l r  of l i gh t s  vvhen the  d i f f e r en t i a l  outpilt e x c e e d s  a  p r e d c ~ e i l ~ r ~ l ~ c i ~  
l e v e l .  The  l leh t  t ha t  I S  o n  l n d l c a t e s  u ~ h l c h  s e n s o r  h a s  r e sponded  to  1'-e i: k, 
i n t r o d u c e d .  
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Figure 4-13. Portable Gas Detector Differential Amplifier Circuit Schematic 
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A prototype gas  de tec to r  has  been t e s t ed  under  l abora to ry  a tmosphe re  
conditions m os t l y  with ammonia  ( to  which the n i t r o  po lymer  responds)  afid 
sul fur  dioxide ( to  which the amino  po lymer  responds) .  In a quantitative 
re l iabi l i ty  t e s t ,  these  ga se s  w e r e  a l t e rna te ly  injected into the s e n s o r  
chambe r  with a gas  hypodermic  syringe.  F o r  20 t e s t s  with each g a s ,  the 
corresponding po lymer  responded t o  the  gas t o  which i t  was  sensi t ive  with 
no responses  f r o m  the other  polymer .  Concentrat ions a s  low a s  190 ppm 
w e r e  used,  with no fa i lu re  t o  respond. T h e r e  i s  r e a son  t o  believe the 
sensi t iv i ty  could be a s  low a s  one to 10 ppm. F o r  example,  in one 
instance,  when the s e n s o r  chambe r  had been left open, i t  detected a 
s m a l l  leak in a sul fur  dioxide bottle 6 fee t  away which was  undetected 
by a p e r s o n  si t t ing next t o  the bottle. S imi la r  behavior  was  observed 
with the n i t r o  polymer ,  By opening a bottle of amrnonium hydroxide at 
varying dis tances  f r o m  the inlet  duct, it was  found that  the s e n s o r  v~cau;rld 
respond a s  anticipated.  
Other  qualitative t e s t s  we re  a l s o  pe r fo rmed  with var ious  gases  in orcle r I il 
a s s e s s  the de tec tor ' s  capabil i t ies.  Table 4- 1 l i s t s  some  of the gases  used 
and which po lymer  responded. 
It was concluded f r o m  this  p r o g r a m  that  a sol id-s ta te  gas detector  basetl ui>Qr. 
the use  of polymeric  organic semiconductors  i s  feas ible .  Excellent sells i 1.1- 
t i e s  w e r e  at tained and s o m e  specifici ty was  demonstra ted,  Response and 
recovery  t i m e s  w e r e  on the  o r d e r  of seconds.  With fu r ther  work thc so: r ? -  
s ta te  s e n s o r  s y s t e m  can be optimized fo r  enhanced sensit ivi ty.  
4. 3 .  4 Oscillating P iezoe lec t r i c  C rys t a l  Detectors 
P iezoe lec t r i c  gas s e n s o r s  show p r o m i s e  (Reference  2 7 )  f o r  monitoring &]:at c - 
cra f t  a tmosphe re s  f o r  contamination and onboard leakage. 
This  s e n s o r  works  on the pr inciple  that  any fore ign  ma te r i a l  a t t a c h e 4  is i7 
oscil lat ing (exci ted)  p iezoelect r ic  c ry s t a l  tends  t o  dampen ( d e c r e a s r )  the  
f requency a t  which it resonates .  The addition of a hydroscopic film on tlrc, 
c ry s t a l  rrlakes i t s  f requency change with the  humidity t o  which it is pxpostl:i, 
The  prob lems  assoc ia ted  with t he se  gas  s e n s o r s  s t e m  f r o m  the  laci i  of 
development of se lect ive  s table  coatings fo r  CO, COZ,  S O 2 ,  a n d  CH %hi[ :I 4 
Table 4- 1 
RESPONSE BEHAVIOR O F  PRO TO TYPE 
GAS DETECTOR 
- 
Gas  Polymer  Responding 
Diethyl e the r  
BF3 
T r  iethylamine 
Nitro 
Ni t r o  
Amino 
Amino 
Nitro 
a r e  of i n t e r e s t  to vehicle damage  control  l eak  de t ec to r s .  Most  coatings 
such a s  organic  po lymer s  wil l  ab so rb  a mult i tude of o rgan ics ,  and because  
of many  cross- l inking react ions ,  i t  i s  poss ible  they m a y  not revers ib ly  
de  so rb .  
Uncoated c r y s t a l s  have been used by NASA (Refe rence  2 8 )  to de tec t  
backs t r eaming  of d i f fus ion pump oil  into vacuum sys t ems ,  but considerab't e 
development  wil l  be requ i red  to develop a family  of se lect ive  gas de t ec to r s .  
One potential  use  of the  c r y s t a l  i s  f o r  moni tor ing an  unexpected a tmospher ic  
buildup of a component through onboard leakage o r  outgass ing of a vehicle 
ma t e r i a l .  There  a r e  many  m a t e r i a l s  which f a l l  into th i s  c lass i f ica t ion.  
P r e s e n t  s t a te  -of - t he - a r t  methods  uti l ize the  sensit ivi ty and versa t i l i ty  of 
the vapor  f r a c t o m e t e r s  to moni to r  these  t race- type con t an~ lna t c s .  
T h e s e  ins t ruments  contain s e v e r a l  partitioning columns to provlc? i- 
separa t ion  of the numerous  compounds exper ienced.  P r e s e n t  p rac t i ce  calls 
f o r  pe r iod ic  sampl ing of the vehicle a tmosphe re  through each  of the columns, 
which i s  somewhat of a n  a r b i t r a r y  ra t ionale .  A m o r e  speci f ic  use  of the 
vapor  f r a c tome te r  could be achieved with p iezoe lec t r i c  s e n s o r s .  E a c h  
s enso r  would be coated with the specif ic column m a t e r i a l .  These  s e n s o r s  
could be located within the t h e r m a l  conditioning a i r  r e t u rn  duct .  
Any contaminant finding i t s  way into the vehicle a tmosphe re  would absorb  
on one o r  m o r e  of the s enso r  s u r f a c e s ,  causing a corresponding change in  
c r y s t a l  f requency.  This  signal  could be used a s  a contaminate " ea r l y  
warning" a l a r m  and could a l s o  actuate  the vapor  f r a c t o m e t e r  and s e l ec t  
the p rope r  part i t ioning column, s ince  the  s e n s o r s  ma t ch  the specif ic 
f r a c tome te r  column m a t e r i a l s .  The vapor f r a c tome te r  would then identify 
the  compound and i t s  concentrat ion by retention t ime  and signal  magni tude ,  
r espec t ive ly .  
4. 3 .  5 Human Nose 
Another analyt ical  tool  which should not be overlooked i s  the humari nose 
which in many c a s e s  i s  m o r e  sensi t ive  than chemical  ana lys i s .  During 
the 90-day manned tes t ,  one of t h e  c rewmen awoke dur ing his  s leep  
be cause  he smel led overheated insulation.  Investigation revealed that a 
pump in the wa te r  s y s t e m  had stal led and was  overheating.  His alarm 
came  long before  any i nc r ea sed  leve l s  of CO o r  hydrocarbons in cabin g s s  
o c c u r r e d .  In addition, the i r  noses  located improper ly  sealed garbage 
containers  and leaks  in the  u r ine  recovery  subsys tem.  
Considerat ion should be  given to "coating" c r i t i c a l  components with a 
se lect ion of chemica l  compounds which generate  identifiable odors  when a 
leak,  over load,  o r  other malfunction occu r s .  This concept has  the advaa~t - 
age  of requ i r ing  no equipment o r  consultation on the c r e w m a n ' s  pa r t .  E z c h  
c r ewman  can conduct h i s  own investigation,  allowing a concentrated effort 
to find the leaking o r  malfunctioning i t em .  This  concept i s  used by gas 
companies in injecting an organic  mercap tan  into a l l  na tura l  gas used by t h e  
public.  The mercap t an  gives the otherwise  odo r l e s s  gas  an odor  s~ in i la r  
to rotten eggs and i s  detected by the nose a t  a low ppm level. Varaoi:s 
e s t e r s  could be used,  depending on the na ture  of the malfunction to 11e 
detected. High- vapo r  p r e s s u r e  compounds could be injected into oxygen 
o r  the hea t  t r anspo r t  f luids , fo r  example .  Low-vapor-pressure e s t e r s  
could be coated on equipment subject  to over temperature- type fa i lu res .  
In th is  c a se ,  l i t t le  o r  no  odor could be detected until an above-normal  
t empe ra tu r e  o c c u r s .  Typical  e s t e r  odors  a r e  those associa ted w-ith the  
s m e l l s  of f ru i t  ( e .  g .  , oranges  o r  pineapples)  and f lowers  (e .  g. , gardenias 
o r  r o s e s ) .  
4 . 4  KIDDEN LEAKS 
Hidden leaks  can general ly  be c lass i f ied a s  those which defy detectrcn. by 
conventional methods.  Examples  a r e :  ( I )  a leak in the Sabatier  eataEysr 
loading flange caused by unequal t h e r m a l  expansion a t  the elevated aperat-. 
ing t e m p e r a t u r e ;  however ,  the joint shows no leakage when tes ted a t  rcon l  
t empe ra tu r e ,  ( 2 )  a slow but insidious buildup of hydrogen in the vehi~:~, 
Testing with soap suds and hydrogen detectors of a l l  hydrogen lines and 
components give negative resul ts  because the leak i s  too smal l  for  bubble 
formation and the microjet  of hydrogen barely punctures the a i r  boundary 
layer before i t  i s  swept into the dilution of the vehicle ventilation systenl,  
There  i s  an infinite mix of situations where the leak "comes and goes" o r  
the leak locater sensor cannot o r  i s  not placed in  a position to pick up that 
concentration gradient that allows a leak to be "homed" in on. There are 
a lso  only limited l ines and components which can be bagged with plastic 
o r  other coverings so that the gas i s  prevented f rom migration until 
enough concentration i s  accumulated to detect.  Instruction books and 
procedures  cannot be written for finding every leak. The main resul ts  will 
depend upon the ingenuity of the crew and some general provision mater ia l s  
suitable for  making improvised r epa i r s  . 
One of the candidate i tems suitable to general repa i rs  would be an 
a s  sortment of flexable l ines or  hoses terminated with AN connectors. This 
would allow a whole section of hidden line to be replaced quickly. This 
replacement technique is sometimes called leak detection by substitution, 
Other useful i tems would be tube cut ters  and a handheld flaring tool which 
would allow wall-mounted tube runs to be cut and flared at  location. For 
plumbing a s  so ciated with mater ia l s  normally found in vehicle cabins and 
E C  / LS sys tems,  emergency replumbing can be performed with copper 
tubing which i s  easy to bend, cut, and f la re .  Many i tems will suggest 
themselves a s  our knowledge and experience in this a r t  increases .  
4 . 5  ANALYSIS O F  SMALLEST DETECTABLE LEAK 
Detecting onboard leaks i s  a time-dependent function. Onboard leakage of 
process  fluids produces an increased part ia l  p res su re  signal. As t ime 
passes  and more  fluid leaks,  the par t ia l  p res su re  signal increases  until 
eventually the signal i s  within the detection capability of the detector.  F o r  
gas chromatographs,  m a s s  spectrometers ,  and vapor f rac tometers ,  the 
par t ia l  p res su re  signal need only be a few pa r t s  pe r  million to be detected, 
Therefore,  the sma l l e r  the enclosed volume, the more  rapidly the partial  
p res su re  signal will reach  the threshold of the detecting instrument for a 
given s ize leak. The human nose can also detect odors in the par t s  per  
million range. 
The tape leak detector may signal a liquid leak with only one drop o f  IraLurd 
being lost, assuming that the tape i s  attached directly a t  the point 17' 
leakage and that the one drop of liquid i s  sufficient to wet the wick enoagh 
to allow current  flow through the foil electrode. In another case ,  the l d ~ r e  
may not be on the exact location of the leak and hence a number of drops 
may be required before the wicking becomes conductive and se ts  off thc  
a l a rm.  A very slow leak may never set  off the a l a rm.  This would b e  t rde 
if the f i r s t  drop of liquid did not wet the wick sufficiently to set  off the a1arr.r- 
and then evaporated bef0r.e i t  was reinforced by a second and subsequent 
drops of liquid. Leak r a t e s  of this low ra t e ,  particularly of nontoxic 
fluids, could continue for days without any detriment to the operating 
equipment. 

Sec t ion  5  
WEIGH?' T R A D E O F F  ANALYSES 
A n a l y s e s  h a v e  been  m a d e  of the  weight  t r adeo f f s  betwc,cln the I1C;S a n d  
a t m o s p h e r e  supp ly  r e s e r v e s  f o r  v a r i o u s  l e a k  r a t e s .  A s s e s s n - ~ c n t s  a l s o  wc i-I 
m a d e  of t he  addi t iona l  weight  pena l t i e s  t ha t  m a y  bc i n c u r r e d  due  l o  Ihc, r i l a c -  
c e s s i b i l i t y  of the  ho le  o r  l eak  s o u r c e  and the weight  o f  too ls  and n~alc r r a l s  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  r e p a i r i n g  the  leak .  T h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  a n a l y s c . ~  a r e  p rese t - !  .d 
below i n  a  p a r a n l e t r i c  g r a p h i c a l  f o r m  s o  tha t  they  m a y  be  appl ied  t o  a n y  
s p a c e c r a f t .  
T h e  weight  t r a d e o f f s  a r e  p r i ~ n a r i l y  inf luenced  by the  s i z e  of tht. ho le  o r  "LC 
equiva len t  h o l e  s i z e  f o r  any  l eakage -p roduc ing  fau l t .  Hole s l z c s  nlay v? rIr 
f r o m  m i c r o h o l e s  to  n ~ a j o r  m e t e o r o i d  p e n e t r a t i o n s  r e su l t i ng  In h o l c s  of  u p  L O  
a  few i n c h e s  in  d i a n l e t e r .  F i g u r e  5 - 1  g ives  the amoun t  of g a s  l o s s e s  i ^ r ? l . r l  n 
s e a - l e v e l  equiva len t  oxygen-n i t rogen  s p a c e c r a f t  a t l -nosphere a s  a functio11 01 
m i s s i o n  d u r a t i o n s  f o r  a  f a m i l y  of equiva len t  ho le  s i z c s .  A r a n g e  of 0 ,  05 r l l i l i  
to  1  mrn d i a n l c t e r  h o l e s  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d .  Methods  of oxygeu and u l t roqc .n  
s u p p l i e s  and the  r e s u l t s  of the p a r a m e t r i c  t r a d e o f f s  arc. p r e s e n t e d  i n  i l i i  I ~ J J -  
lowing p a r a g r a p h s .  
5 . 1  METHODS O F  OXYGEN AND NITROGEN S U P P L Y  
Oxygen and  n i t r o g e n  n l a y  be suppl ied  f r o n ~  s t o r a g e  tanks  o r  f r o m  ilic c3eccri1- 
pos i t i on  of c h e n ~ l c a l  co lnpounds  s u c h  a s  ~ n e t a l l i c  s u p e r o x ~ d e s  and c h l o r a i t  
c a n d l e s .  Oxygen m a y  a l s o  be  r e c o v e r e d  f ron l  c a r b o n  d loxide  exhaled  13~7  1 1 . i  
c r e w .  F o u r  m e t h o d s  f o r  the  s t o r a g e  and  supply  of oxygen and n l t r o g i n  ar 
p r e s e n t e d .  Inc luded  a r e  h igh-  p r e s s u r e ,  supe  r c  r l t i c a l  and subc  r i t l ca l  s t i x i L ~ (  , 
and e l e c t r o l y s i s  of w a t e r  and  h y d r a z l n e .  Both h i g h - p r e s s u r e  and s u p c . r r r l ~ i c d '  
s t o r a g e  h a v e  been  f l i gh t - t e s t ed ,  whi le  s u b c r i t l c a l  s t o r a g e  and electrci :y . ;~i  a r t '  
i n  t he  p ro to type  deve lopmen t  s t a g e .  
5 .  1. 1 H i g h - P r e s s u r e  S t o r a g c  of A t m o s p h e r i c  Cons t i t uen t s  
7 
H i g h - p r e s s u r e  g a s e o u s  s t o r a g e  i s  u s u a l l y  h e a v i e r  than  c r y o g e n i c  51 o r ?  i c h  
b e c a u s e  of the  h e a v y  v e s s e l s  d i c t a t ed  by the  high s t o r a g e  p r e s s u r c  
M
IS
SI
O
N
 D
U
R
A
TI
O
N
 (D
AY
S)
 
Fr
rju
ra 
5-
1.
 A
tm
os
ph
er
e 
Le
ak
ag
e 
To
: 
Eq
an
lv
al
er
rt 
H
ol
e 
Si
ze
s a
s 
Fu
nd
ro
w 
of
 M
rss
ao
n 
B
ur
at
io
n 
p
p
p
-
p
-
 
--
,=
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-"=-- 
-
-
 
-
 
.*- 
-
-
 
-
-
-
-
-
 
A
-
a
p
-
-
-
-
-
-
"
-
 
-
,- 
-
-
 
(about 5. 17 x lo7  ~ / m '  o r  7, 500 psia) .  The p r i m a r y  advantages ol hrgh- 
p r e s s u r e  s to rage  a r e  that  the  equipment i s  re la t ively  s imple  and the g a s  i s  
read i ly  available fo r  the r equ i r emen t s  of rapid  r ep re s su r i za t i on  and e i m e r -  
gency operation.  Oxygen tanks  a r e  usually made of 4340 s tee l  while nitrogen 
tanks a r e  made of t i tanium alloy (Ti-6Al-4V). The fi l l  p r e s s u r e  may be u p  
7 2 to 5. 17 x 10 N / m  (7, 500 ps ia )  a t  cabin aimbient fo r  both ga se s .  The sloraci 
weights of oxygen and nitrogen supply sy s t ems ,  including gas ,  tankage, a n d  
controls ,  have been computed pa rame t r i ca l l y  a s  functions of miss ion  du ra -  
t ion for up to 1, 000 days .  
5. 1. 2 Superc r i t i ca l  and Subcr i t ica l  Storage of Oxygen and Nitrogen 
G a s e s  may  be s t o r ed  a s  cryogenic fluids in  superc r i t i ca l  and subcr i t icz i  
thermodynamic conditions. The tankage weights for superc r i t i ca l  stora:,e 
a r e  somewhat higher  than those  for  subcr i t i ca l  s to rage  for short-duratbi>n 
miss ions  because  of the  g r e a t e r  design operating p r e s s u r e  level .  S ~ p e l  - 
c r i t i c a l  fluids a r e  i n  a homogeneous ( i .  e . ,  s ingle-phase)  thermodynzmrc 
s ta te  while subcr i t i ca l  fuilds exis t  a s  two phases  (liquid and vapor )  in saru- 
r a t ed  equil ibrium. Subcr i t ica l  s to rage  h a s  not been demonstra ted Lo be  
operat ional  for  ze ro-g  applications because  techniques to draw off vapor 
selectively have not yet been fully developed. 
Superc r i t i ca l  s to rage  tanks  a r e  usually filled with subcr i t ica l  fluid. Z'ht 
v e s s e l  i s  capped and the fluid allowed to heat  to  a t empe ra tu r e  higher than. 
c r i t i ca l .  The fluid then ex i s t s  a t  a  single-phase,  homogeneous s ta te  at 
supe rc r i t i c a l  t empe ra tu r e  and p r e s s u r e .  Fluid  can be subsequently w r t r -  
d rawn f r o m  the tank a t  constant  p r e s s u r e  i f  heat  i s  added. The s u p e r c r i t ~ -  
6 2 
ca l  s to rage  p r e s s u r e  range i s  4. 9 to 5. 9 x 10 N / m  (7 10 to 850  psis) f t # i .  
2 
oxygen and 2. 9 to 3 . 4  x lo6 N / m  (425  to 570 ps ia )  fo r  nitrogen.  
Subcr i t ica l  tanks  a r e  filled in  the  s a m e  fashion a s  superc r i t i ca l  tanks 
however,  the operating p r e s s u r e  i s  then kept a s  low a s  p rac t ica l  t o  vnlneri?~ze 
v e s s e l  weight. As vapor  i s  withdrawn f r o m  the tank, heat  mus t  be a d d e d  to  
vapor ize  a like amount of remaining liquid. Consequently, the insulalioll 
th ickness  i s  de te rmined  by the hea t  of vaporization requ i red  to maintain t h e  
design del ivery r a t e .  Higher del ivery r a t e s  requ i re  the addition of e ler* t ~ l c  
power  through the r e s i s t ance  h e a t e r .  Lower  de l ive ry  r a t e s  mean  that  t h e  
gas  boil-off is los t  by venting. The subcr i t i ca l  tanks a r e  usually operated 
2 
a t  8 . 6 2  x l o F ' N / m  (125 p s i a )  maximum.  
Cryogenic oxygen s t o r age  tanks  usually ut i l ize Inconel 718 fo r  the inner  t ~ l ~ n l i  
shel l  and a n  a luminum alloy such a s  al loy 221 9 f o r  the outer  shel l .  V a p u r -  
cooled shie lds  a r e  often included i n  the insulat ion a s semb ly  t o  reduce insu ia -  
t ion th ickness ,  f o r  th is  p e r m i t s  fluid leaving the s to rage  v e s s e l  to in tercept  
p a r t  of the hea t  enter ing the tank through the  v e s s e l  ou te r  shell .  The s to rage  
weights for  supe rc r i t i c a l  and subcr i t i ca l  s t o r age  s y s t e m s  have been 
computed pa r ame t r i c a l l y  a s  functions of miss ion  durat ion for  up to one yea r .  
Weight of insulat ion r equ i r ed  fo r  longer  miss ions  makes  these  s to rage  
methods unat t rac t ive .  
5. 1. 3 Oxygen and Nitrogen Supply by E l ec t ro ly s i s  
Oxygen and nitrogen may  be s t o r ed  in  the f o r m  of s table  l iquids which can be 
e lec t ro lyzed  a s  requ i red .  Water  and hydrazine  a r e  the fluids used fo r  the 
production of oxygen and nitrogen,  respect ively .  The hydrogen p r o d ~ ~ c e d  
when e i t he r  wa te r  o r  hydrazine  i s  e lec t rolyzed may  be used i n  the 60 .- 2 
reduct ion r e a c t o r  o r  dumped overboard.  The t h r ee  mos t  p romis ing  csnd i -  
date wa te r  e l e c t ro ly s i s  s y s t e m s  a r e  the s ta t ic  feed and the continuous f l o w  
a sbe s to s  ma t r i x  KOH elect rolyte  units  and the solid po lymer  e lect rolyte  
wa te r  e l e c t ro ly s i s .  When hydrazine  was fed into the e lec t rolyte  in a water 
e l ec t ro ly s i s  sy s t em,  i t  was  found to reac t ,  forming oxygen a t  the oxygen 
e lec t rode  i n  addition to hydrogen a t  the cathode. Refe rence  29 indicates  
hydrazine  i s  oxidized a t  the anode to produce ni t rogen and  wa t e r .  The re&c - 
t ions involved a r e  e i the r  chemica l  o r  e lec t rochemica l .  A sma l l  amount of 
ni t rogen i s  a l s o  found in  the effluent hydrogen a t  the cathode, where  the 
hydrazine  i s  decomposed to ni trogen and hydrogen.  
The ma jo r  por t ion of the weight penal t ies  assoc ia ted  with e lec t ro lys i s  
s y s t e m s  i s  due t o  the power r equ i r ed  f o r  e lec t rolyzing the wate r .  
5 . 2  RESULTS O F  PARAMETRIC TRADEOFFS 
Curves  showing total sy s t em weights ( fo r  gas  r e s e r v e s  required to r ep l en - sk  
leakage)  a s  functions of m i s s ion  durat ions  fo r  equivalent hole s i z e s  u p  Lo ,y7-r: 
a r e  p resen ted  in F i g u r e s  5-2 through 5-5, f o r  a cabin p r e s s u r e  of 1, Cil x i 0 5 
2 2 N / m  (14. 7 ps ia ) .  The s a m e  informat ion f o r  p r e s s u r e s  of 4. 8 x 10' N!nl 
2 (7 p s i a )  and 7 x l o 4  N / m  (10 p s i a )  a r e  shown in  F igu re s  5-6 and 5-7. G i s e -  
ous and cryogenic  s t o r age  methods  a s  well a s  the supply of oxygen and 
ni t rogen through the e lec t ro lys i s  of wa te r  and hydrazine  a r e  included, ? l i e  
total  sy s t em weights shown in F igu re s  5- 2 through 5- 5 include the  weigh^ ol 
gase s ,  tankage, and controls .  F igu re  5- 1 indicates  f o r  the actual  wcrgb t  01 
g a s e s  supplied by each sy s t em.  Super imposed on F i g u r e s  5-2 through 5 - 5  
a r e  p r e l im ina ry  e s t ima t e s  of the weight penalt ies al located to the DCS, ~ " c c ~ s ~  
methods ,  and r e p a i r  tools and m a t e r i a l s  f o r  the 10. 1-m-dia Space SlaCron A 
weight of 35. 8 kg (78. 8 l b )  al located to the DCS i s  desc r ibed  in detarl i n  
Section 8 of this  r epor t .  
The weight a t t r ibutable  to a c c e s s  provisions was  obtained by f i r s t  exanri::ii-g 
each of the four  decks  of the 10. 1-m-dia  Space Station, identifying t he  equ12- 
ment  placed next to the p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  and then es t imat ing the nunlber  G 1 7 d  
types of a c c e s s  lmethods to be  employed to accomplish  shel l  a c c e s s ,  De la r l s  
of types of a c c e s s  and assoc ia ted  weight penalt ies a r e  given in Sectioil 6 of 
this  r epo r t .  The following assulnptions we re  made :  
Average Pivot  Weight = 0. 9 1  kg (2. 0 lb)  
Average  Slide Weight = 2 . 7  kg (6 .  0 lb )  
Average S l ide IP ivo t  Weight = 3 .63  kg (8. 0 lb )  
Average Weight fo r  Unit Removal  = 3 .63  kg (8. 0 lb)  
Average Weight for  Flexible  L ine s  and Ducting p e r  Unit = 0.  91 kg 
(2 .  0 1b) 
A s u m m a r y  of the a c c e s s  p rov i s ions  weight al locations for  each of the  GILT 
decks  of the Space Station i s  given in Table 5- 1. 
It should be noted that  a c c e s s  provis ions  may  be provided for  purposes c t l ~ e r  
than l eak  r e p a i r ,  such a s  maintenance o r  mult iple space  uti l izat ion.  GOT:-- 
sequantly,  a number  of cu rve s  showing percen tages  of a c c e s s  p rov i s iaa  
weights we re  introduced.  The p rope r  pe rcen tage  of a c c e s s  provision wefq5.t 
to be a l located to leak r e p a i r  pu rpose s  i s  left to the judgment of the u s e r ,  
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Table 5 -  1 
WEIGHT ESTIMATES FOR 10 .1-M DIA SPACE 
STATION ACCESS PROVISIONS 
F l ex  
Slide / Unit L ines  / 
Pivots  Sl ides  P ivo t s  Removal  Duc ting Total  
x wt x wt x wt x wt x wt We~ght  
Deck (kg) (kg (kg (kg (kg) 0%) 
Plus  10 p e r c e n t  fo r  equipment 
not identif ied that  will r equ i r e  
a c c e s s  p rov i s ions  24+ 59 
-- 
Total  Weight 270 ,49  
-- 
In a s s e s s ing  the weight penalt ies a t t r ibuted to leak r epa i r s ,  i t  was  assunled 
that the two m o s t  de s i r ab l e  l eak  r epa i r  s y s t e m s  would be  used :  e l a s t omer  seal- 
a n t  and replacement ,  which a r e  identified in  Section 7. The weight of repair  
tools and m a t e r i a l s ,  including 5 gallons of e l a s t omer ,  i s  a s sumed  to be 34 Icg 
f o r  a m i s s i o n  durat ion of 180 days ,  a s  indicated i n  F igu re s  5-2 through 5-5, 
In o r d e r  to a s s e s s  the effects  of varying the total  cabin p r e s s u r e  froxl? 
2 5 2 4. 8 x l o 4  N / m  to 1. 01 x 10 N / m  (7. 0 t o  14. 7 p s i a )  on the wexght t radeof is  
between the DCS and the a tmosphere  supply sys tem,  the data  i n  F igu re  5 - 3  
2 have been replotted in  F igu re s  5-6 and 5-7 f o r  4 .8  x l o 4  N / m  (7. 0 ps ia )  a n d  
2 6. 89 x l o4  N/rn (10. 0 ps ia) ,  respect ively .  A supe rc r i t i c a l  a tmospher ic  storage 
method was  se lec ted  because  i t  was found to be  m o r e  a t t rac t ive  f r o m  a rota1 
s y s t e m  weight penalty standpoint than the o ther  supply methods  considered,  
Total  a tmospher ic  supply sy s t em weights w e r e  found to d e c r e a s e  propostion- 
al ly with reduced cabin p r e s s u r e s .  An i l lus t ra t ion of the u s e  of F i g u r e s  5-0 
and 5-7 i s  given i n  the following paragraphs .  
The  weight tradeoffs have been p resen ted  pa r ame t r i c a l l y  to enable the 
computed data  to be applied to any spacecra f t .  The a c c e s s  provisioning and 
r e p a i r  weights, however, we re  based on the 10. 1-m-dia  Space Station and 


should b e  modified o r  s c a l e d  f o r  o t h e r  appl ica t ions .  The h i g h - p r e s s u r e  
g a s e o u s  s t o r a g e  i n c u r s  the  h e a v i e s t  pena l t i e s  of a l l  the methods  cons ide red ,  
but  m a y  be  p r e f e r r e d  f o r  long m i s s i o n  dura t ions  o r  when f a s t  de l ive ry  of 
g a s e s  is r e q u i r e d ,  such a s  i n  c a s e  of cabin  r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n .  The subcr i t i -  
c a l  s t o r a g e  method h a s  the  l e a s t  s y s t e m  weight penalty f o r  m i s s i o n s  up to  
approx imate ly  100-day dura t ion ,  but r e q u i r e s  s o m e  addi t ional  development  
ef for t .  S u p e r c r i t i c a l  s t o r a g e  h a s  been  f l ight - tes ted  and  i s  su i table  f o r  
longer  m i s s i o n s  than  s u b c r i t i c a l  s t o r a g e .  The supply of oxygen and ni t rogen 
by e l e c t r o l y s i s  was  not found to  be compet i t ive  with the  c ryogen ic  s t o r a g e  
methods ,  ma in ly  due t o  the  weight pena l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  with the  r e q u i r e d  
e l e c t r i c a l  power .  
The u s e  of the plotted d a t a  m a y  be i l l u s t r a t e d  by the following exai71nle, 
Cons ide r  an  equivalent  hole  s i z e  of 0. 25 m l n  (10 m i l s ) .  A s s u m e  u s e  a l  ibc 
s u p e r c r i t i c a l  g a s  s t o r a g e  method and a l loca te  5 0  p e r c e n t  of a c c e s s  provls lon-  
ing weight f o r  l eak  r e p a i r  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Then, f r o m  F i g u r e  5 - 3 ,  i t  c a n  bp 
s e e n  that  the c r o s s o v e r  point, w h e r e  the  weight of the g a s  supply :jyste7-ii 1s 
equivalent  to the combined weights  of the  DCS, a c c e s s  provis ions ,  and rcparl- 
s y s t e n ~ ,  i s  105 days .  The amount  of g a s e s  los t  i n  105 days  f r o m  the 0, 25-mni 
equivalent  hole  i s  approx imate ly  150 kg, a s  m a y  be s e e n  f r o m  F i g u r e  5 -  8, Tor 
a s e a - l e v e l  type of space  cabin a t m o s p h e r e .  Thus ,  the  DCS plus a c c e s s  pro- 
vis ions  and r e p a i r  s y s t e m  weights  would pay f o r  themse lves  a f t e r  105 f lays ,  
F o r  a total  m i s s i o n  dura t ion  of 10 y e a r s  and a 0. 25-rnm equivalent  halib s l ze ,  
the  a c c r u e d  weight  savings  resul t ing  f r o m  the u s e  of the DCS would exceed 
6, 800 kg (15, 000 lb) .  / 
The above example  m a y  a l s o  be applied to o the r  a t m o s p h e r i c  supply nlethods 
o r  s p a c e c r a f t  cabin  p r e s s u r e s  to  show t h e i r  e f fec ts  on weight t r adeof f s ,  The 
r e s u l t s  of c o m p a r i s o n s ,  with 0. 250-mm equivalent  hole  s i z e ,  50 pe rcen t  
a c c e s s  provis ion  al locat ion,  r e p a i r  s y s t e m ,  and s u p e r c r i t i c a l  s t o r a g e ,  a r e  a s  
fol lows.  
5 2 A. F o r  a 1. 01 x 10 N / m  (14.7 ps ia )  a tmosphere  and h igh -p re s su re  
s t o r age  method, the c r o s s o v e r  point where  the weight of DCS, access 
provision,  and r e p a i r  s y s t e m  i s  equivalent to total gas  supply system 
weight i s  s e e n  f r o m  F igu re  5-2 to be only 38 days.  
4 2 B. F o r  a 4 . 5  2 x 10 N / m  (7.  0 ps i a )  cabin p r e s s u r e  and supe rc r i t i c a l  
supply method, the c r o s s o v e r  point i s  s een  f r o m  F igu re  5-6 to be 
248 days.  
4 2 C. F o r  a 6. 89 x 10 N / m  ( l o .  0 ps i a )  cabin p r e s s u r e  and superc r i t i ca l  
supply method, the c r o s s o v e r  point i s  s e e n  f r o m  F igu re  5-7 to be 
159 days.  
Tradeoffs f o r  var ious  supply methods o r  spacecra f t  cabin p r e s s u r e s  may be  
obtained l ikewise f r o m  F igu re s  5-2 through 5-7. 
Section 6 
STUDY OF METHODS FOR GAINING ACCESS TO LEAKS 
The study approach consis ted of: (1)  determinat ion of the conditions which 
r e s t r i c t  a c c e s s  to l eaks  i n  any p a r t  of the p r e s s u r e  shell ;(2) identif ication 
of a c c e s s  methods for specific a c c e s s  conditions; (3)  evaluation of a c c e s s  
methods fo r  specific a c c e s s  conditions, and(4) development of r ecommen-  
dations fo r  u s e  of a c c e s s  methods during configuration design.  
The following ground r u l e s  a r e  applicable to the study effort :  
A. The 10. 1 m (33 ft)  dia Space Station, a s  defined by the para l l e l  
s tudies  of MDAC and the Space Division of North Amer ican  
~ l o n  Rockwell, will be used a s  a baseline to identify a c c e s s  res t r r i c"  
conditions. 
B. Sys t ems  will ex i s t  to detect ,  identify types ,  and indicate genera l  
location of leaks .  
C. A leak may  occur  any place in the p r e s s u r e  shel l  o r  onboard the 
vehicle.  
D. Acces s  methods mus t  be compatible with p r e s s u r i z e d  suit  
operat ions .  
E. Acces s  methods mus t  be compatible with operat ions  in a ze ro-g  
environment.  
F. All equipment at tachment f a s t ene r s  will be readi ly  access ib le  to a 
c rewman  in a p r e s s u r i z e d  p r e s s u r e  sui t .  
G .  Weight penalty for  c rewman r e s t r a i n t s  requ i red  during a c c e s s  
operat ions  will not be included in t r ade  s tudies .  
H. The study will not include E V A  a c c e s s  methods.  
I. To the extent  poss ible ,  a c c e s s  methods will be applicable to 
modular Space Station and Shuttle Orb i te r  configurations. 
J .  A perpendicular  distance of 0.762 m (30 in.) f r o m  the p r e s s u r e  shel l  
to  any obstruction will be used to ensu re  adequate working space for 
a c rewman in  a p r e s s u r i z e d  suit  for  r e p a i r  of l eaks  on the pressure 
shel l  o r  on any vehicle sys tem.  
6. 1 CONDITIONS RESTRICTING ACCESS T O  LEAKS 
A deta i led  rev iew of the 10. 1-m (33-ft)  d ia  Space  Stat ion configuratsons 
identif ied 10 condit ions which p reven t  a c c e s s  to  the p r e s s u r e  she l l ;  ( I )  par- 
t i t ions located  agains t  the p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  ( 2 )  s t o r a g e  cab ine t s  o r  s y s t e m  
equipment  abutting the p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  (3 )  s t o r a g e  cab ine t s  o r  equipment 
a t tached to the p r e s s u r e  she l l ,  ( 4 )  c r e w  f u r n i t u r e  a t tached t o  the  p r e s s u r e  
shel l ,  ( 5 )  d e c o r  and c r e w  pro tec t ion  padding a t tached to the p r e s s u r e  s ~ c I X ,  
( 6 )  l iquid t r a n s f e r  l ines  ad jacen t  to  the  p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  ( 7 )  g a s  t r a n s f e r  l ines  
and ducting adjacent  to the p r e s s u r e  she l l ,  (8 )  conduit o r  e l e c t r i c a l  wir ing  
adjacent  to the p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  ( 9 )  equipment lying aga ins t  the p r e s s u r e  shell 
with f lex  and d isconnect  l ines ,  and (10)  a i r - l o c k  equipment prot ruding inLo 
the a c c e s s  a r e a .  In addition, though the  s t r u c t u r a l  m e m b e r s  a t tached to the 
p r e s s u r e  she l l  did not a p p e a r  to  r e s t r i c t  a c c e s s ,  the poss ib i l i ty  e x i s t s  IhaL 
the m o d u l a r  des ign  o r  o r b i t e r  des ign  m a y  i m p o s e  th is  type of a c c e s s  r e s l r l c -  
tion, T h e r e f o r e ,  this  condition prevent ing  a c c e s s  i s  included in  the siudy, 
6, 2 IDENTIFICATION O F  ACCESS METHODS FOR SPECIFIC ACCESS 
RESTRICTION CONDITIONS 
E a c h  condition which could p reven t  a c c e s s  to the  p r e s s u r e  she l l  o r  vehic le  
s y s t e m  was evaluated  i n  r e s p e c t  1.0 the 10. 1 - m  (33-ft)  d ia  Space  Stat ion lo 
identify poss ib le  me thods  of des ign  and p r o c e d u r e s  which will  pe rmi t  access, 
This  evaluat ion (Tab le  6 -1 )  r e s u l t e d  in the identif icat ion of eight. accci;s 
methods :  (1)  inhe ren t  in design,  ( 2 )  pivot, ( 3 )  s l ide ,  (4 )  s l ide /p ivot ,  (5) unit 
r emova l ,  ( 6 )  i t e m  d i sp lacement ,  ( 7 )  d i s a s s e m b l e ,  and (8 )  p a r t i a l  d i s a s s e m b l e ,  
The  t i t l e s  of a c c e s s  me thods  a r e  se l f - exp lana to ry  with the exception of arikeer- 
ent  i n  des ign  and i t e m  d i sp lacement .  Inheren t  i n  des ign  m e a n s  the dessgr i  
provides  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  without m o v e m e n t  of equipment.  I t em disgiace- 
m e n t  i s  appl icable  to  f lex  gas ,  l iquid, o r  e l e c t r i c a l  conduit and m e a n s  tllc 
physica l  d i sp lacement  of l ines  by f o r c e  of hand ( s e e  Appendix C, F i g u r e s  C- k 
and (2-21). 
6 . 3  EVALUATION O F  ACCESS METHODS FOR SPECIFIC ACCESS 
RESTRICTION CONDITIONS 
A t r a d e  study was  m a d e  of each a c c e s s  method v e r s u s  the appl icable  condl- 
t ion r e s t r i c t i n g  a c c e s s .  Evaluat ion c r i t e r i a  included r e q u i r e m e n t s  for tools  


and s t o r age  f ix tu res ,  the number  of c r e w m e n  requ i red  to  a c c e s s ,  the c r e w  
t ime  fo r  a c c e s s ,  c r ew  t ime  to  reposi t ion equipment for  no rma l  o p e r a t i o r ~ s ~  
t a s k  difficulty of a c c e s s  method, weight penalty i f  a c c e s s  provis ion is  i n h e r  - 
ent  in  i t e m  design,  and weight penalty of por table  handling f ix ture  for  
r emova l  of equipment (Table 6  - 2 ) .  
The following procedure  was  employed t o  de te rmine  the re la t ive  ranking for 
each applicable a c c e s s  method fo r  a speci f ic  condition r e s t r i c t i ng  access. 
The values  f o r  a l l  t r a d e  p a r a m e t e r s  except  weight we re  summed  to provade 
a raw sco re .  This  summed value with the raw s c o r e  weight penalty was 
en t e r ed  into the m a t r i x  for  each a c c e s s  method applicable to specif ic condi- 
t ions prevent ing a c c e s s .  The a c c e s s  method with the min imum weight 
penalty was  used  a s  a basel ine  for  compar i son  with other  applicable access 
methods .  Each pound of weight d i f ference in  the method of a c c e s s  froyT1 the 
basel ine  was  i nc r ea sed  by a fac tor  of 2. 5 and added to the basel ine  to  provide 
an adjus ted weight penalty which r e f l e c t s  the e s t ima t ed  $250 p e r  pound l a u n c h  
cos t .  The weighting factor  fo r  t ime  fo r  a c c e s s ,  reposit ioning of equiprnerrt, 
and t a sk  difficulty i s  included a s  a p a r t  of the ra t ing sca le  fo r  the ma.trix 
en t ry  (Table  6 - 3 ) .  The adjus ted va lues  were  summed  to  provide  a priorie-y 
ranking f o r  engineer ing cons idera t ions  in  configuration layout and design, 
6 . 4  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONFIGURATION DESIGN 
The detai led review of the  10. 1-m (33-f t )  dia Space Station configurations 
r evea l s  a capabil i ty fo r  a des ign which p e r m i t s  un re s t r i c t ed  a c c e s s  to  all 
posi t ions  of the p r e s s u r e  shel l  without a r equ i r emen t  to move equipment,  
The only condition which p r e sen t s  a p rob lem is  the a i r  lock protrudiiig ~ n t o  
the living and working a r e a s .  When th i s  a i r  lock i s  p r e s s u r i z e d ,  its skeli i s  
in effect the Space Station p r e s s u r e  shel l  and a c c e s s  t o  the  a i r - l ock  shell 
m u s t  be cnsurt ,d in design.  Appendix (: ( F i g u r e  C -  1 )  i l l u s t r a t e s  on<. c ? i e s ~ g q  
concept to  ensureL ready a c c e s s .  
The use  of the inherent- in-des ign method prov ides  the mos t  rap id  access 
with the l e a s t  weight penalty.  I t  should be u sed  t o  the maximum extent  
poss ible  in configuration layout and des ign to provide  a c c e s s  to the p r e s s u r e  
shel l  o r  vehicle s y s t e m s  for r e p a i r  of l eaks .  I nc r ea sed  p r e s s u r e  s h e l l  
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T a b l e  6-3 
EVALUATION AND RANKING O F  ACCESS METHODS 
I Access  Method Score Evaluation 
Condition 
::;The first figure in a column indicates accumulative score,  the second figure accumulative weight. The rank i s  denoted by a circled n:irnher. 
For example, on the Pivot Score, 3 = Accumulative Score, 0. 5 = Accumulative Weight, and 1 r Rank. 
t h i c k n e s s  should  be c o n s i d e r e d  if a c c e s s  i s  not p o s s i b l e  u s ing  any  of the 
m e t h o d s  ident i f ied  i n  t h i s  s tudy .  In a l l  c a s e s ,  s t r u c t u r a l  m e m b e r s  sbouiri be  
a t t ached  to  the e x t e r n a l  p r e s s u r e  s h e l l  s u r f a c e  to r e d u c e  the  nurnbei- of ~ - i i a j e>r  
p rnb le rns  i n  l e a k  r e p a i r .  
F o r  the  c l a s s  of a c c e s s  r e s t r i c t i o n  c o ~ n p r i s e d  of p a r t i t i o n s ,  s t o r a g e  ca131.11ets, 
and equ ipmen t  a t t a c h e d  to  the  f l o o r  and touching the  p r e s s u r e  she l l ,  rt is 
reconxn~endccl  tha t  the pivot  neth hod of a c c e s s ,  if p o s s i b l e ,  be u s e d  i n  cop- 
f i gu ra t ion  layout  a n d  des ign .  Appendix C ( F i g u r e  s  C - 2  t h r o u g h  C -  l 1 )  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  a c c c s s  m e t h o d s  a n d  s u n l r n a r i z e s  the  p r i o r i t y  f o r  u s e  i n  
con f igu ra t ion  layout  a n d  er lg incer ing  des ign .  
F o r  t he  c l a s s  of a c c e s s  r e s t r i c t i o n  c o m p r i s e d  of s t o r a g e  c a b i n e t s  and crt>.cn. 
f u r n i t u r e  with a t t ach -po in t s  on the  p r e s s u r e  she l l ,  i t  i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  that 
e n g i n e e r s  u s e  the  pivot  m e t h o d  of a c c e s s ,  if pos s ib l e ,  i n  con f igu ra t ion  layout 
and des ign .  T h i s  m e t h o d  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Appendix C ( F i g u r e s  C-  1 2  a n d  C-  1.3)- 
Appendix C  ( F i g u r e s  C- 1 4  through C -  18) i l l u s t r a t e s  l e s s  f a v o r a b l e  rnc-thctds of 
gaining a c c e s s  t o  the  p r e s s u r e  s h e l l  f r o m  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of s t o r a g e  c a l > ~ n r t s  a n d  
c r e w  f u r n i t u r e .  
F o r  the  she l l -moun ted  sof t  d e c o r  and  c r e w  p r o t e c t i o n  padding,  the  r lenl  d i s -  
p l a c e m e n t  a c c e s s  m e t h o d  i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  and  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Appendix il' 
( F i g u r e  C-  19) .  F o r  the  she l l -moun ted  f i r m  d e c o r  and  c r e w  p r o t e c t i o n  paddrng, 
the  pivot  m e t h o d  of a c c e s s  i s  r e c o r ~ ~ m e n d e d  and  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Appenclrx C 
( F i g u r e  C- 20).  
F o r  the  c l a s s  of a c c e s s  r e s t r i c t i o n  c o n l p r i s e d  of g a s  t r a n s f e r  l i nes ,  liquid 
t r a n s f e r  l i nes ,  and  condui t  o r  e l e c t r i c a l  c a b l e  a d j a c e n t  t o  the  p r e s s u r e  sne i i ,  
i t  i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  tha t  e n g i n e e r s  u s e  the  following p r i o r i t y  f o r  a c c e s s  rx*.eth- 
ods  i n  con f igu ra t ion  layout  and  des ign :  i t  ern d i s p l a c e m e n t ,  p a r t i a l  drsas s e n ~ b i y ,  
and  d i s a s s e m b l y  a s  shown i n  Appendix C  ( F i g u r e s  C - 2 1  th rough  C - 2 3 ) -  
A c u r s o r y  eva lua t ion  of v a r i o u s  s t o r a g e  o r  equ ipmen t  c a b i n e t  s i z e s  rn 10,1 1x2 
(33  f t )  d ia ,  6. 7 m ( 2 2  f t )  d ia ,  and  4. 3  m ( 1 4  f t )  d i a  s h e l l s  w a s  m a d e  to m ? ~ X i - -  
m i z e  the s t o r a g e ,  l iving,  and  work ing  a r e a  d u r i n g  p e r i o d s  when a c c e s s  to the 
p r e s s u r e  s h e l l  i s  r e q u i r e d  ( F i g u r e  6 -  1  t h rough  6 - 6 ) .  T h e  0. 38 rn (15 in ,  ,I 
Figure 6-1. 10.1 m (33 Ft)  Diameter Shell with 0.51 m (20 In.) Deep by 0.76 m (30 In.) Wide Cabinet 
P I 4 4  
L 
Figure 6-2. 6.7 m (22 Ft) Diameter Shell with 0.51 m (20 In.) Deep by 0.76 m (30 In.) Wide Cabinet 
-.-- 
Figure 6-3. 4.27 m (14 Ft) Diameter Shell with 0.51 m (20 In.) Deep by 0.76 m (30 In.) Wide Cabinet 
/ 
Figure 6-4. 4.27 m (14 Ft) Diameter Shell with 0.51 m (20 In.) Deep by 0.66 m (26 In.) Wide Cabinet 
Figure 6-5. 4.27 m (14 Ft) Diameter Shell with 0.51 m (20 In.) Deep by 0.56 m (22 In.) Wide Cabinet 
-- 
R 144 
Figure 6-6. 4.27 m (14 Ft) Diameter Shell with 0.38 m (15 In.) Deep by 0.56 rn (22 In.) Wide Cabinet 
-- 
deep by 0. 56 m (22  in. ) wide cabinet in a 4. 3 m (14 f t )  dia shel l  appears 
to offer an acceptable s torage a r e a  with the maximum living and working 
a rea .  
Fu r the r  detailed studies a r e  recommended to optimize cabinet s i ze  and con-  
figurations in relation to t rade  pa rame te r s  such a s  total s torage space 
required,  type of ma te r i a l  to be s tored,  in ternal  f r e e  a r e a  required,  and 
weight associated with various s ize  cabinets. 
The use of any par t icular  identified a c c e s s  method should be evaluated wi th  
respec t  t o  a l l  factors  influencing configuration layout and design. It is 
envisioned that the 4. 3 m (14 ft)  dia modular design and the orbi ter  design 
will of necess i ty  employ a combination of a c c e s s  methods to  ensure  
acceptable a c c e s s  for r epa i r  of p r e s s u r e  shell  l eaks .  This study provides 
guidelines t o  ensure  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  portions of the p r e s s u r e  shell  and vehicle 
sys tems  with the leas t  weight penalty and loss  of c rew t ime.  
Section 7 
LEAK REPAIR SYSTEMS STUDY 
The objective of this task was the synthesis of repa i r  systems (p r scedc res ,  
tools, mater ia l s )  applicable to leak fai lures  f rom vehicle systems and over- 
board leaks of a tmospheric  gases  through holes in the vehicle p res su re  
shell. The following approach was employed. 
A. Define leak parameters ,  including fluid, container material, repair 
conditions, and crew hazards.  
B. Define r epa i r  o r  replacement (R/R)  methods compatible v\r i tb  the 
leak parameters  and quantitatively evaluate their  des i r ab~ l i ty ,  
C. Develop and define crew repa i r  procedures employing specified 
repa i r  methods and quantitatively evaluate their  desirabilityy, 
D. Combine repa i r  methods with suitable procedures to specify 
recommended leak repa i r  systems.  
The following ground rules  a r e  applicable to this study effort: 
A. The 10. 1 m (33 f t )  dia  Space Station, a s  defined by the pa:rallell 
studies of MDAC and the Space Division of North American 
Rockwell Corporation, i s  used a s  a baseline to identify subsystems 
and their  fluids. 
B. Leak repa i r  sys tems a r e  res t r ic ted  to onboard R / R  a t  the compo- 
nent level o r  above (i. e . ,  no r epa i r s  will be undertaken within 
components). 
C.  Leak detection and location capability i s  assumed to exist, 
D. Leak isolation capability has  been provided and has been actival,ed 
(automatic,  manual, o r  semiautomatic mode). 
E. Leak passivation has occurred  when the repa i r  is initiated, that i s ,  
no hazard exists f rom pressu re  or temperature conditionis. T ~ X L C L ~ ~  
and corrosivity of residual fluids may be an extant hazard. 
F. All repair  methods require manned activity. 
G. Cure time refers to the duration required for an R/R method, once 
applied, to permit operational reactivation of the subsystem. For 
purposes of procedure evaluation, cure times a r e  excluded from 
R/R time, although the maximum expected cure times a r e  stated 
when applicable. Curing requires continued system downtime for 
that duration, but requires no further manned activity. 
H. All R/R methods studied must be compatible with system opera- 
tional conditions ( e. g. , temperature, pressure, corrosivity, ear 
galvanic action). 
I. Leak source fluids and materials a r e  limited to those which reflect 
current Space Station concepts. Thus, certain alternative fluids 
and container materials which a r e  under consideration as  design 
improvements a r e  not included in this study. Examples of these a re  
Wes c odyne (possible urine chemical pretreatment solution), hydro - 
chloric acid (potential urine electrolytic pretreatment fluid), 
Hastalloy C (a high-nickel-content steel possessing superior 
corrosion resistance), titanium (high s trength-to -weight ratio 
container material),  and Freon (heat transfer medium). 
J. This study will be limited to a generic evaluation of leak repair, 
Unless otherwise stated, evaluation of leak repair systems will 
be limited to an examination of feasibility and thus will avoid 
consideration of real  o r  conceptual Space Station component posi- 
tions and leak failure configurations, such as  splits, jagged and 
irregular  - sized openings, and invisible o r  hairline cracks. 
7.1 IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF R/R METHODS 
An R / R  method remedies a leak once it  has been detected and located and 
access has been provided. Table 7-1 provides an overview of all systems 
and subsystems currently conceived to be onboard the 10. 1 m ( 3 3  ft) dia 
Space Station and identifies all fluids (gases o r  liquids) and their con1:ainers 
in each system. This table served as  a starting point fox  the identification 
of R f  R methods. 
Table 7-1 
LEAK SOURCES 
System Subsystem Fluid Containe r Mat esiad 
EC/LS 0 2  Generation H2O Stainless Steel o r  Plastic 
(Electrolysis)  
0 2  Stainless Steel o r  Plastic 
H2 Stainless Steel o r  Plastic 
KOH Stainless Steel o r  k31astic 
Wash Water H2° Stainless Steel 
Recovery 
(Multifiltration) 
Potable Water Urine Stainless Steel 
Recovery 
(Vacuum H2° Stainless Steel 
Distillation) 
H2so4 Stainless Steel 
C r 0 3  Stainless Steel 
CuSOq Stainless Steel 
Atmosphere O2 Aluminum 
Control Air  ( N2 Aluminum 
-- 
Thermal  Control O2 Aluminum 
Air ( 
N2 Aluminum 
Hz0  Stainless Steel 
Humidity Control 0 2  Aluminum 
Air 1 
N2 Aluminum 
1120 Stainless Steel 
C02 Removal c o 2  Aluminum 
(Molecular Sieve) 
H20 Stainless Steel 
O2 \ Air  Aluminum 
Table 7-1 
LEAK SOURCES (Continued) 
System Subsystem Fluid Container Material  
- 
ECILS Toxin Control O2 Stainless Steel o r  
(Continued) ( Catalytic Burner )  Air Aluminum 
N2 
Sabatier Reactor CH4 Stainless Steel 
Aluminum 
Stainless Steel 
H2 Stainless Steel 
02 - t r aces  Aluminum 
N2-traces Aluminum 
Reaction 
Control 
Hypergolic 
(Mono propellant) N2H4 
He 
Aluminum 
Aluminum 
Resistoj et  Aluminum 
Aluminum 
Aluminum 
Structure P r e s s u r e  Hull 
Docking Shock Absorber  Unknown Unknown 
Mechanism (Hydraulic) 
m- 
Latch Activator Air?  Unknown 
( Pneumatic) 
He? 
Secondary Bat ter ies  KOH Stainless Steel 
Pow e-r::' (Nickel- Cadmium) 
-- 
*:Considered identical for  study purposes to electrolysis subsystem of  
EGlLS  sys tem,  
Table 7-2 summarizes  available R / R  methods which satisfy operational 
requirements.  Although many R / R  methods exist ,  not a l l  a r e  inclucled In 
Table 7-2. Some were  excluded because of an inherent lack of reliability, 
others  because they were  in an ear ly  o r  low developmental s ta tus ,  still 
others  because they would impose l a rge  amounts of toxic o r  corrosive sub- 
stances,  and for  other  reasons relating to feasibility of use  under ze ro -  
gravity and in semi-closed o r  closed ecological conditions. Examples of 
these include electron beam welding, soldering, and thermo-active plastics. 
The evaluations of methods of leak r epa i r  were  performed in the following 
manner.  Nine c r i t e r i a  were  identified which appeared to provide a bas is  for  
differentiating the various R / R  methods and which could ser iously affecl 
subsystem performance. The c r i t e r i a  selected were: permanency, re l i ab i l -  
ity, onboard weight, vehicle electr ical  power requirements ,  s torage volume, 
requirements fo r  use  of special  tools, cure  t ime,  shelf -life expectancy, and 
requirements for  control of s torage environment. These appear ac ross  the 
top of Table 7 - 2  and a r e  fully defined in  Table 7-3. 
Within each cr i ter ion,  subcategories o r  levels were  established to permit; 
evaluation using f iner  judgments. As  an example, for  the cr i ter ion of 
permanency, three  levels were  identified: H, highly permanent, o r  capable 
of functioning a s  a r epa i r  a f te r  application for  one year  o r  more ;  Ad, msder-  
ate, o r  capable of functioning f o r  6 to 12 months; and L, less  permanent 
o r  capable of functioning for  l e s s  than 6 months. Next, each c r i t e r ~ o n  was  
assigned a value on a scale  of importance f rom 1 to 5, with 1 being equiva- 
lent to minimum importance and 5 equivalent to maximum importance, 
Importance was estimated on the bas is  of expected impact upon space sys tern 
operations. F o r  example, r epa i r  permanence and reliability were  con- 
s idered of g rea te r  importance than shelf life. Thus,  shelf life was given a 
value of 1 while permanency and reliability w e r e  each rated 5. 
These cr i ter ion values were  considered to be weighting factors  and were 
used in  the determination of overal l  desirabili ty in the following manner: 
fo r  each fluid and container combination, applicable R / R  methods were  
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Table 7-3 
DEFINITION O F  CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF 
R / R  METHODS, D (M) 
Weighting 
Criterion Fac tor  Sub cat ego r y  Evaluation 
-- 
Permanency 5 :kH = 1 year  o r  more  
M = 6 months to 1 year  
L = l e s s  than 6 months 
Reliability 5 :kH = Highly reliable 
M = Requires periodic monitor - 
ing 
L = Temporary  - expect further 
R / R  
Weight 
- 
H =  m o r e  than 9 kg (20 Ib) 
M =  2.3 kg ( 5  l b )  t o  9 kg (20 'h) 
:::L= l e s s  than2 .3  kg ( 5  lb) 
Power Y = Requires vehicle electrical 
power 
:kN= Requires no electr ical  power 
Storage Volume H =  Requires more  than 0. 142 rn 3 
( 5  ft3) onboard 
M =  Requires 0.028 rn3 (1 it3) to 
0. 142 m 3  ( 5  ft3) onboard 
:::L = Requires l e s s  than Q,28 nlS 
(1 f t3 )  onboard 
Special Tools (Other 3 Y = Special Tool(s) Required 
than tho s e normally 
provided onboard for  :>N = Special Tool(s) Not 
periodic scheduled Required 
maintenance) 
Cure Time 2 H = Requires 24 hours o r  rnczr~e 
M = Requires 4 to 24 hours 
::'L = Requires l e s s  than 4 hours 
Table 7-3 
DEFINITION O F  CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION O F  
R / R  METHODS, D(M) (Continued) 
Weighting 
Cri ter ion Fac tor  Subcategory Evaluation 
--- 
Shelf Life 1 :::H = 6 months to 1 yea r  
L = l e s s  than 6 months 
Storage Environment 2 :::VAC = Requires no environrnen- 
ta l  control 
EC = Requires environmental 
control 
'bAs ter isked i tems a r e  considered to be desirable  and thus contribute 
toward the D(M) values noted in  Table 7-2. All other evaluations nlake 
no numerical contribution toward the determination of desirabili ty,  
identified. Each method was then evaluated in t e r m s  of i t s  expected perfor- 
mance within the Space Station and subcategory designations were  assigned 
for each cr i ter ion.  Certain subcategories were  defined a s  desirable ,  while 
others  were  defined a s  of no desirabili ty.  As an example, taking the 
cr i ter ion of permanency with i ts  subcategories of H, M, and L, it was 
decided that an evaluation of H was desirable  f o r  the Space Station, while any 
other evaluation was not desirable .  Thus, if  an R / R  method were  evaluated 
a s  H for  permanency, i t  earned a desirabili ty of 5, the weight fo r  that 
cr i ter ion.  If ,  however, i t  was judged to be M o r  L on permanency, i t  earned 
no desirabili ty value whatsoever. The u s e  of this system forces  an exagger-  
ation of desirabili ty which was thought to be valuable to this analysis. 
Once a l l  cr i ter ion subcategory designations had been inser ted,  a count was 
made of the number of desirable  cr i ter ion subcategories.  This number,  
multiplied by the weighting factors  f o r  the associated cr i te r ia ,  provided a 
raw score  f o r  the desirabili ty of the method for  Space Station application, 
This was converted to a standard sco re  (proportion) by dividing i t  by the 
total possible desirability raw score obtainable, which i s  a value of 270. The 
value obtained after division was entered as  D(M), the desirability of the 
method. 
Table 7-4 presents the mathematical formulas for  the calculation of D appli- 
cable to methods, D (M)' An analogous procedure applies to the calculation 
of D applicable to procedures, D (PI' D i s  thus considered to be a mathe- 
matical index of desirability of methods and procedures assuming consensus 
on the selection of cri teria for each. 
Table 7-4 
DESIRABILITY INDEX::: 
Calculation of R/ R Method Evaluation Index 
- 
Cc x Cw 
- 
RS 
D (M) - - -  MPS MPS 
1. C Number of desirable cri teria = Cc 
2 ,  C Weight factors of desirable cri teria = Cw 
3 .  Cc x Cw = Raw Score = RS 
4. Divide RS by maximum possible score = MPS = 270 
Example: Cc = 9 
Cw = 30 
Cc x Cw = 270 = RS 
RS 
- = 270 = 1.00 = D maximum (M) 
MPS 270 
RS 0 
- = -  
MPS 270 0.00 = D minimum (M) 
Range of D(M, = D max - D min = 1.00 - 0.00 = 1-00 
::'(M) subs cript denotes applicability to R/ R method. Subscripts differentiate 
D applicability. Desirability of R/R procedures is identified by D i P)' 
7 . 2  IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION O F  R / R  PROCEDURES 
R / R  Procedures  a r e  defined a s  the crew activities required to effectively 
utilize a valid R / R  method. A valid R / R  method has been defined a s  one 
which i s  evaluated a t  D(M) of 0 .25  o r  above. Procedures  were  evaluated 
in a manner  s imi lar  to R / R  methods. Cr i te r ia  used a s  a basis  for  evalua- 
tion were: number of crewmen required, requirements for  special  skil ls ,  
presence of hazard necessitating the use of protective equipment, special  
preparation requirements ,  waste generation, and repa i r  t ime requirements,  
Each cr i ter ion was fur ther  divided into the subcategories identified and 
defined in Table 7-5,  weighting values f rom 1 to 5 were  assigned, and the 
subcategories were  ranked in t e r m s  of their  desirability. The calculation 
of desirabili ty of the procedure f o r  orbital  application (D(p) )  was accorn- 
plished in the same  way a s  the D(M).  D ( p )  thus provides a quantitative index 
of the desirabili ty of each crew procedure. 
Utilizing valid [D(M)  > 0. 25 ] R / R  methods f rom Table 7-2, Table 7-6 
demonstrates the evaluation of applicable R / R  procedures and provides a 
quantitative index of their  desirabili t ies.  (D(p))  i s  based upon the weighted 
cr i te r ia  defined in Table 7-5, Reference identification i s  seen to both R / R  
methods ( Column 4) and to the detailed procedures ( Column 5) which were  
developed fo r  evaluation. 
Crew procedures were developed a s  logical flows of activit ies required for 
men to accomplish an R / R  operation. For  each fluid and container combina- 
tion, a sequential activity profile was developed which was consistent with an 
understanding of the method requirements ,  leak character is t ics ,  and the 
operational capabilities of a crew. Fifty- two such procedure profiles were  
generated of which 11 illustrative examples a r e  presented in Appendix D, 
These served a s  the basis for the procedure evaluations and D deterrnina- (P )  
tions shown in Table 7 -6. Each procedure i s  identified by a hyphenated 
number,  The f i r s t  number i s  identical to the fluid- containe r combination 
identification numbers f i r s t  established in Table 7 -2, while the number to 
the right of the hyphen reflects the category of procedure,  e. g. , Category li 
= weld, 2 = elastomer sealant, 3 = replacement,  4 = bolt and seal,  5 = epo>cy 
Table 7-5 
DEFINITION O F  CRITERIA FOR 
EVALUATION O F  R/R  PROCEDURES D(p) 
Weighting 
Criterion Fac tor  Subcategory Evaluation 
--- 
Number of Crewmen 5 H = 4 crewmen o r  m o r e  required 
M = 2 to 4 crewmen required 
:::L = 1 crewman required 
Special Crew Skills 2 Y = Special skills and training 
required 
:::N = Special skil ls  and training 
not required 
--.-- 
Hazard - Protective 
Equipment 
Y = Hazard to men o r  equiprn+$nt 
exists.  Special precaution s 
o r  protective equipm en& 
required 
:::N = No hazard 
-- -- *- 
Special Preparat ions 2 Y = Requires unusual p repa ra -  
(solvent cleaning, tions 
surface etching, 
rounding, surface :rCN = Requires no p r e p a r a t i ~ n  
smoothing of protru- 
sions,  isolation, 
sanding, etc. ) 
---- 
Special Testing Y = Techniques other than v,riau;,i 
inspection 
':'N = Visual inspection csn1.y 
Waste Material  
Gene ration 
H = Requires special  storage Ecr 
waste  generated 
M = Requires waste  storage--20 
special  s torage conditions 
)::L = Generates no waste  
mater ia l  
Table 7-5 
DEFINITION O F  CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION O F  
R / R  PROCEDURES D (Continued) (PI 
Weighting 
Cri ter ion Factor  Subcategory Evaluation 
Repair Time (exclud- 3 H = 20 minutes o r  m o r e  
ing s ealant c u r e  t imes  , 
i f  any) M = 15 to 20 minutes 
:::L = l e s s  than 15 minutes 
:::These contribute toward the calculation of D ( p )  values. All other evalu- 
ations make no numerical contribution toward the determination of 
desirabili ty.  
adhesive, 6 = epoxy adhesive patch, and 7 = adhesive tape. Thus, for each 
category, one can by use of Tables 7-2 and 7-3, t race  i ts  R/R character is t ics ,  
evaluation considerations, and desirability. 
7.3 REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS AND RESULTS 
Repair sys tems a r e  defined a s  an R/R method and the activities (procedures)  
necessary  to accomplish leak repair .  Methods and procedures a r e  synthe- 
sized in Table 7 -7  which provides an overview of the applicability of each o f  
seven identified R /  R sys terns to onboar d Space Station leak failures.  
Table 7- 7 provides repair  system desirability index ( D  ) values for each of  (S) 
the fluid- container combinations previously identified. D was derived by (S) 
multiplying previously determined D and D values. Identification (MI (P) 
numbers provided permit  ready reference to more detailed information on 
specific leak situations a s  available in previous tables. 
Table 7-8 represents  a summary of R / R  systems applicable to all hardware 
and fluids. It provides average desirabili ty indices fo r  methods and proce- 
dures  used with each, and multiplying these indices, provides an average 
desirabili ty index of the R / R  sys tem (a(S)). Relative ranking of desirabili ty 
indices for  each of the methods (R(M))  and procedures (R(p))  i s  provided, as 
well a s  a ranking of the desirabili ty of the repa i r  sys tem (R(s)). Ranlcirzgs 
a r e  based upon the magnitude of the associated average desirabili ty values 
shown. A rank of 1 i s  best ,  while 7 i s  worst .  
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Table 7- 7 
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS 
Container 
Ma te r i a l  Method P rocedu re  
and Type Fluid  ID No. ID No. 
D ( ~ )  "(p) 1 (5) 
NO. 1 W E L D  
Sta in less  Hzo 1 1 - 1 0. 28 0. 30 (' 
Tubing 0 2  20 20-1 0. 28 0. 16 i? li 
H2 42 42-1 0 .28  0,O8 0 ' 1 2  
CH4 82 82-1 0. 28 0, I6 G 0 4  
A i r  88 88-1 0. 28 0, I6 8 0: 
H2S04 118 118-1 0.28 0,Oj :> ( 1 .  
C r 0 2  & CuS04 124 124-1 0 .28  0.11 G r '  
Sta in less  
Tank 
H z 0  
H2 
H2S04 
Ur ine  
Sta inles  s 
Condenser  
H z 0  
Aluminum 0 2  
Tubing N2 
A i r  
c o 2  
Aluminum 
Tank  
GO2 
0 2  
N2 
A i r  
Aluminum 
Wall 
0 2  
N2 
A i r  
Aluminum 
Heat  Exch  
N2 
Steel  Tubing N2H4 5 3 53-1 0.28 0 ,  I1  C 
Steel  Tank  N2H4 
Mean 
Table  7- 7 
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS (Continued) 
Conta iner  
Ma te r i a l  Method P r o c e d u r e  
and Type F lu id  ID No. ID No. D ( ~ )  D(p) D6) 
Aluminum 
Wall  
0 2  
N2 
A i r  
S ta in less  N2 
Duct 
F i b e r  G la s s  O2 
Duct Air  
Aluminum 
Tubing 
N2H4 
Aluminum N2 
Duct 
Aluminum 
Wall 
*2 
Mean 
NO. 2-ELASTOMER SEALANT 
Table  7 -7  
Container 
Mate r ia l  Method P r o c e d u r e  
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. (M)  D D (M) (S) 
NO. 3 - R E P L A C E  
Stainle s s H2° 4 4-3  0.60 0. 58 0. 35 
Valve H2 48  48-3 0.60 0. 38 0,  2 3  
N2 62 62-3 0.60 0.73 0,44 
CH4 87 87-3 0 .60 0. 38 0, 2 3  
H2s04  120 120-3 0 .60 0 .33 0, 23 
C r 0 3  & CuS04 127 127-3 0 .60 0. 33 0 , Z O  
Aluminum 
Valve 
0 2  
N2 
A i r  
GO2 
Table 7- 7 
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS ( C O I I ~ ~ I T ~ ~ C ' C ~ )  
NO. 3-REI'LAC I;: 
Container 
Mater ia l  Method Procedure  
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. TJ( , 
Teflon Seals  - 0 2  
Wall A i r  
Steel  Valve N2H4 55 55-3 0. 60 O* ' 
77 77-3 0.44 0 ,  - Aluminum 
Heat 
N2 
Exchanger 
Polysulfone KOH 
Tubing 
Mean 0. 60 0. d r  
'Tab1 e 7- 7 
NO. &ROL,T AND SEAL, 
Container 
Mater ia l  Method Procedure  
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. D ( ~ )  D ( ~  : ) I  - 
Stainles s H2O 
Tank H2 
H2so4  
Urine 
Stainless H20 
Condenser 
Aluminum O2 
Tank 
Air  
Table 7- 7 
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS (Continued) 
NO. 4-BOLT AND SEAL 
Container 
Ma te r i a l  Method P r o c e d u r e  
and Type Fluid  ID No. ID No. D( Db% 
Stee l  Tank  N2H4 
Mean 
Table  7-7 ( e )  
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS (Continued) 
NO. 5-EPOXY ADHESIVE 
Container 
Ma te r i a l  
and Type F lu id  
Method P r o c e d u r e  
ID No. ID No. D ( ~ )  D (PI D (Sl 
Polyethylene H2 0 
Tubing O2 
H2 
A i r  
Poly  sulfone 
Tubing 
H 2 0  
0 2  
H2 
A i r  
Mean 0. 31 0.24 0, 08 
Table  7-7 ( f )  
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS (Continued) 
NO. 6-EPOXY ADHESIVE PATCH 
Container 
Ma te r i a l  Method P r o c e d u r e  
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. D (PI D (S) 
Aluminum 0 2  
W a l l  N2 
A i r  
Table  7-7  
REPAIR SYSTEM S Y  NTIIESIS (Con t inued )  
NO. 6 -EPOYY ADI-IESIVE PATCII  
Container 
Mater ial  Method Procedure 
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. D ( M )  D 51i $1 
F iber  Glass 
Ducts 
0 2  
Air 
Steel Tubing N2H4 
Stainless Duct N2 
Aluminum 
Duct 
N2 
Stainles s Urine 
Tank 
Mean 0.44 0 .  30 C *  13 
REPAIR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS (Continued) 
N O ,  7-ADI-IESIVE T A P E  
Container 
Material  Method Procedure 
and Type Fluid ID No. ID No. D (M)  D (E")P n csi 
-- 
Aluminum 0 2  
Walls N2 
Air  
F ibe r  Glass 0 2  
Ducts Air 
Stainles s N2 
Ducts 
Aluminum N2 
Ducts 
Mean 0. 36 0 . 6 5  C, 2 3  
-- 
Table  7-8 
R/ R SYSTEM EVALUATION SUMMARY 
No. 
Repair  
Methods Procedures  Sys t em 
TY pe F D R 
- R - (M) (M) D(p) (P) D(s) R (S) 
1 Weld 0. 28 7 0.20 6 0.05 6 
2 E la s tomer  0.44 2 0. 63  2 0. 28 1 
Sealant 
3 Replace 0.60 1 0.46 3 0. 28 1 
4 Bolt and 0 .44  2 0. 08 7 0. 04 7 
Seal 
5 EPOXY 0. 31 6 0 .24  5 0. 08 5 
Adhesive 
6 EPOXY 0 .44  2 0. 30 4 0.13 4 
Adhesive 
Patch 
7 Adhesive 0. 36 5 0 . 6 5  1 0. 23 3 
Tape  
7. 3. 1 Methods 
Table 7-8 shows that the bes t  available leak r epa i r  method i s  replacement  s f  
the defective component (R(M) = 1).  Where replacement i s  not feasible  o r  
otherwise  undesirable,  e las  tomeric  sealants o r  epoxy adhesive patches ( R  i MI 
= 2 )  a r e  the p re fe r r ed  repa i r  methods for those fluid- container combinations 
permitt ing this approach. A vers ion of the patch concept i s  shown in Fig- 
ure  7- 1. F o r  remaining fluid-container combinations, an equally des i rable  
repa i r  method is  the bolt and sea l  approach, utilizing a silicone o r  f luorel  s e a l  
and a metal l ic  bolt inser t  (R ( M )  = 2 ) .  
Least  desirable  of the methods is arc-welding (R = 5). Its low desirabil i ty (MI 
index ref lects  i t s  anticipated requirements  fo r  significant vehicle e lec t r ica l  
power, lift-off weight, and onboard s torage volume. 
Figure 7-1. Blister Patch Concept for Space Station Pressure Wall 
- 
7. 3 . 2  Procedures  
Table 7 -8 shows that the grea tes t  procedural desirabili ty (R(p)  = 1) i s  in the 
application of adhesive tape which reflects i t s  simplicity. It i s  undesirable 
a s  a method for  space systems because of low permanency and reliability, 
The second alternative procedure (R(p)  = 2 )  i s  the application of an elasto- 
m e r i c  sealant,  which appears  highly desirable  because of i t s  relative ease  
of application. A ma jo r  drawback to the use  of such sealants i s  significant 
cure  t imes of up to 24 hours.  During cure,  systems would be inoperative, 
Thus, the applicability of e lastomers  i s  seriously abridged despite desirabi l -  
ity f rom both the methods and procedures  standpoints. 
Replacement appears  a s  the next desirable  alternative,  but of course,  i s  
l imited again by feasibility for  space operations. 
Of markedly lower desirabili ty,  the next procedural alternative i s  the use oi 
an epoxy adhesive patch. This i s  applicable to a wide variety of container 
mater ia l s  and fluids, but cannot be readily applied to a wide variety of con- 
ta iner  configurations. While applicable to pres  su re  hulls and ducting which 
present  flat  surfaces fo r  repa i r ,  i t  i s  not applicable to tubing o r  other con- 
ta iners  possessing m o r e  complex surface geometries.  The desirable  
alternative seems  to be epoxy adhesive. While over coming the limitations 
in  applicability of epoxy adhesive patches, epoxy adhesive s t i l l  suffers .from 
deficiencies in  permanency, reliability, and requirements fo r  environmental 
control during storage, a s  shown in  Table 7-2. 
Leas t  desirable  f rom a procedural standpoint i s  the bolt and sea l  approach 
because of i t s  procedural complexity and requirements fo r  special  skil ls  and 
unusual surface preparation. F o r  a description of the bolt and sea l  proce- 
dure ,  s ee  Procedure 6 -4  in Appendix D which i s  typical of the activities 
necessary  for  the accomplishment of a bolt and sea l  repair .  
7. 3 .  3 Systems 
On an absolute basis ,  no one repair  system i s  more  than 28 percent  desirable 
fo r  space application. This i s  a serious potential problem for the repair  of 
onboard leaks on the Space Station by crew members .  The two systems 
eshibit lng a 28 pe rcen t  des i rabi l i ty  or a ranking of r epa i r  sys ten i  o f  1 1  1 ( 5 )  
a r e  the usc. of compoileizt replacemc~nt  and the application of elastolllcr-ic 
s calant s .  
Sor i i~~*~l ia t  l e s s  desii-a!,lc, 1,ut s t i l l  art cptal?le, i s  the 11sc of aclhesl\c. a;?< 
(IX(si ? \ ,  rlcspltc low p e r m a n e n o -  and relia1)ility. The lise of t l i ~ s  -cxl,a: t- 
syst ~ i l i  pr<-'siipposes the. u l l l i n ~ n c ~ s s  t~ rindertake cant intlecl pe~-icjtilc ic,ali 
m o n i t o r i ~ ~ g  o f 11ie r epa i r  site and m i l l  reqllire repeated ~ ~ t i l i z a t ~ o i ~  l 1 ~ 1 ~ , 1  a 
m o r e  perniancnt r epa i r  1s achiex cti. 
Lea s t  de s i r ab l e  of the r e p a i r  systems a r e  welding ( R  = 6 )  and bolt anc? (S)  
s ea l  (R (S )  = 7) .  These  a r e  s e r i ous ly  impa i r ed  by p rocedura l  considcrat ic~iis  
o r  methodological  diff icult ies.  
7 . 4  RECOMMENDED SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
The  findings l ead  to the inescapable  conclusion that  l eak  r e p a i r  s y s t c ~ n s  
currently avai lable  f o r  Space Station u s e  a r e  l e s s  than sa t i s fac to ry ,  Thei r  
def ic iencies  r e l a t e  to p rocedura l  diff icult ies,  methodological shortcoming.;, 
and l imi ted  commonali ty.  I t  i s  r ecommended  that r epa i r  s y s t e m s  as d e l ~ n e d  
in this  study be  considered only a s  secondary  sy s t ems  f o r  Space Station L ~ s e ,  
Rel iance  should f i r s t  be  placed on approaches  which tend to minilmi7 c tb.i 
probabil i ty of l e a k s ,  then upon des ign redundancy f o r  c r i t i ca l  sy s t em filnc- 
t ions ,  and l as t ly  upon R/R sys t ems .  
If l e ak  probabil i ty reduction and redundancy cannot be  provided o r  a r e  w x i -  
mal ly  avai lable ,  then R/R sys t ems  could be  re l i ed  upon if additional effort 
i s  expended in  the i r  development.  Such development should cen te r  upon 
eliminating diff icult ies in  the r e p a i r  s y s t e m s  offering the  g r ea t e s t  potentzal 
commonali ty f o r  fluid- container combinations. Th is  study indicates  that 
a r c  -welding h a s  the g r ea t e s t  potential commonali ty,  but i s  somewhat dei: - 
cient f r o m  both a methods  and p rocedures  standpoint.  Efforts  in -~velding 
should thus be  d i rec ted  toward reducing power,  s i z e ,  and specia l  tool 
r equ i ren len t s  and minimizing spec ia l  ski l l s  and haza rd  protection i-r qir 1 i = -  
m c r ~ t  s o f  f t i t  111-c c r e \ ~ - ? .  
In the realm of repair systems for nonmetallic containers, development 
effort might best be spent on epoxy adhesive systems whose major limita- 
tions stem from inadequacies in permanency, reliability, and cure time 
requirements. 
The ground rules used in the present study suggest that the results be used 
with some caution. To improve the applicability of this study to future space 
systems, it is recommended that a more detailed and comprehensive study 
effort be undertaken which considers the following aspects: (1)  specific leak 
configurations, ( 2 )  procedural time demands, ( 3 )  newer container materials, 
(4)  alternative fluids, (5 ) leak repair response time requirements and 
( 6 )  full pressure suit operations necessitated by rapid response time 
situations. 
Sec t ion  8 
IIAMAGF, CONTROL SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN 
The  p r l l i ~  ipa l  c o n s i d c r a t i o n  i n  the p r e l i m i n a r y  d e s i g n  of the DCS i s  to  p-rov~clc 
a coinjsatible i n t e r f a c e  w i t h  the e s t a b l i s h e d  Space  S ta t ion  d e s i g n  colli epl .  
Fqla sc R Space  S ta t ion  concep t  ( 1  0 .  1 m d i a ) ,  a s  we l l  a s  t h e  m o d u l a r  c l i \ s -gn  
~ , i > o w -  11,) s lgn i f l can t  diff tkrenccs lu tho  me thod  of i n t eg ra t ion  of t h e  I X S .  i ' h ~  
ioglc a1 rnc.thod of i n t eg ra t ion  o f  t h c  DCS funct ion i s  t h r o u g h  t h e  o l ~ b c ~ a r i l  rhecl? - 
0111 s y i l i ~ r - n ,  which h a s  t h e  o v c r a l l  responsibility f o r  ~ n f l i g h t  checlrout ant1 
i a ~ t l l  i ?(,la1 ion f o r  a l l  Spacc  S ta t ion  s u b s y s t e m s  and  e x p e r i m e n t s .  Thr. f o I l ~ ~ v / i : ? f ~  
5 1  ( i i o n s  prc,scxi~t a13 (31 c,r.vlcw of thc  p r e f e r r e d  a p p r o a c h  f o r  the  d e s i g n  of i b ~  
5 p ~ i  i, S tar ic~i i  oi-11)oard chccl\out s y s t e m  a n d  a  m o r e  de t a i l ed  examrnat ron  c,l th,, 
11itt.gi-at 101-1 ( ~ i  l h ( ~  sc.1 ~ , c t e d  DGS into the  onboa rd  checkout  s y s t e m .  
- 1 I ~ ~ S C I I I I ' T I O N  O F  THE ONBOARD CHECKOUT SYSTEM 
1 ]-I(. o l b j ( \ c t  : ~ ~ t ~ s  or the b a s e l i n c  onboard  checkou t  s y s t e m  (OCS) d e s i g n  
nppt-oach are ( 1 )  to i m p r o v e  c r e w  conf idence  and  s a f e t y  b y  p r e s e n t i n g  rn;lri..,e- 
( 1  iatc, inclic i t  ions of o u t - o f - t o l e r a n c e  condi t ions  i n  c r i t i c a l  s u b s y s t e m s ;  6" LO 
-~.;cc.~-ic*~~i i a i n t c n a n c e  n e e d s  and e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e ,  and (3)  to  p rov ide  
\-ralllc s y s t e i n  h y  r rc ju i r ing  a n  i n h e r e n t  f lex ib i l i ty  i n  the d e s i g n  to acco:m~-r-~o- 
tiiit(> I ~ I - O T ~  I l l  aliri c h a n g e s  in  both h a r d w a r e  and  s o f t w a r e .  I t e m  ( 1 )  above i.; 
( o ~ r ) ~ ) l  I i l ? c . t i  I ) \ -  p ro1  iding a  c o n t ~ n u o u s  m o n i t o r  of l i f e  and  m i s s l o n  c r ~ t ~ c a !  
l l rni- t io~?s,  a l c r t l n g  the  c r e w  th rough  cau t ion  and w a r n i n g  i n d i c a t o r s  w h e n  Lhc 
i ~ i o a t i o n  v,a r r a n t s ,  and b y  provid ing  a u t o m a t i c  sa f ing  when t h e r e  i s  ~ n s t i f -  
f rc : i . i~ t  t ~ m c  for c r e w  i n t e r v e n t i o n  I t e m  (2 )  i s  a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  p r o ~ r r d i r g  s 
f a s t ,  a (  ( u r a t e  a s s e s s r n e i l t  of s u b s y s t e m  p e r f o r m a n c e  wi th  i s o l a t i o n  of l a r ~ i t s  
t o  th(. 10\11(,11t r e p l a c e a b l e  unit  (LRU)  l e v e l .  I t e m  (3)  i s  a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  
i i ~ t ~ ~ g ? ~ ~ i  i ri7i.z; c-xpc\rin~cl~t.s and  s u b s y s t e m s  th rough  the u s e  of s t a n d a r d  modula r  
irit c r  Ta i c rriiits a s  w t l l  a s  p rov id ing  a  capab i l i t y  to  g e n e r a t e  checkou t  prcce- 
citircls cl i ~ c l  i o i  twarci c h a n g e s  on- l ine  to  a d a p t  to changing  condi t ions  
The OCS design approach  for  the Space Station i s  a highly user -or ien ted  
s y s t e m  with max imum automation.  The sys t em i s  designed to min imize  
c r e w  intervent ion i n  routine checkout functions, but provides fo r  a coopera -  
t ive  effort  when the  capabi l i t ies  of the  c r e w  a r e  needed.  The design takes  
maximum advantage of the  data management  sy s t em capability for data 
acquisi t ion,  distr ibution,  d isplays ,  p rocess ing ,  s to rage ,  and sof tware .  
8. 1.  P Data Acquisi t ion 
Two methods a r e  used i n  the OCS fo r  data  acquisi t ion.  One method i s  calleci 
ind i rec t  and i s  typical  of equipment which contains in te rna l  data-formatt ing 
c i r cu i t ry  such a s  spec ia l  t e s t  and monitoring c i r cu i t ry  o r  an in tegra l  
dedicated data p r o c e s s o r .  Direct  data  acquisi t ion i s  utilized when the equip- 
men t  does  not contain this  capability. In this c a s e ,  the t e s t  points o r  
t r ansduce r  outputs a r e  connected d i rec t ly  to a s tandard interfacing module 
which i s  r e f e r r e d  to a s  a r emo te  data acquisi t ion unit (RDAU). The principal 
c i rcu i t s  in  the RDAU, shown in  F igure  8-1  a r e :  (1) a 32-channel analog 
mul t ip lexer  which i s  controlled b g  the channel sequencer  and se lec t s  the 
channel of i n t e r e s t ,  (2)  a  p rogrammable  gain ampli f ier  which adapts  to the 
gain levels  s to red  for  e ach  analog mul t ip lexer  channel,  (3) an  A-D c o r ~ v e r t e r  
which changes the analog input signal  to digital  fo rmat ,  (4) a digital  compara -  
t o r  c i rcu i t  which pe r fo rms  high and low l imit  checking between the incoming 
data and s to red  l im i t s ,  and (5) the input/output buffer which rece ives  
command m e s s a g e s  f r o m  the data bus t e rmina l  and i s  used to t r ansmi t  data 
words  back to the data bus t e rmina l  under di rect ion of the control  logic. XM 
addition to the analog channels,  the RDAU can a l so  accept  32 digital  inputs 
(logic 0 o r  logic 1 functions).  These  inputs a r e  a l s o  checked i n  the compara -  
to r  fo r  changes with r e spec t  to the i r  s to red  nominal level .  
Operat ion of the RDAU i s  under control  of the OCS p roces so r  which t r sn s rn i l :~  
control  informat ion via  the data bus subsys tem.  A standard word fo rmat  
containing the a d d r e s s  of the appropr ia te  RDAU and a n  ins t ruct ion code are 
used f o r  control .  Severa l  modes  of operation a r e  provided,  including a 
compare  mode i n  which each  input channel i s  scanned sequential ly and 

compared to i t s  s to red  l im i t s .  If an  e r r o r  i s  detected,  a m e s s a g e  i s  
format ted for  t r ansmis s ion  to the OCS p r o c e s s o r .  The s to red  l imi t s  are 
under control  of the p r o c e s s o r  and can be a l t e red  a s  requ i red  to accomnTo- 
date changing conditions. A sequential  output mode of operat ion i s  a l so  
provided whe re  the l imi t  checks a r e  inhibited and the b inary  coded output of 
each  channel i s  t r ansmi t ted  to the OCS p roces so r  fo r  fu r ther  analysis  o r  
s to rage .  The RDAU can  a l s o  be operated i n  a single-channel output mode 
whe re  data f r o m  a specific channel i s  t ransmit ted (once o r  repeti t ively,  as  
de s i r ed ) ,  
8 .  1 .  2 Stimuli Generat ion 
The following conclusions have resul ted f r o m  the Space Station P h a s e  B 
studies:  
A. At p resen t ,  r equ i rements  can  be identified for  only a few 
special ized s t imul i .  
B. The design approach  will  provide flexibility fo r  future growth and 
changes.  
C .  T e s t  s t imul i  should be located nea r  the using equipment and m a d e  
in tegra l  to the equipment where  possible.  
D. Ex te rna l  sou rce s  wil l  be supplied when buil t- in s t imul i  a r e  not 
p rac t ica l  o r  a common use  can  be identified. 
8. 1 .  3 Data Distr ibution 
The data  bus s y s t e m  has  been selected to p e r f o r m  the data distr ibution for 
the Space Station. It ha s  been determined that the OCS data distr ibution 
requ i rements  a r e  re la t ively  s imple  with r e spec t  to the data  management  
subsys tem (DMS). In addition, the DMS and OCS frequently r equ i r e  a c c e s s  
to common data  points; the re fore ,  a  shared  data  bus s y s t e m  for  the DMS and 
OCS i s  p r e f e r r e d ,  The ma in  data  bus sy s t em cons i s t s  of a coaxial  cable and 
a combined t ime divi sion-frequenc y division multiplexing scheme.  The QCS 
digital  data  information i s  t ime-multiplexed onto a specified c a r r i e r  f requ-  
ency,  which i s  then f requency multiplexed with other c a r r i e r s  on the common 
bus sy s t em,  It i s  expected that the OCS command and control  signals and 
measu remen t  data  wil l  be  partitioned by use  of separa te  carriers which will  
aliow full duplex operat ion.  P rov i s ions  fo r  clock synchronization wil l  be 
made  through a  s epa ra t e  clock c a r r i e r  o r  the use  of self-clocking codes .  
The data  bris t e rmina l  shown in  block d i a g r a m  f o r m  i n  F igu re  8 - 2  provide,s 
the in te r race  between the data bus and a l l  o ther  s y s t e m s .  This  unit has  the 
capabil i ty to t r a n s m i t  speci f ic  commands  to any o r  a l l  of i t s  t e rmina ted  
devices  (e  g , RDATJ's, d i sp lays ,  o r  p r o c e s s o r s )  through i t s  i n p u t / o u t p ~ t  
switching 1rni.i I t  a l s o  provides  512-bit buffer s t o r age  fo r  accommodat ing 
data  that ic to be t ransmi t t ed  to the data  bus .  This  f e a tu r e  i s  included to 
accornrr>aclace i r r e g u l a r  data  r a t e s ;  i t  provides  a  m e a n s  of a s s e m b l y  of data  
f o r  block t r a n s f e r  to the bus .  
8. 1 .  4 P roce s s ing  
-- 
Data p rocess ing  and con t ro l  fo r  the OCS a r e  accomplished i n  the subsysterm 
control  computer  and the subsys tem backup/exper iment  compute r .  These 
units a r e  p a r t  01 the DMS and contain the executive p r o g r a m s  which control  
the O C S  data  acquisi t ion and p e r f o r m  the a r i t hme t i c ,  logic,  and ana lys i s  
requ i red  to de tec t  malfunct ions ,  control  reconf igurat ion,  and p r e p a r e  data  
fo r  s t o r age  and display updates.  Operat ion of the data  t r a n s f e r  f r o m  
t e rmina l  to p r o c e s s o r  wi l l  be accomplished through a  polling mode ;  that  ~ s ,  
each  data  t e rmina l  wi l l  respond with data  only when reques ted  by the super -  
v i so ry  p r o g r a m .  The data  t r a n s f e r  sequence wil l  be a s  fol lows: 
A. An encoded command f r o m  the supe rv i so ry  p r o g r a m  to the t e rmina l  
vi, the data  bus  request ing s ta tus .  
13. A response  f r o m  the t e rmina l  to the supe rv i so r  indicating s ta tus  
C. A command f r o m  the supe rv i so r  to the t e rmina l  to ini t iate data 
t r a n s f e r  
D, The data  t r a n s f e r  f r o m  t e rmina l  to supe rv i so r  
8. 1 .  5 Storage 
The bulk s t o r age  capabil i ty of the DMS i s  a l s o  sha r ed  with the OCS. The 
se lected s ubsys t em use s  u l t ra-high-densi ty  magnet ic  tape record ing  techni- 
ques and i s  designed to m e e t  l a rge-vo lume data  s t o r age  r equ i r emen t s  with 
a  re la t ively  slow a c c e s s  t ime .  This  s t o r age  subsys t em will  be used 
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p r i m a r i l y  f o r  record ing  digital  data  before  onboard p rocess ing  o r  before  
r e t u r n  to  ground s ta t ion fo r  p rocess ing .  The data  s t o r age  i s  under control  
of the DMS compute r .  Data f r o m  var ious  subsys tems  and locations a r e  
tagged and s t o r ed  i n  add re s sed  locations.  Acces s  to data  f r o m  the m e m o r y  
location upon a command ini t iated by  the DMS compute r .  
8. 1.  6 Display and Control  
Onboard checkout d i sp lay  and control  r equ i r emen t s  have been reviewed as  
p a r t  of the P h a s e  B Space Station study. The conclusions indicate that O C S  
and operat ional  controls  and displays  should be  located a t  a  c en t r a l  location. 
The posit ion of these  units  shal l  be such that  dur ing no rma l  operat ion,  a 
single c r e w  m e m b e r  can  observe  OCS displays  and mainta in  a c c e s s  to the 
OCS switches  and keyboard inputs while maintaining operat ional  con t ro l ;  
however ,  sufficient space  wi l l  be provided fo r  optional two-man operat ion 
(one a t  OCS con t ro l s  and one a t  operat ional  con t ro l s )  during c r i t i c a l  per iods .  
P rov i s i ons  a r e  made  i n  the Space Station des ign f o r  a p r i m a r y  control  
c en t e r  and a backup secondary  control  c en t e r  located in  a n  a r e a  maintained 
by a n  independent E C / L S  sys t em.  The key  fea tu res  of the display and 
control  console a r e  a s  follows: 
A. Dedicated displays  a r e  provided for high- p r io r i ty  functions s u c h  
a s  the caution and warning s ignals .  
B. The p r i m a r y  display device  i s  a  cathode r a y  tube which p r e sen t s  
a lphanumer ic  and graphic  informat ion per t inent  to subsys tem,  
mi s s ion ,  and exper iment  operation.  
C. Control  functions a r e  provided by keyboards  and mul t i -mode 
switching a r r a y s .  
A concept of a Space Station command and control  cen te r  i s  shown in  
F igure  8-3 .  The block d i a g r a m  shown i n  F igure  8-4 shows how a typical 
cathode r a y  tube display sy s t em,  using loca l  m e m o r y ,  in te r faces  with the 
DMS through the data  bus  dis t r ibut ion sy s t em.  
8. 1. 7 Caution and Warning 
The p r i m a r y  requ i rement  of the OCS i s  to continuously moni tor  and provide 
s ta tus  indications of a l l  l ife -upport  and mi s s ion  p a r a m e t e r s  that  a r e  defined 
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a s  cr i t ical .  Two levels of a l a r m  have been defined for the Space Statioii. 
Warning level a l e r t s  a r e  activated when out-of-tolerance conditions a r e  
detected which indicate an immediate threat  to c rew life. Examples of these 
include: (1) a rapid decay of a tmospheric  p res su re ,  ( 2 )  f i r e ,  and ( 3 )  high 
levels of toxic contaminants. Caution level a l e r t s  a r e  to be displayed when- 
ever  immediate crew action i s  necessary  to prevent major  degradation of 
Space Station performance. Caution level functions a r e  derived f rom the 
analysis of sensor  outputs which might indicate, for example, (1) increased 
f i re  o r  explosion hazard,  (2 )  excessive nitrogen o r  oxygen resupply r a t e ,  
(3)  excessive humidity, (4) high or  low cabin temperature levels ,  o r  (5) 
rising C 0 2  level. Analysis of the overall  Phase B Space Station sys tem 
caution and warning requirements  have been made. The resul ts  were  that  
approximately 135 caution functions and 15 warning functions a r e  identified, 
Integration of the caution and warning level signals into Space Station 
displays has  been considered. The prefer red  method used to convey caution 
level information to the crew members  i s  through the use of dedicated dks- 
play panels capable of presenting alphanumeric messages .  A typical panel 
contains 8 rows of 32 charac ters  each. Each charac ter  i s  presented in a 
5 by 7 dot ma t r ix  format .  The panel display unit contains the electronics 
including d r ive r s ,  memory ,  timing, and charac ter  generators  a s  well a s  
the parallel  plate, gas discharge type display. There a r e  three advantages 
to this type display: (1 ) information i s  displayed in  English language m e s  sage 
ra ther  than a coded format  on the source of the malfunction, (2) a s  many as  
five o r  six individual messages  can be displayed simultaneously when 
required, and (3) the physical character is t ics  of this type of display a r e  
attractive with respect  to the amount of information t ransferred.  Warning 
level information will be conveyed by means of dedicated lights which will  
be redundantly located a t  the p r imary  and secondary control centers  a s  wreEl 
a s  locally. A tone o r  audible attention-getting signal will a l so  be generated 
to ensure crew response.  The identification of the warning sources i s  not 
considered essent ial  since they a r e  few, and the crew reaction will be the 
same regard less  of the cause-retreat to  the tunnel or other designated safe 
a r e a  and don space suit. 
8 . 2  INTEGRATION O F  SELECTED DCS SYSTEM INTO THE OCS 
The following sect ions  contain the descr ipt ions  of the data  acquisitiori 
p roces s  between selected DCS subsys tems  and the p r e f e r r ed  P h a s e  P, Space 
Station basel ine  OCS. Also  included i s  a n  analysis  of the requ i rements  of 
the DCS and the es t imated  impac t  of this s y s t e m  on the overa l l  Space Station 
design.  The emphas i s  i s  on providing insight into the sy s t ems  integration 
problem.  
Signal conditioning and preprocess ing  requ i rements  a r e  discussed in  this 
sect ion for  the se lected DCS. Sensors  include (1) the two-gas a tmospherc  
con t ro l le r  fo r  nitrogen gas  use  r a t e ,  (2)  the impac t  gage a r r a y  for  detecting 
and locating meteoroid- type impac ts  on the inner  p r e s s u r e  shel l ,  (3)  the 
acoust ic  emi s s ion  s e n s o r s  which moni tor  format ion growth of flaws o r  
m i c r o c r a c k s  i n  solid m a t e r i a l  ( p r e s s u r e  shel l )  under s t r e s s ,  (4) the s e a l  
leak de tec tors  which moni tor  leaks  a c r o s s  s ea l s  due to imprope r  seating 
o r  degradation,  (5) the active u l t rason ics  subsys tems  which uti l ize an a r r a y  
of t r ansponde r - r ece ive r s  to locate flaws o r  c r a c k s  i n  the p r e s s u r e  shel l  
s t r uc tu r e ,  and (6) the onboard leak subsys tem based on the Space Station 
E C / L S  s y s t e m  a s  a typical  representa t ion.  
8. 2. 1 Data Acquisition Requirements  
8 . 2 .  1 .  1 Two-Gas Atmosphere  Control ler  
As d i scussed  previously ,  the nitrogen gas  resupply r a t e  can  be used to 
detect  a n  onboard ni t rogen gas  o r  overboard a tmosphere  leak.  Changes in 
the ni t rogen resupply r a t e  can  a l so  be analyzed to de te rmine  the o r d e r  of 
magnitude of the leak.  
Planned a tmospher ic  10s s e  s  wil l  be known. Verif ication will  be obtained 
during in i t ia l  operation of the Space Station. There fore ,  the pulse r a t e  
modulated two-gas a tmosphere  control  s y s t e m  will  normal ly  admit  a fixed 
number  of pulses  pe r  hour .  Sho r t - t e rm  anomal ies  such a s  those due to 
t empe ra tu r e  cycling will  be known and allowances made  for  the nitrogen 
resupply ra te  monitor. The following i s  a description of a method of 
acquiring data based upon a modification of the two-gas atmosphere 
controller used in the 90-day manned space simulation tes t  (Reference 1 ' 7 ) .  
The nitrogen resupply ra te  can be monitored by adding a n  accumulator 
c ircui t  to the basic  pulse ra te  modulated two-gas atmosphere controller.  
This accumulator i s  assumed to be incorporated into the controller design 
and the input and output signal requirements  a r e  a s  shown in  the block 
diagram of Figure 8-5.  The basic operation i s  a s  follows: 
A. A high limit  check i s  controlled by an 8-bit binary word 
a rb i t r a r i ly  called LIMIT. The value of LIMIT i s  determined 
by operator  input o r  by program control, and i s  input to the 
two-gas controller f rom the subsystem mult iprocessor  via the 
data bus and data terminal.  
B. The LIMIT input word i s  stored in  a latch reg is te r  in the 
controller.  The contents of this reg is te r  a r e  used to r e se t  
the accumulator during the normal  l imit  check cycle. 
C. The integrator  r e s e t  pulses f rom the nitrogen channel of the 
controller a r e  used to increment  the accumulator. If the input 
pulse ra te  exceeds the value determined by LIMIT, a TERMINAL 
COUNT output i s  generated. This output i s  the digital input to a 
RDAU. If no TERMINAL COUNT occurs ,  the accumulator r e se t s  
and begins counting input pulses for the next cycle. This opera-  
tion resul ts  in a continuous upper l imit  monitoring of the nitrogen 
gas resupply rate .  
D. When a TERMINAL COUNT i s  input to the RDAU, the subsystem 
mult iprocessor  i s  notified via the standard Space Station interface 
(the RDAU to data bus terminal  to data bus to mult iprocessor) ,  
The mult iprocessor  then sends an  instruction word to the gas 
controller through the data bus terminal.  The accumulator i s  
then r e s e t  to zero  ( ra ther  than the LIMIT used for upper l imit  
monitoring) and permitted to count for  one timing period. At $lie 
end of this timing period, the accumulator contains the nitrogen 
gas resupply ra te  integrated over the period. This information 
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i s  formatted into a data word which i s  t ransmit ted to the 
multiprocessor via the data bus terminal.  Operation in the continu- 
ous monitor mode i s  then res tored  if desired. The LIMIT word may 
be  the same a s  before o r  a new LIMIT based upon analysis of the 
present  nitrogen resupply r a t e  may be  input by the  multiprocessor^ 
E. Periodically,  the main checkout program will request data on the 
nitrogen resupply ra te .  These data a r e  acquired for  the mult i -  
p rocessor  in  the same manner  a s  described above. The data 
acquired f rom this routine will be checked for lower l imit  (internal 
nitrogen leak evaluation). The data will be analyzed for deviations 
f rom previously acquired data and stored i f  significant changes 
relevant to long or  shor t - te rm trends a r e  discernible. 
A modification to the existing two-gas atmosphere controller with respect  
to the frequency of the integrator r e se t  pulses i s  required to accommoda.te 
the leak detection scheme within the 15-second period. This change would 
not affect the operational character is t ics  of the present  design and would 
offer some advantages in  component selection for  the integrator c ircui t .  
In summary ,  the following i tems a r e  considered to be of importance: 
A. This sys tem will provide continuous upper l imit  monitoring 
of nitrogen gas resupply ra te .  
B. Out-of-tolerance l imits on the high side can be monitored by 
one digital input to the RDAU. 
C .  High limits to detect out-of-tolerance operation a r e  under the 
control of the main checkout program (adjustable l imits) .  
D. Approximately 15 seconds af ter  the leak i s  detected, data on 
the nitrogen gas resupply ra te  will be available for display a t  
the control monitor. 
E. The operator  a t  the control monitor may  request continuous 
update information for analysis.  This can be supplied a t  a rate 
of 4 updates pe r  minute. 
F. The basic design of pulse ra te  modulated two-gas atmosphere 
controller i s  retained with ve ry  minor  modifications. 
G, The data acquisition method i s  compatible with the Space Station 
interface.  
8. 2. 1 .  2 Impact  Gage Subsys t e m  
The impac t  gage subsys t em will  be used to moni to r ,  c lass i fy ,  and locate 
damage to the ex te rna l  p r e s s u r e  she l l  a s  i t  occu r s .  The impac ts  which can 
cause  damage to the p r e s s u r e  she l l  include those f r o m  the ex t e r i o r  such as  
coll isions with meteoro ids  o r  space  deb r i s ,  docking col l is ions ,  o r  ma1 - 
functioning equipment ex te rna l  to the p r e s s u r e  shell .  Damage to the external 
p r e s  s u r e  shel l  m a y  a l s o  r e su l t  f r o m  shrapnel-type impac ts  f r o m  explosion 
caused by  malfunctioning onboard equipment. 
The impact  gage subsys tem consis ts  of a se t  of t r a n s d u c e r s ,  mounted in  
contact with the inner s ide  of the outer  p r e s s u r e  shel l .  Energy from any 
significant impact  will be sensed in one o r  m o r e  of these  t r a n s d u c e r s .  
For  th is  port ion of the study, it  will be a s s u m e d  that  t r ansduce r s  a r e  
mounted a t  approximately  equidistant in tervals  on the wall of the  outer  
p r e s s u r e  shel l .  Spacing i s  expected t o  be 4 . 6 m  (15 f t )  minimum. 
This subsys tem can be operated i n  the following manner :  
A .  Continuous upper l imi t  test ing shal l  be performed on s enso r  outputs 
for  each  t ransducer  i n  the impac t  gage subsys tem.  
B. In the event a n  impac t  occu r s ,  the acoust ic  energy  i n  the f o r m  of 
s t r e s s  waves  propagates  through the p r e s s u r e  wal l  and i s  ini t ial ly 
detected by the t ransducer  n e a r e s t  the point of impac t .  The 
velocity of propagation i s  a s sumed  to be 5 m m / p s e c  (wave travels 
approximately  0 . 3 m  in 60 p. s e c ) .  
C .  The output of the  s enso r s  resul t ing f r o m  a n  impact  on the  p r e s s u r e  
shell  wall can be c lass i f ied a s  follows: 
1. Using a f requency d i sc r imina t ion  technique on the s enso r  
output s igna l s ,  i t  should be poss ible  to dist inguish between 
an  impac t  f r o m  a high-velocity sou rce  such a s  meteoroid  
o r  space deb r i s  and impac ts  f r o m  other  sou rce s  ( see  
Appendix B) .  
2 .  The amplitude of the sensed signal  resul t ing f r o m  the impact 
should provide informat ion re la t ive  to the extent  of damage 
incur red .  F o r  example ,  a th ree- leve l  detection sy s t em could 
be implemented whereby the f i r s t  detection level i s  designed 
to be a t  that point which just exceeds the damage threshold, 
the highest detection level may be a t  that point where 
penetration of the p res su re  wall is  fairly certain,  and 
another level about half way between. This sys tem would be 
able to provide quantitative information on severi ty  of the 
impact.  
The impact may  be located by analyzing the t ime relationship 
of the t ransducer  signals in  the a r e a  of the impact. Location 
resolution i s  obviously a function of sys tem complexity. 
1. F i r s t -o rde r  resolution i s  accomplished simply by 
determining which t ransducer  was f i r s t  excited by the 
impact. With the assumed spacing of 4 . 6  m, this would place 
2 the impact within a 22. 2 m a r e a .  
2. Improved resolution of the impact a r e a  can be achieved b y  
relating the t ime between the initial t ransducer  pickup and 
subsequent transducer outputs due to the same impact. If 
this information can be determined for  the second and third 
t ransducers  to record the impact,  sufficient resolution should 
be possible. 
3 .  A method of resolving the impact a r e a  based on digital data 
could be incorporated. Consider the a r r a y  shown in  Figure 8-6, 
Assume that an impact has  occurred within the bounded a r e a  
and energy has propagated to the B2 t ransducer .  Use this 
incident to trigger a timing period, t1 , and monitor the 
adjacent t ransducer .  If the energy imparted to the p res su re  
wall does not propagate to other t ransducers  during time t l  , 
i t  can be concluded that the impact must  have occurred in 
Area 9 shown in the figure.  If other t ransducers  record t h e  
impact during t1 , these data can be used to locate the a r e a  
a s  shown in  the logic table in Figure 8-6. 
E. Due to the design of the data acquisition sys tem for the Space 
Station, i t  i s  not easy  to determine the time relationship for  
signals input f rom widely dispersed t ransducers  such a s  a r e  
required in  the impact gage subsystem. It i s  therefore appropriate 
A "1" IN THE ABOVE TABLE INDICATES 
THAT AN IMPACT WAS RECORDED BY 
THE INDICATED TRANSDUCER WITHIN 
360 pSEC OF THE TIME THAT TRANS- 
DUCER B2 RECORDED THE IMPACT. 
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Figure 8-6. Impact Gage Subsystem Transducer Array 
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to consider the feasibility of determining the a r e a  of impact 
utilizing amplitude data only. One such sys tem has been suggested 
and i s  described a s  follows: 
1. Assume a t ransducer  sys tem i s  dispersed a s  described in the 
previous example. 
2 .  Assume the sensor  signal for  each transducer i s  conditioned 
so  that two outputs a r e  derived. Output 1 m a y  be a digital 
output (0 of 1 ) which signifies the resu l t  of the frequency 
discrimination. A second analog output could be provided 
with the amplitude proportional to the peak input sensor  
signal. This analog voltage would be automatically r e se t  to 
zero  by the transducer af ter  a time period which i s  long with 
respect  to  the data acquisition t ime of the Space Station OCS. 
3 .  Assume that the outputs f rom each transducer a r e  monitored 
by standard analog and digital inputs to remote data acquisi-  
tion units. When an impact occurs ,  amplitude data f rom each 
transducer that exceeded the l imit  i s  acquired by the system. 
Analysis of this peak amplitude data should locate the impact 
with an  acceptable a r e a  resolution. 
8. 2. 1. 3 Acoustic Emission Monitor Subsystem 
Acoustic emission i n  a solid mater ia l  occurs  a s  a resul t  of energy release 
caused by plastic deformation or  f rac ture  within the solid. This phenon~enon 
can be used a s  a bas is  for  a technique to detect the formation and growth of 
flaws o r  microcracks  in the Space Station p res su re  shell. It i s  a lso theoreti-  
cally possible to locate the source of the emission by time correlation of 
severa l  t ransducer1 sensor  signals. 
This subsystem i s  s imi lar  to the impact gage subsystem relative to the 
expected dispersion of sensors  on the Space Station p res su re  s t ructure.  
However, the signal charac ter i s t ics  a r e  significantly different. It should 
be possible to utilize the same sensing element for pickup of the signal for 
both the impact gage subsystem and acoustic monitor and then branch out to 
individual signal conditioning channels for fur ther  processing. 
A block d i ag ram of a n  acoust ic  emi s s ion  monitor s e n s o r / t r a n s d u c e r  which 
can  be in tegrated into the Space Station OCS-DCS i s  p r e sen t ed  in F igure  8-7. 
The operat ional  concept of th is  subsys tem i s  a s  follows: 
A. The acoust ic  s ignals  a r e  detected by the s e n s o r ,  ampl i f ied,  and 
f i l tered.  The requ i rements  for th is  port ion of the signal  p rocess ing  
a r e  a function of the s e n s o r  cha rac t e r i s t i c s .  
B. The d i sc r imina tor  and pulse  shape r  c i rcu i t  s e l ec t s  the significznt 
signals (e .  g . ,  amplitude o r  pulse width discr iminat ion)  and provides  
an  output pulse  compatible with the accumulator  requ i rements .  
C .  The n bit accumulator  s u m s  the pu lses .  When the accumulator  i s  
full, a  t e rmina l  count signal  i s  generated and input to the KDAU 
(digital  input). The value of n will be a function of the c r i t i ca l  rate 
information requ i rements .  
D. The subsys tem mul t ip rocessor  will acqu i re  the information about 
the accumulator  t e rmina l  count via the RDAU data bus link.. This  
informat ion will be analyzed re la t ive  to e lapsed t ime  f r o m  the 
previous  t e rmina l  count to  der ive  r a t e  information and a summation 
of a l l  previous  t e rmina l  counts will provide total count information.  
The subsys tem mul t ip rocessor  will compare  th is  information t~ 
s t o r ed  l imi t s  and notify the c r ew  o r  take other  appropr ia te  action a s  
the si tuation wa r r an t s .  
The location of the developing flaw o r  mic roc rack  by t ime  cor re la t ion  of 
s eve ra l  s enso r  signals i s  difficult to in tegrate  into an  automat ic  sy s t em w h e n  
a l a rge  s e n s o r  a r r a y  i s  requ i red .  Severa l  poss ible  approaches  should be 
investigated to de te rmine  the feasibil i ty of methods other  than t ime c o r r e l a -  
tion. F o r  example ,  analys is  of the  ampli tudes ,  emi s s ion  r a t e s ,  o r  total  
emi s s ion  counts of var ious  t r ansduce r s  within the a r r a y  may  provide a 
sa t i s fac tory  method. If fu r ther  study indicates  that t ime  cor re la t ion  i s  the 
only feas ible  approach,  the design effort  should be d i rec ted  toward utilization 
of the s a m e  sys t em a s  the impac t  gage subsystem.  
8. 2 .  1. 4 Seal  Integri ty Monitor Subsystem 
This  subsys tem will monitor the per formance  of each of the p r e s s u r e  shell- 
space vacuum in te r faces  that  depends upon s ea l s  such a s  neoprene 0-rir ;gs 

o r  inflatable gaskets .  The DCS will provide a continuous monitor of  the 
integrity of each sea l  through this  subsystem. It will be capable of locating 
a faulty s ea l  and determining the quantity of gas  flow pas t  the seal .  No 
requirement  h a s  been established to provide for  fur ther  partitioning of large 
sea l s  such a s  the 10. 1 m (33  ft)  dia sea l  on the toroidal dome covers .  
Table 8-1 contains a compilation of information on sea l s  included in the 
MDAC Phase  B Space Station concept. This  l ist ing i s  intended to be used as 
a general  guide to  the overal l  design of the interface between the sea l  
integrity monitor subsystem and the Space Station onboard checkout-data. 
management sys tem.  This subsystem will consis t  of one leak detecting 
t ransducer  for each of the sea l s  in Table 8-1. Each t ransducer  i11 the sub- 
sys tem will output a voltage proportional to  the flow of a tmospheric  gas 
a c r o s s  the seal .  The leak r a t e  l imit  for each sea l  will be established Iritiai- 
ly by design analysis  and subsequently upgraded by monitoring actual seal  
performance.  This information will be used to  es tabl ish upper and lower 
l imi t s  for each seal .  The monitor function will be per formed by the OCS 
through the remote  data acquisition unit which i s  physically located close s t  
to a specific t ransducer  in  the subsystem.  The RDAU has  high-low limit  
check capability and i s  polled periodically by the supervisory OCS p rog ram 
to detect  out-of-limit performance.  Upon detection of an out-of - tolerance 
condition, the output voltage f rom the malfunctioning sea l  i s  input to the OCS 
through s tandard RDAU operation.  These data a r e  then processed  to a s c e r -  
tain the quantity of the leakage and formulate possible solutions; that i s ,  to  
rev ise  l imi t s ,  or  inspect,  r epa i r ,  o r  replace the seal .  Information about 
the condition of malfunctioning sea ls  can be presen ted  to  the crew in var;  sou s 
formats  for decisions.  
Under normal  conditions, defined a s  no seal  leak r a t e  exceeding i ts  p re se t  
l imit ,  a periodic check of each t ransducer  output will be performed.  The 
data thereby acquired can be used to compare actual performance with that 
predicted by analysis  of previously acquired data.  It may a l so  be  used to 
update t rend analysis  information if significant changes a r e  observed.  
Table 8 - 1 
SPACE STATION PHASE B SEAL SUMMARY 
Total Number 
Reqd/System Description Comments 
4 0 Ring Seal between P r e s s u r e  Static seal 
Cylinder and Toroidal Dome - 10. 1 m 
dia 
0 Ring Seal between Tunnel Cylinder Static seal  
and Toroidal Dome (4), and (1) at  
Forward  Cone and Tunnel Interface- 
3 .4  m 
25 0 Ring View P o r t  Seal-0.254 m Static seal 
7 Inflatable Seal for Docking P o r t s  - Double seal  for 
1.7 m redundancy, 
inflatable by hand 
pump in emergency 
Inflatable Seal for Airlock- 1. 07 m dia 
Tunnel to Deck Access Por t s  - Normal operation 
1. 7 m dia with hatches open 
or  with zero pres-  
su re  differential 
ac ross  seals  
4 Rotating Hub, 3 .  4 m dia, 4 rpm Dynamic Seals on 
Space Base only 
9 Solar Ar ray  Gimbal-1 m dia Dynamic seal on 
modular Space 
Station only 
8. 2. 1. 5 Active Ultrasonic Subsystem 
This subsystem utilizes a pulse-echo concept to locate defects in  the p r e s -  
sure  wall which may have been caused by cracks ,  punctures, or flaws. The 
sensing t ransducer  operates  a s  a two-way device to t ranslate  an electrical 
excitation into an acoustic energy pulse that i s  coupled into the s t ructure as 
well a s  a receiver  that i s  capable of detecting any energy reflected from the 
t ransmit ted pulse. Continuous operation of each element of an a r r a y  of these 
t ransducers  cannot be achieved because of the effect of cross-coupling of  
t r ansmi t t ed  pu lses .  There fore ,  i t  i s  anticipated that  the test ing sequence 
will be controlled by the OCS-DCS executive p r o g r a m  s o  that  each t ransducer  
in  the  sy s t em can be sequential ly pulsed and moni tored for ref lected s ignals ,  
A number  of assumpt ions  and simplif ications have been made so that  a n  
e s t ima te  can  be made of the impac t  of integrating th is  subsys tem into the: 
basel ine  Phase  B Space Station e lec t ron ics  sys tem.  These  a r e :  
A. The s e n s o r s  a r e  mounted in physical  contact  with the inner  su r i ace  
of the outer  p r e s s u r e  shel l  s t r uc tu r e .  
B. Sensors  a r e  spaced equidistant f r o m  each  other a t  3 .  1 to 3 .  7 n? 
( 1 0  to 1 2  f t )  in tervals .  
C .  The a r e a  moni tored by a specific t r ansduce r  over laps  the a r e a s  
moni tored by adjacent  t r ansduce r s  so  that  c r a c k s  al igned with the 
t r ansmi t t ed  signal  f r o m  the  nea re s t  t r ansduce r  can be detected,  
D. Each t r ansduce r  opera tes  a s  a t r ansmi t t e r - r ece ive r  and can detect  
ref lected pu lses  of energy within a re la t ively  sho r t  per iod of 
t ime  a f t e r  the t ransmi t ted  pulse so  that  flaws c lose  to the t ransducer  
can be detected.  
E .  Thc energy  coupled into the s t ruc tu r e  by excitat ion of a t r a n s -  
ducer  will d i sperse  within 20 1x1s af ter  generation.  (Signals 
a r r i v ing  a t  t r ansduce r s  a r e  below threshold.  ) 
F. Control of a sensor  (excitation and receive  mode)  can be acconi-  
pl ished through hard  wi re  a t  d is tances  to  6. 1 m ( 2 0  f t ) .  
In the following discuss ion of the in terface  between OCS-DCS and the active 
ul t rasonic  subsys tem,  the data acquisi t ion method and the information flow 
a r e  en~phasizccl .  The validity of the data acquired re la t ive  to  the loca- 
t ion of the flaw i s  a s sumed .  The method descr ibed  he re in  i s  not in te i~ded  to 
r ep re sen t  a n  optimum means  of locating the flaw, but does  typify the expected 
sy s t em complexity. 
The requ i rement  for a l ternate ly  exciting a t ransducer  and monitoring 
response  exceeds  the capabil i ty of the s tandard  RDAU. It i s  the re fore  
expected that a special ized data acquisi t ion unit (DAU) would be developed 
for th i s  purpose.  A concept of th is  i s  shown in block d iagram f o r m  i n  
Figure 8-8.  The s imilar i ty  with the RDAU i s  evident and a pa r t s  com- 
monality of 50 percent or grea ter  i s  es t imated between the two units. The 
actual disper sion of the sensor s, sensitivity, maximum signal path lengths, 
minimum hole size,  total a rea ,  overlap, and other factors  will ultimately 
determine the number of sensors  each DAU will control. For  the purpose 
of this  study, it i s  assumed that each DAU will have eight associated sensors  
capable of operation a s  either t r ansmi t t e r s  or rece ivers .  A total of eight 
DAU's a r e  required to  implement the active ultrasonic subsystem in the 
Phase B baseline Space Station by present est imates .  
Referring to the DAU block diagram shown in Figure 8-8, a typical data. 
acquisition sequence i s  a s  follows: 
A. The memory block for the DAU contains high and low amplitude 
l imits  for peak reflected signals a t  each sensor .  These l imits a r e  
programmable and can be changed by the DMS executive program,  
a s  required. Initial l imits  will be estimated based on ground 
testing and analysis.  The l imits  will be updated a s  additional data 
a r e  acquired and analyzed. 
In addition to amplitude l imits ,  the memory a lso  contains l imits for 
starting and terminating the variable gate for the peak voltage 
detector.  Initially, these gate l imits a r e  set  to admit to the peak 
voltage detector a l l  reflected pulses f rom i t s  associated scan area ,  
The capability to program these l imits  i s  used in a second opera- 
tional mode to resolve the distance f rom the detector to the reflected 
pulse. 
B. Assuming that the proper  amplitude l imit  and gate t ime data a r e  
stored in the memory, the unit will periodically receive a digital 
control signal f rom the OCS-DCS executive program requesting the 
DAU to poll each of i t s  t ransducer  inputs. 
C. Decoding of the incoming request  i s  performed in the control and 
decode logic block. An address  reg is te r  i s  s e t  up and an excitation 
pulse i s  input to the appropriate t ransducer  through the output. 
multiplexer. 

D. The input multiplexer se lec t s  the appropria te  sensor  (In F igure  8-8, 
th is  has  been shown to be the same a s  the add res s  of the translmitter 
sensor  .) 
E. The incoming signal i s  blanked for  selected per iods of t ime by the 
variable  gate c i rcui t .  This feature  i s  used to block the init ial  
t ransmit ted pulse and to te rmina te  the rece iver  a t  the appropria te  
boundary so that the tes t  sequence can be re i te ra ted  within a 
nominal t ime f r ame .  
F. The peak voltage detector c i rcui t  i s  used to sense and hold the peal\ 
value of the reflected energy pulse during the gating period.  This 
c i rcui t  i s  necessary  due to the t ransient  nature  of the reflected 
signal. The peak voltage detector c i rcui t  in  this operating mode is  
acting a s  a g ros s  check on the a r e a  scanned; that  i s ,  there  may be 
seve ra l  reflected signals of significant amplitude during the gate 
period.  Resolving this information i s  accomplished a t  a l a t e r  time. 
6 .  The DAU sequentially repea ts  the t e s t  descr ibed above on each of i ts 
s enso r s  by incrementing the add res s  reg is te r .  Upon completion of 
the polling, the DCS-OCS mult iprocessor  i s  notified via the data 
te rmina l .  Information in this t ransmiss ion  would include the 
add res s  of any sensor  o r  s enso r s  whose output exceeded the 
programmed l imits .  
H. All remaining DAU' s will be sequentially polled in  a like manner 
under the control  of the OCS-DCS p rog ram in the mult iprocessor ,  
I. When the polling p roces s  descr ibed above i s  completed, the addres- 
s e s  of a l l  s enso r s  which received significant ref lected signals are 
available for fur ther  processing.  This information will be analyzed 
and specific s enso r s  selected for fur ther  testing. 
J. A command signal i s  sent to the DAU of which the selected sensor  
i s  a subset.  This command signal i s  decoded and the following sub-- 
routine i s  used to isolate fur ther  the fault which apparently caused 
the reflected signal. 
1. The programmed l imits  for the var iable  gate a r e  changed so 
that fur ther  resolution of the distance f rom flaw to t ransducer  
can be achieved. F o r  example,  a method of successive 
approximations analogous to  a technique used in some A-D 
conver te rs  may be cmployed. The gate period would be divided 
in half and the excitation pulse applied. If the out-of- tolerance 
rcflection i s  received, then the remaining gate period is  again  
divided by two and the process  repeated until sufficient resolu- 
tion i s  achieved. 
2. Multiple reflections caused by more  than one flaw in the a r e a  
checked by a par t icu la r  t ransducer  can be detected by actively 
checking the gating per iods that a r e  assumed to contain no 
flaws . 
3.  Upon conclusion of this  t e s t  sequence, information on the gate 
per iods  and amplitudes of the re la ted reflected pulses a r e  
format ted and t ransmi t ted  to the OCS-DCS executive p rog ram,  
K. The routine descr ibed in J i s  repeated for other selected t r ans -  
ducers  a s  required for triangulation of the reflected signals.  
L. Information regarding the flaw or  flaws detected by the active ultra- 
sonic subsystem i s  then presen ted  to  the c rew via the control  pane!. 
Information would contain location a s  well a s  es t imated s ize  o r  
degree of imminence.  This information could be re la ted with 
previously acquired data,  if a h i s tory  exis ts ,  so  that the crew 
could be made aware  of changes. 
M. Based upon the es t imated 2 0  millisecond damping t ime require- 
ments,  a scan of a l l  s enso r s  (and therefore  the total  a r e a  under  
consideration) can be accomplished in 1 .28 seconds. When f l a w s  
a r e  detected, some additional t ime i s  required for acquiring t h e  
data fo r  triangulation of the fault.  It i s  es t imated that the total 
elapsed t ime would not exceed 2 . 5  seconds. 
The advantages of the descr ibed method for acquiring data f rom the active 
ul t rasonic  t ransducers  a r e ;  ( I )  using the DAU concept, fewer d i rec t  t r ans -  
miss ions a r e  required between the data management sys tem and the active 
ul t rasonic  subsystem; (2) t ransmiss ion  of signals between the DAU and its 
associated senso r s  a r e  kept to reasonably shor t  paths;  ( 3 )  complex t iming 
c i rcu i t s  a r e  avoided; and (4) the acquisition of pulse-echo data i s  divided 
into two categories .  Overall  surveil lance i s  accomplished in a 
s t ra igh t forward  manner  with a minimum amount of p rogramming  r equ i r e -  
ments .  This  would be the p r e f e r r e d  mode of operat ion and will consti tute 
mos t  of the impact  of the act ive  ul t rasonic  subsys tem on the DCS-OCS multi-. 
p r o c e s s o r .  
8. 2. 1 . 6  Onboard Leakage Detection 
The p r i m a r y  purpose of th is  subsys tem i s  t o  provide sufficient data to the 
DCS-OCS so  that  the p r e sence  of c r i t i c a l  a tmospher ic  contaminants can  be 
detected and the location of the malfunctioning component, s to rage  container ,  
p r e s s u r e  l ine,  o r  equipment can be determined.  This  subsys tem will con- 
s i s t  of a s e t  of var ious  types of s e n s o r s  located within the EC/LS  sys t em 
a t  c r i t i c a l  points where  l eaks  of p r o c e s s  fluids o r  g a s e s  could occur .  
S imi la r  leaks  in other  sy s t ems  (for example ,  propulsion o r  onboard exper i -  
ments )  may a l so  resu l t  in  contamination;  however,  the EC/LS  sys t em 
contains a number  of ga se s  and fluids in var ious  equipment. It i s  expected 
that  the ins t rumentat ion prob lems  encountered in  th is  sy s t em a r e  s imi l a r  to  
those  in other  sy s t ems .  
The operation of th is  sy s t em i s  descr ibed  in  Section 4 of th i s  repor t .  The 
block d i ag ram of the Space Station ECILS  sys t em (F igu re  4-1) shows the 
location of some of the s e n s o r s  that  a r e  requ i red  to p e r f o r m  the onboard 
leakage damage control  function. The s enso r - sys t em interface  r equ i r e -  
ments  for the acquisi t ion of data per t inent  to specific contaminants a r e  a s  
follows: 
A. Hydrogen gas ,  HZ, i s  a product of the water  e lec t ro lys i s  p r a c e s s -  
The buildup of hyrdogen in  the a tmosphere  r e su l t s  in  an  i nc r ea se  in  
the potential combustion and explosion hazard ,  and thereby  r e p r e -  
sen t s  a c r i t i ca l  damage control  function. Hydrogen gas ,  under 
posit ive p r e s s u r e  with r e spec t  to the cabin environment,  i s  
contained in the water e lec t ro lys i s  unit and the Sabat ier  a s  w e l l  as 
the connecting plumbing, a s  indicated in the functional block 
d iagram,  F igure  8 -9 .  Several  s enso r s  a r e  t he r e fo re  required t o  
isola te  a malfunction which causes  H gas  buildup in  the controlled 2 
a tmosphere .  These  include t r ansduce r s  in  the Sabat ier  and e lec t ro -  
lys i s  unit for  detecting leaks  ins ide  th is  equipment. Additional 
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s e n s o r s  a r e  located in  the  t he rma l  conditioning r e tu rn  duct and 
stagnation a r e a  so  that  leaks  in the connecting plumbing can be 
isolated.  The s enso r  used for  detection of Hz gas  i s  a combusti-  
ble gas  de tec tor .  The output voltage of the  sensor  i s  moni tored by 
the s tandard RDAU, a s  shown in F igure  8- 1 .  Initial l im i t s  will be  
de te rmined  by analysis  and l imi t s  will be updated by the OCS-DCS 
p r o g r a m  a s  the miss ion  p r o g r e s s e s .  Typical  operat ion i s  expected 
to be a s  follows: 
1. Initial l imi t s  a r e  s e t  a s  follows: 2 percen t  a t  Saba t ie r ,  e lec t ro -  
lys i s ,  and t h e r m a l  conditioning duct; 0 . 2  percen t  a t  s tagnation 
a r e a  s enso r .  (Assuming nominal level  i s  about 0. 05 percen t ,  
4 percen t  i s  f lammabi l i ty  l imi t ,  6 percen t  i s  detonation l imi t ,  ) 
2. The H senso r  located i n  the stagnation a r e a  should be the first  2 
to exceed i t s  l imi t .  The DCS p r o g r a m  then reques t s  data froxi  
the remaining H senso r s  and i so la tes  the malfunction to the 2 
e lec t ro lys i s  unit,  the Saba t ie r ,  o r  the plumbing by analyzing 
re la t ive  levels .  
3 .  In c a s e  of isolat ion to the e lec t ro lys i s  unit,  a check for l eaks  
in KOH l ines  i s  a l s o  accomplished (pa r t  of an  exist ing sensor  
sy s t em d iscussed  in a l a t e r  sect ion) .  This provides  fu r ther  
resolut ion of the faulty component. 
4. The r e su l t s  of the above analysis  a r e  displayed for  c rew action,  
Sho r t - t e rm  t r end  analysis  may  be pe r fo rmed  to a s s e s s  the 
cr i t ica l i ty  of the situation. 
B. Al-nnlonia (NH ) contamination of the  a tmosphere  m a y  occur  as  a 3 
resu l t  of leaks  o r  malfunctions in the waste collection and disposal  
3 
sys tem.  The nominal level  of NH i s  expected to be 0. 5 m g / m  . 3 3 A maximum safe  level  i s  es t imated  to be about 10 m g / m  . It i s  
anticipated that  the high l imi t  for  a s enso r  monitoring this  gas  
3 
should be about 2 m g / m  . The m a s s  spec t rome te r  i s  u sed  to detect 
the p r e sence  of NH3 in the a tmosphere .  This  unit will provide a n  
output voltage propor t ional  to  the NH3 pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e .  Isalatiar? 
of the malfunctioning component i s  accomplished by utilizing tape 
line s e n s o r s  which a r e  designed to detect  and approximately locate 
a leaking fluid. Three  tape l ines  a r e  utilized, one each on the 
ur ine  col lector ,  the holding tank, and the  feedline to the wicks.  
The s e n s o r s  and the i r  re la t ionship  to the OCS-DCS data acquisi t ion 
a r e  shown in  the block d iagram,  F igure  8- 9. Out-of-limit 
detection,  ana lys i s  of s enso r  input da ta ,  and display of r e su l t s  
a r e  accomplished in a s imi l a r  manner  t o  that  used for the  HZ 
gas  contamination. 
C. Carbon monoxide gas  i s  p r e s e n t  in  the Space Station environment  
f r o m  c rew  metabolic generation.  I t  i s  a l s o  a product of any 
combustion that  may  occur .  Removal  of CO i s  accomplished i n  the 
catalytic oxidizer .  Improper  operat ion of th is  unit c an  r e s u l t  0%: a
buildup of CO levels .  Nominal levels  a r e  approximately  18 to  20 
3 3 
m g / m  , and an  unsafe l imi t  i s  on the o rde r  of 50 to 60 m g / m  ; 
the re fore ,  an  upper l imi t  of about 28  m g / m 3  would indicate an  
abnormal  condition which r equ i r e s  fu r ther  analysis .  The detector  
u sed  to monitor CO i s  an  in f ra red  ana lyzer .  This  device provides  
an  output voltage propor t ional  to  the CO concentrat ion.  F igure  8-9 
shows the re la t ionship  of the CO detector  to the  OCS-DCS with 
r e spec t  to the acquisi t ion of the requ i red  data.  When the sensor  
output exceeds  the high l imi t ,  the OCS-DCS p r o g r a m  will co r r e l a t e  
the  data with the CH4 detector  ( to be d i scussed  in  the next sect ion) ,  
A simultaneous i nc r ea se  in both levels  would indicate combustion;  
o therwise ,  the malfunction mus t  be re la ted  to the catalytic r eac to r .  
In th i s  c a se ,  s t o r ed  data would be used to  extrapolate  the t ime Go a n  
unsafe level  and the c r ew  notified. 
D. Methane, CH4, i s  a biowaste product of CO convers ion in the 2 
Saba t ie r .  Toxic levels  of hydrocarbons will r e s u l t  i f  l eaks  into the 
Space Station a tmosphere  continue undetected. The total  hydro-  
ca rbon  analyzer  i s  used for  detection of CH The output of this 4' 
senso r  will be a voltage propor t ional  to the concentrat ion of CH4. 
The nominal level  in  the Space Station a tmosphere  i s  approximately 
3 500 m g / m 3  and a n  unsafe level  i s  es t imated  to be 2 ,  000 m g / m  
An upper l imi t  on the detector  monitoring th is  gas  would init ial ly 
3 be an the o r d e r  of 1 ,000 m g / m  . Detection of an  out-of-l imit  
condition would r e su l t  in  a cor re la t ion  with CO level  for  possibil i ty 
of combustion. Otherwise,  the leak i s  a s s u m e d  to be in  the 
Saba t ie r .  A poss ibi l i ty  ex i s t s  that  the CH g a s  would be c o m p r e s -  4 
sed  and s t o r e d  for  use  in  the guidance and  propuls ion r e s i s t o j e t  
sy s t em.  This  would necess i t a te  some  addit ional  s e n s o r s  for  fault 
i sola t ion.  The poss ibi l i ty  of l eaks  f r o m  the CH4 exhaust  plumbing 
i s  sma l l ,  s ince  these  l ines  a r e  normal ly  a t  a  negative p r e s s u r e  w-tll-, 
r e s p e c t  to the cabin a tmosphe re .  
E .  Water vapor i s  not cons idered  a n  a tmosphe re  contaminant.  
However,  water  i s  p r e sen t  in  s e v e r a l  of the E C / L S  units and rs 
plumbed to va r ious  locations within the Space Station. An undelectec: 
wa te r  l eak  i s  a  potential ly s e r i ous  p rob l em due to overloading of 
the humidity control  unit, depletion of wa te r  r e s e r v e s ,  and possib,o. 
damage to exper iments .  Additionally, a  water  leak would indicate 
a malfunction in the c r i t i c a l  E C / L S  s y s t e m  and  m a y  be a p r e c u r s o r  
to  degradat ion of the a tmosphe re  control  loop. F o r  these  reasoi ls ,  
i t  h a s  been included a s  p a r t  of the onboard l eak  monitor r e q u ~ r e d  Tor 
the DCS. 
Essen t ia l ly ,  th is  subsys tem cons i s t s  of tape line leak de tec to rs  
a t tached to  each unit and plumbing which contains wa te r .  Each of 
these  de t ec to r s  i s  in ter faced with the n e a r e s t  RDAU analog inpirt 
channel .  An output voltage f r o m  th i s  s enso r  i s  a n  indicator cf a 
leak and the ampli tude of the output voltage i s  propor t ional  to the 
dis tance  along the tape l ine where  the l eak  h a s  pene t ra ted  the tage 
This s e n s o r  t he r e fo r e  a c t s  a s  a detector  and a l s o  i so la tes  tho 
faulty component o r  connection. The tape line s e n s o r s  a r e  sllovcrrl 
in the functional schemat ic ,  F igu re  8- 9 .  Continuous moiiito r i r ig  
of these  s e n s o r s  i s  provided by the RDAU. When a leak i s  detect td ,  
the ampli tude of the s enso r  signal  i s  conver ted to digital for inat  
and t r an smi t t ed  to the mul t ip rocessor .  The data  a r e  then cornpared 
with previously  s t o r ed  informat ion fo r  probable  faults  along tn~; 
tape l ine and the c r ew  notified via the disp.lay and control  terminal  - 
F, Potassitlm hydroxlrlt.  (KOT-I) i s  a  working f lu id  in the wate r  electrol- 
y s i s  p r o c e s s .  Leaks in the KOH sys t em can r e su l t  in contamlna- 
tion of the a tmosphe re  with a n  i nc r ea se  in the hydrogen context 
(f lammabili ty and explosion haza rd ) ,  a s  previously d i scussed ,  h 
addition, KOH leaks  can cause  s e v e r e  damage by the  cor ros ive  
effect on m a t e r i a l s  found within the  water  e lec t ro lys i s  unit.  The 
senso r  used to  detect  and locate leaks  in  the  KOH sys t em i s  a tape 
l ine s imi l a r  to  those  descr ibed  fo r  u s e  for  water l eak  detection,  
The data acquisi t ion and ana lys i s  a r e  identical  to that  descr ibed 
for  the water  leak de tec tors .  
G .  F r e o n  i s  p r e sen t  in the Space Station in the re f r igera t ion  and deep 
f r eeze  s y s t e m s  and will a l so  be used in  the heat  exchanger of the 
t h e r m a l  control  sys tem.  A l imited amount of F r e o n  i s  a l s o  
r e l ea sed  by outgassing f r o m  components and h a r d  su r f ace s  that 
have absorbed  cleaning fluids. The r e l e a s e  of F r e o n  into the 
a tmosphere  r e su l t s  i n  contamination of cata lys t  bed in the GO2 
removal  sy s t em.  This  r e q u i r e s  p r e m a t u r e  maintenance on the 
charcoa l  f i l t e r  on the 60 inlet  line. F r e o n  contamination can be 2 
detected by monitoring t empera tu r e s  in s eve ra l  p laces  along the 
cata lys t  bed. The t empera tu r e  changes can be updated for nornirial 
contamination utilizing the  OCS-DMS executive control  and the 
RDAU programmable  l imi t s .  Excess ive  t empe ra tu r e  changes along 
the bed would indicate contamination by Freon .  This  information 
would be displayed for c r ew  information and could be cor re la ted  
with a gas  chromatograph analysis .  
H. The a tmosphere  control  sy s t em normal ly  regu la tes  the oxygen 
pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e .  This  i s  accomplished by detecting the  O2 pa r t i a l  
p r e s s u r e  with a m a s s  spec t romete r  and comparing th is  level  wxtl? 
a r e f e r ence  in the two-gas con t ro l le r  assembly .  When a deficiency 
ex i s t s ,  make-up 0 i s  supplied by a pulse r a t e  modulated or i f ice  2 
supplied f r o m  a p r e s s u r e  regulated oxygen supply o r  by modulating 
e lec t ro lyzer  cu r r en t .  Oxygen leaking into the cabin ups t r eam of  
the p r e s s u r e  regulator  and solenoid controlled or i f ice  could l eak  to  
a n  oxygen-rich environment;  the re fore ,  the monitor of oxygen 
pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  i s  included a s  p a r t  of the damage control  function, 
Nominal levels  of oxygen pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  a r e  expected to be an 
the o r d e r  of 160 & 5 m m  Hg. The minimum allowable l imi t  (due 
to hypoxia) i s  considered to be 85 m m  Hg. A high l imi t  of 
180 m m  Hg i s  defined a s  an  i n c r e a s e  in f i r e  hazard .  As shown. in 
Figure  8-9, the oxygen par t i a l  p r e s s u r e  s enso r  i s  the  m a s s  
spec t rome te r .  The output i s  moni tored by the  RDAU utilizing the 
high and low l imit  capabil i ty.  If the output voltage deviates f rom 
i t s  window l imi t s ,  the OCS-DCS executive p r o g r a m  i s  notified v-a 
the data  bus .  A sho r t - t e rm  t r end  analysis  i s  then per formed  t o  
p ro jec t  the r a t e  a t  which a c r i t i ca l  l imi t  i s  being approached anci 
the c rew notified of the si tuation.  Additional s e n s o r s  such as  a 
hand-held ul t rasonic  detector  could then be used to isola te  the 
leak.  
8 , 2 .  2 Damage Control  Sys tem Requirements  for St imul i  Generat ion 
The s t imul i  gene ra to r s  enable the operational  s ta tus  of a par t i cu la r  sub- 
sys t em to be determined by providing a cal ibra ted o r  known input signal  or 
s t imulus .  This  input will a l so  be used by the OCS diagnostic p r o g r a m  to help 
i sola te  a malfunction to  the lowest replaceable  unit, o r  in  the c a s e  of the 
DCS, to the repa i rab le  level .  The u se  of s t imul i  gene ra to r s  fo r  each 
se lected DCS i s  d i scussed  in  the following pa rag raphs .  
8. 2 .  2 .1  Two-Gas Control ler  
The design of the two-gas a tmosphe re  control ler  fo r  Space Station applica- 
tion will include provis ions  for utilizing the  available s t imul i  t o  provide 
fault isolat ion t o  the L R U  level .  The addition of the accumulator  c i rcui t  
d i scussed  in previous  sect ions  should provide a valuable t e s t  point since 
quantitative data can  be obtained by th is  method. A typical  t e s t  would be 
accomplished by providing a n  input signal  equivalent to a known ni t ragen 
pa r t i a l  p r e s s u r e  e r r o r  signal  and monitoring a l l  t e s t  points fo r  p roper  
response .  Other than to maintain operational  s ta tus  of the two-gas 
con t ro l le r ,  no additional requ i rements  fo r  t e s t  s t imul i  a r e  anticipated,  
Exist ing s t imul i  requ i red  to ensu re  the no rma l  EC/LS  function will be 
adequate,  
8.2.2.2 Impact Gage 
The checkout of the impac t  gage t r ansduce r  a r r a y  can be accomplished by 
excitat ion through the active u l t rason ics  t ransponders .  A method to produce 
seve ra l  levels of excitation f r o m  these t ransponders  would provide seve ra l  
levels  of energy for the impact gage t ransducers .  The conclusion, there-  
fore ,  i s  that no requirement  for  d i rec t  st imuli  genera tors  i s  present ly  
identified f o r  the impact gage t ransducer  a r r a y .  
8 .2 .2 .  3 Acoustic Emiss ion  Monitoring 
The requi rements  for controlled checkout of the acoustic emiss ion  transducer 
a r r a y  a r e  basically the s ame  a s  for the impact gage system.  Since the t w o  
subsystems will probably sha re  the s ame  sensor  elements,  the above 
descr ibed method can be extended to provide t ransponder  signals of the 
requi red  amplitude and frequency levels to be compatible with this system.  
8. 2 .2 .  4 Seal Integrity Monitor 
The ideal s t imulus  for  checking this t ransducer  would consis t  of a method of 
electr ical ly  controlling an atmosphere  flow pas t  a seal .  However, the 
inherent complexity and accompanying reduction of reliabil i ty may preclude 
this kind of approach. An al ternate  method i s  to i n se r t  an e lec t r ica l  
offset in the differential amplifier  loop to  provide a known calibration point, 
This offset can be inser ted  conveniently into the re fe rence  thermocouple 
c i rcui t .  Due to the low level of the signal, the control  of this signal would 
be accomplished by a digital input. 
8 .2 .2 .5  Active Ultrasonics 
Maintenance of the active ul t rasonics  t ransducer  a r r a y  and signal condition- 
ing can best  be accomplished by utilizing the built-in t e s t  capability of t h i s  
sys tem.  This would be achieved by providing a variable-level st imulus 
signal through an adjacent t ransducer  in the a r r a y  and programming the 
gating and amplitude l imits  to the appropriate rece iver  - t ransducer .  
Utilization of this concept i s  an  extension of the method used for testing the 
impact gage and acoustic monitor t ransducer  a r r a y s .  
8 .2 .2 .6  Onboard Leaks 
The requirements  for st imuli  generation for  the s enso r s  used to detect 
onboard leaks  a r e  of two types.  Sensors  such a s  the hydrogen detector and 
m a s s  spec t rometer  will accommodate the analog signal substitution method 
used to simulate a known input offset level. The tape line s enso r s  descr ibed 
in  a previous  sect ion will ut i l ize e lec t r i ca l ly  controlled switches a t  d i s c r e t e  
in te rva l s  along the length to s imulate  l eaks .  These  s imulated leaks  will be 
detected and analyzed for  location and the  r e su l t s  compared  to  the known 
location. 
8 . 2 .  3 P roces s ing  Requi rements  for Selected DCS Subsys tems  
The process ing  r equ i r emen t s  for  se lec ted  DCS subsys tems  have been 
es t imated  using the methods evolved in the Phase  B Space Station study. The 
r e su l t s  of th is  ana lys i s  and a n  e s t ima te  of the impact  of the DCS r equ i r e -  
ment s  upon the overa l l  Space Station data management sy s t em process ing  
requ i rement  a r e  p resen ted  in  Tables  8-2 and 8-3. The c r i t e r i a  used  to 
formulate  the quantitative information presen ted  in t he se  tables  a r e  next 
d i scussed .  This information i s  intended to be used a s  a bas i s  for  updating 
these  e s t ima te s  a s  additional definitive DCS requ i rements  a r e  es tabl ished,  
8. 2, 3. 1 T e s t  Point MonitoringILimit  Checking 
This  function i s  normal ly  per formed  on-line by the  RDAU. However,  the 
abil i ty to check f o r  p roper  operat ion of the  total  sy s t em m a y  r equ i r e  dupli- 
cation of th is  capability by the  subsystem mul t ip rocessor  a s  well. The 
s ta tus  monitoring function logic was es t imated  to be 100 and an  upper and 
lower l imi t  a s  well a s  the c u r r e n t  value a r e  r equ i r ed  for  each  t e s t  point. 
The re fo re ,  100 t 3 n s to rage  locations will be requ i red  for monitoring and 
l imi t  checking n t e s t  points.  
8 .  2 .  3 . 2  T rend  Analysis  
A discuss ion of the method of per forming  computer ized t r end  analysis  for 
Space Station applications i s  contained in  Reference 30. The r e su l t s  of 
analys is  show that  the memory  requ i rements  for t r end  analysis  can be 
es t imated  by 200 t 23 nt words,  where  nt i s  the number of t e s t  points being 
examined for  t r ends .  The factor  of 200 in the preceding express ion  i s  a n  
estiimate of the number of ins t ruct ions  r equ i r ed  to  p e r f o r m  the l e a s t  squares  
fit  subroutine.  
Table 8-2 
FACTORS USED TO ASSESS DCS PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS 
Damage Control  T e s t  Point  Trend Executive 
Subsystem Monitoring Analysis  Diagnostics Control 
n nt nr n,, nt9 "a 
Two-Gas 
Control ler  
Irnpac t Gage 80 0 80 a ,  0, 1. 94 
Acoustic Emis s ion  80 0 Modified 1,0, ! : .  94 
Impact  Gage 
Routine 
Seal  Integr i ty  38 10 38 1 ,  110, 0. 8 
Active Ul t rasonics  6 4 8 64 P $ 8 ,  1 6 . 0  
On-board Leaks  38 10 38 1 ,  10 ,  0. 8 
Table 8 - 3  
SUMMARY AND COMPARISON O F  DCS-OCS MEMORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ONBOARD PROCESSING 
DCS Total  Data Mgmt System DCS 
(Words) (Words)  Impact (70) 
T e s t  Point  Monitor 1006 15 l o 3  7. 1 
Trend Analysis  8 90 1 1 . 6  x 10 3 7" 7 
Diagnostics 48 70 48 x l o 3  l ill 
Executive Control  606 4 . 8 ~  10 3 12. 6 
8 . 2 .  3. 3 Diagnostics 
The diagnostics requ i rements  a r e  a function of the  number  of replaceable  
units in  a specific assembly .  Each  diagnostic s t r uc tu r e  i s  expected to be 
fa i r ly  unique and an  average  approach i s  difficult t o  predict .  The 
express ion  used  to de te rmine  total  s to rage  requ i rements  fo r  the Space 
- - 
Station was na (486 t n r l l )  where  na i s  the number of a s sembl i e s  and n, is 
the ave rage  number  of replaceable  units  p e r  assembly .  F o r  the purpose of 
evaluating the diagnostics r equ i r emen t s  f o r  the DCS subsys tems ,  the data in  
Table 8-2  were  used to der ive  gr for  the five subassembl ies .  
8 - 2 .  3 . 4  Executive Control  
The checkout executive s to rage  al location i s  compr i s ed  of 10 p r o g r a m  
elements  (d i scussed  in Reference 30) and weighted by  the following exp re s -  
sion: Total  words  = 310 t 42 ns t nt + na, where  ns i s  the number of sub -  
sy t ems ,  nt i s  the number  of t e s t  points being examined for t rends ,  and n f2 
i s  the number  of a s sembl i e s .  
8. 2 .  4 S torage  Requi rements  
Storage r equ i r emen t s  f o r  the DCS other  than those  previously  determined 
for data p rocess ing  a r e  l imi ted to those requ i red  fo r  long- te rm t rend  
ana lys i s .  The p r e sen t  Space Station p r e f e r r e d  design concept indicates 
that long- te rm t r end  analysis  will be pe r fo rmed  by t r ans f e r r i ng  the data t c i  
ground s ta t ions;  the re fore ,  no es t imate  of s to rage  al locations ha s  been 
made.  It i s  sufficient to a s s u m e  that  the 30 p a r a m e t e r s  indicated in  
Table 8-2 would a l s o  be candidates fo r  long- term t rend  ana lys i s .  The 
t e m p o r a r y  s to rage  requ i rements  for  the t r ans f e r  of these  data a r e  a 
function of t r ansmis s ion  capability, the sample  r a t e ,  and the amount of  
data compress ion  accomplished.  
8. 2 .  5 DCS Control  and Display Requi rements  
The DCS control  and display functions a r e  in tegrated with that  of the o n h o a r d  
checkout sy s t em.  As previously  discussed,  the p r i m a r y  method of control  
will be through keyboard entry .  The display mechanism general ly  used 
other than caution and warning will be a cathode r a y  tube. The following 
paragraphs  d i s cus s  the control  and display requ i rements  for  each of the 
selected DCS subsys tems .  
8 .2 .  5.1 Two-Gas Controller 
The DCS pa rame te r  being monitored a t  the two-gas controller i s  the nitrogen 
gas  use  r a t e .  When the OCS indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, the 
operator  will need to display information re la t ive to  the his tor ical  use sate, 
This can bes t  be accomplished by a graphic display on a cathode ray tube 
plotting nitrogen addition r a t e  v s  t ime .  F igure  8-  10 shows data of this type 
a s  recorded  during the 90-day manned tes t .  
In addition to the t rend  analysis ,  a requirement  ex is t s  to modify the p rog ram 
and to change o r  check l imi t s  a t  the RDAU. Modifications can a l so  be 
accomplished with a keyboard en t ry  and an alphanumeric display on the 
cathode r ay  tube. This display would be s imi la r  to those encountered when 
using a computer graphic te rmina l  in an  edit mode. 
8 . 2 . 5 . 2  Impact Gage 
The impact gage display requirements  for p rog ram editing and changing 
RDAU l imi t s  a r e  the s a m e  a s  for  the two-gas control ler .  In the event ara 
impact i s  recorded by the sys tem,  a matrix-type display of the t ransducer  
outputs in the a r e a s  of concern would be beneficial. This display would 
contain identification numbers  and relative magnitude for each of the 
s enso r s .  This can a l so  be accomplished by keyboard en t ry  and cathode ray 
tube display. 
8 .2 .  5. 3 Acoustic Emission Monitor 
The principal display for this subsystem will probably consis t  of graphic 
display of count ra te  v s  t ime and total  count v s  t ime.  Magnitude and identi-  
fication numbers  provided by a matrix-type alphanumeric display s imi la r  to 
that for the impact gage may a l so  be useful in locating the detected fault. 
8 .2 .  5 .4  Seal Leak Monitor 
Two types of displays may be utilized to presen t  information f rom this sub- 
system. A tabular output showing the cur ren t  leak r a t e  through each of sea l s  
and a total leak r a t e  for the vehicle may be useful for a n  overal l  monitor s f  
leak performance.  The second type of display required will be a long-term 
t rend  analysis  s imi la r  to the o thers .  It i s  assumed that  mos t  sea l s  will 

de t e r i o r a t e  gradually and the t r end  ana lys i s  p resen ta t ion  should be useful  
fo r  predic t ing s e a l  maintenance o r  replacement .  
8 . 2 .  5. 5 Active Ul t rasonics  
The display sy s t em will consti tute a n  important  p a r t  of the act ive  u l t rason ics  
subsys tem s ince the opera tor  might be r equ i r ed  to p e r f o r m  a n  in tegra l  part 
in the flow isolat ion.  This  sy tem i s  especia l ly  adaptable to the cathode ray  
tube graphic  type display because  checkout cons i s t s  of applying a controlied 
stimulus and monitoring the response  a t  one o r  m o r e  se lected t r ansduce r s ,  
Information can be displayed i n  a matr ix- type presenta t ion of amplitude and 
location identification. 
8 . 2 . 5 . 6  Onboard Leaks  
The onboard leak monitor subsys tem control  and display requ i rements  can 
be implemented in  the s a m e  manner  a s  those previously  d i scussed ,  In 
addition to the no rma l  functions displayed on demand at  the t e rmina l ,  
mos t  E C / L S  functions will be moni tored by the caution o r  warning rwlonitors. 
8 .2 .6  Caution and Warning Requirements  fo r  DCS 
The DCS subsys tem p a r a m e t e r s  that  a r e  considered sufficiently cr i t ica l  
t o  include in the caution and warning displays fo r  the Space Station sys t em 
a r e  summar i zed  in Table 8-4 ,  Caution level  signals a r e  assumed t o  be 
displayed in  English language fo rmat  on an  a lphanumeric  dedicated panel, 
while warning-level s ignals  indicate immediate  c rew act ion and a r e  signified 
by appropr ia te ly  located lights and audible warnings.  
8 . 3  DCS WEIGHT ANALYSIS 
The weight penalty assoc ia ted  with each se lected DCS have been estj.rnated 
and the r e s u l t s  a r e  summar i zed  i n  Table 8-5. Unit weights shown for 
t r ansduce r s  a r e  based  upon e s t ima te s  of des igns  optimized for  Space Stahon 
application. The weight factor used for the Digital Data Termina l  ( D D T J  
input i s  der ived f r o m  Space Station study r epo r t s  (Reference 30 )  and i s  based 
upon a total  weight of 2.275 kg for an 8-input unit. A factor  i s  a l so  included 
for  wiring based upon Douglas Specification No. 7869679 (modified 
MIL-W-27300). A pa i r  of w i r e s  4 .6  m long, 0-600V, AWG-24, Tefhon- 
insulated,  was a s sumed  for  each input. The RDAU weight p e r  input i s  based  
Table  8-4 
CAUTION AND WARNING LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
DCS Subsys tem and Caution Level  
Measured  P a r a m e t e r  Requi rement  
Warning Level 
Requirement  
Two Gas  Cont ro l l e r  Nitrogen use  r a t e  Use r a t e  has  inc reased  to 
Nitrogen use  r a t e  ha s  i nc r ea sed  to i t s  max imum level  
2 t imes  i t s  no rma l  (approximately  3 4  t rme  s 
r a t e  no rma l  level) .  
Impact  Gage Caution indication None. If impac t  resu l r s  
Significant damage whenever  impac t  i s  in  l o s s  of a tmosphe re ,  the 
to p r e s s u r e  shel l  r ecorded .  Expected ni t rogen gas  use  r a t e  
to be re la t ively  ra re  above wil l  in i t ia te  \varnir-ig 
occur rence .  level  s ignal  a t  c r i t i c a l  
t ime .  
Acoust ic  Emis s ion  Emis s ion  r a t e  of Not es tabl ished fo r  main 
Monitor to ta l  emi s s ion  mon-  p r e s s u r e  shel l  s t r uc tu r e  
Mic roc r acks  o r  flaws i to red  a t  a  pa r t i cu-  
forming in  s t r uc tu r e  l a r  location ha s  
reached a p r e d e t e r -  
mined c r i t i c a l  level .  
Seal  In tegr i ty  Monitor A faulty s e a l  should None. Cr i t i ca l  a t m o s -  
Los s  of a tmosphe re  be  flagged whenever  phere  degradat ion a s  a 
to space  a leak r a t e  becomes  r e su l t  of s e a l  f a i lu re  wi?;  
significant  with be moni tored fo r  warning 
r e s p e c t  to the total  by the ni t rogen ga s  u s e  
planned outboard ra te .  
leak (for example ,  
10 percent) .  
Active Ul t rasonics  This  function wil l  Not defined 
P r e s e n c e  of c r a c k s  probably be  used to 
o r  f laws i n  p r e s s u r e  complement  the 
s t r u c t u r e  acoust ic  emiss ion  
moni tor .  
Onboard Leaks  
Hydrogen gas  
NH3 
CO 
CH4 
H20 l eaks  
F r e o n  
Oxygen 
Hydrogen gas  i s  At approximately  1 0  t imes  
about 4 t imes  i t s  nominal  l eve l ,  the deto- 
nominal  level  nation l imi t .  
2 m g / m 3  10 m g / m 3  
3 0 m g / m 3  50 $0 m g / m 3  
1. 000 m g / m  2 ,  0ih0mg / m  3 
Any None 
Not determined None 
Two t o  3 t imes  Maximum r e  supply rate 
no rma l  r a t e  (sa tura t ion) .  
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on a s i m i l a r  ana lys i s  using a total  weight of 0. 223  kg and 64  inputs. The 
weight ana lys i s  i s  c a r r i e d  through the OCS to the data t e rmina l  only. It i s  
a s s u m e d  that  the DCS integration does  not impose  an appreciable  weight 
i n c r e a s e  on exist ing OCS-DMS equipment beyond that  point. 
8 . 4  COMPATIBILITY WITH SPACE STATION 
The p re l im ina ry  design effort  h a s  been pe r fo rmed  with the objective of 
defining the in te r faces  between the DCS and the  Space Station OCS. 
P roces s ing ,  s to rage ,  t r ansmis s ion  and display of informat ion genera tea  
re la t ive  to the DCS s e n s o r s  a r e  compatible with exist ing Space Station con- 
cepts  and should have a re la t ively  sma l l  impact  on the sizing of these  
sy s t ems .  At p r e sen t ,  the data acquisi t ion sy s t em and the p reprocess ing  
of s enso r  s ignals  p r e s e n t s  the mos t  imposing prob lem f r o m  the sy s t ems  
integration viewpoint. F o r  example,  F igu re  8- 11 shows the  overa l l  data 
acquisi t ion method for  overboard leak  damage control  sy s t ems .  Conclusions 
reached  in  the  p r e l im ina ry  design study a r e  a s  follows: 
A. Caution and warning signals a r e  compatible with the Space Stat:,on 
concept and can  be in tegrated into the p r e sen t  concept without 
significant impact .  
B. Display and control  requirements a r e  compatible with the planned 
sys t em for onboard checkout. 
6. P roces s ing  and s to rage  requ i rements  fo r  the DCS r ep re sen t  about 
10 percen t  of the to ta l  requ i rements  for  onboard checkout. 
D. Most of the DCS sensor  inputs can  be monitored by the exist ing data 
acquisi t ion sy s t em.  The method descr ibed  to locate c r a c k s  and 
flaws in  the impact  gage subsys tem and acoust ic  emiss ion  monitor 
i s  not proven; the p r e sen t  method of t ime-cor re la t ing  signals uiould 
be v e r y  difficult to implement .  The data acquisi t ion method for  
locating defects  in  the active ul t rasonic  subsys tem i s  a l so  untested 
and should be investigated.  
E. The total  weight for the acquist ion of DCS sensor  signals i s  
es t imated  to be 35 .  8 kg, not including controls  and displays and 
other  faci l i t ies  that  a r e  t ime - sha red  with other  sy s t ems .  
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Sect ion  9 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
O.iei-board d a m a g e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  a r e  in an  e a r l y  s t a g e  of deve lopment  
c o m p a r e d  wi th  onboa rd  s y s t e m s  which  h a v e  b e e n  s tud ied  ex tens ive ly  for  t r a c e  
con tamina t ion  a n d  con t ro l .  It i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  tha t  m a j o r  e m p h a s i s  b e  placed 
on el  a lua t ing  p r o m i s i n g  o v e r b o a r d  d a m a g e  con t ro l  s e n s i n g  de t ec t ion  a n d  
loca t ion  t echn iques .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  s tudy  of spec i f i c  s u b s y s t e m s  
follow'i;~: 
A. Ni t rogcn  IJse Rate  Mon i to r .  
T h r  p ~ l s e  r a t e  nlodulatcd t w o - g a s  c o n t r o l l e r  i s  in  a r e l a t i v e l y  
advanced  s t a t e  of deve lopmen t .  T o  i n t e g r a t e  t hc  l e a k  de t ec t~c in  
func t ion  in to  the  c o n t r o l l e r ,  f o u r  add i t i ona l  c i r c u i t  func t ions  shou ld  
bc atldcd. T h e s e  a r e :  t e n l p e r a t u r e  compensa t ion ,  b i l cvc l  ~ntccl- , i ; -  
t ion  l i n ~ i t s ,  t i m i n g  c i r c u i t ,  and a  funct ion g e n c r a t o r .  P c r f o r n l a n i  c 
t c s t s  should be  c a r r i c t f  out on thc  nlodified t o n t r o l l t ~ r .  
B. P a s s i v e  U l t r a s o n i c s .  
P a r a m e t r i c  p r o p e r t i e s  of a n  i m p a c t  gage should b r  i n v e ~ t i ~ a t c t l  ils
a  func t ion  of type  of impac t ,  ve loc i ty  of i m p a c t ,  and  d a m a g e  I I I O C ~ C .  
T r i angu la t ion  t echn iques  f o r  p r e d i c t i n g  point of i m p a c t  should be 
v e r i f i e d  f o r  r e a l i s t i c  Space  S ta t ion  s t r u c t u r e s .  The  concep t  of a 
dua l  func t ion  p a s s i v e  u l t r a s o n i c  gage  combining  the func t ions  of a n  
a c o u s t i c  e m i s s i o n  111onitor and a n  i m p a c t  gage  should  b e  explored, 
C. Act ive  U l t r a s o n i c s .  
P u l s e  e c h o  t echn iques  should be s tudied  wi th  r e a l i s t i c  mode l  s t i - u c -  
t u r e s  t o  def ine  s e n s i t i v i t y  p a r a m e t e r s  s u c h  a s  r a n g e  and  f l a w - c r a t  l; 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  t echn iques .  A dual - func t ion  gage p rov id inS  both 
pu l se  e c h o  and  i m p a c t  gage  capab i l i t i e s  should be inves t iga t ed .  
D. Seal  Leak Detector .  
E lec t ro ly t i c  hygromet ry ,  capacitance,  and t h e r m a l  conductivity 
technique s  should be investigated for prototype development of 
s ta t ic ,  dynamic,  and make  -and-break s ea l  l eak  de tec to rs .  
E. Por tab le  Leak Detector.  
A study of detect ion techniques  based  on di f ferent ia l  a i r  flow tech-  
niques i s  recommended.  The t h e r m i s t o r  bridge s enso r  shows 
pa r t i cu l a r  p romi se  and should be c a r r i e d  through a prototype 
development  s tage  if feas ibi l i ty  i s  demons t ra ted .  A por table  leak 
de tec to r  should be versa t i l e  enough t o  be useful for  both overboard 
and onboard l eak  detection.  
The d e v e l o p ~ l ~ e n t  of flight-type m a s s  spec t rome te r s ,  gas  chromatographs ,  
and support ing ana lyze r s  i s  wel l  advanced. However, the applicat ions of 
these  subsys t ems  t o  onboard leakage detect ion r e m a i n s  t o  be demons t ra ted .  
Leak-detection p rocedu re s  should be studied in  a c losed a tmosphere  env i ro r -  
i-nent with s imulated l eak  s o u r c e s  a s  provided by a damage  control  s imula to r .  
In addition t o  s imula to r  evaluation of m a j o r  subsys tems ,  the development of 
the following suppor t  type s e n s o r s  i s  r ecommended:  (1 )  res i s t ive - tape  leak 
de tec to r ;  ( 2 )  solid-  s t a te  po lymer ic  l eak  de tec to r ;  and ( 3 )  quar tz  r e  sonator  
sorbt ion de tec to r .  
Acces s  t o  the p r e s s u r e  wa l l s  of the Space Station for  l eak  detection and 
r e p a i r  should be designed into the  Space Station dur ing conf ig~lra t ion layout, 
The evaluation study and ranking fo r  var ious  a c c e s s  methods  indicated that 
pivot and d i sp lacement  methods  a r e  favored for  the ma jo r i t y  of conditions 
preventing a c c e s s  t o  the wal ls .  
The weight tradeoff  ana lys i s  between se lected damage  control  sy s t ems  and 
the added weight of a tmosphere  supply r e s e r v e s  t o  compensate for  unplanned 
leakage resu l t ed  in the f i r m  conclusion that  the weight penalty fo r  the damage 
control  s y s t e m s  i s  exceeded by the weight of requ i red  gas  r e s e r v e s  in short 
per iods  of t i m e  compared  t o  the projected t en-year  life of the Space Stat ion,  
Leak  r e p a i r  subsys t ems  cur ren t ly  available fo r  the Space Station are d e f i c i c c t  
f r o m  the standpoints  of methods ,  commonali ty,  and p rocedure  s .  Reliance 
should f i r s t  be placed on approaches  which min imize  the probabil i ty of leaks, 
then on des ign  redundancy for  c r i t i c a l  s y s t e m  functions, and f inally on leak 
r e p a i r  s y s t ems .  
Where p rac t i ca l ,  a  defective component should be replaced.  When replace - 
ment  i s  not feas ible ,  e l a s t o m e r i c  sea lan t s  o r  epoxy adhesives  a r e  rhe 
p r e f e r r e d  r epa i r  methods  f o r  f luid-container combinations permit t ing this 
approach.  F o r  remain ing  f luid-container combinations,  a  bolt and seal 
method i s  favored.  
Ar  c-welding p r o c e s s e s  offer the g r ea t e s t  potential commonal i ty  for  leaji 
r epa i r ,  but a r e  deficient f r o m  both a methods  and p rocedu re s  stantipoint, 
Fu ture  effort  on space  welding r e s e a r c h  should be d i rec ted  towara  reclu(sng 
power,  s ize ,  spe c ia l  tool  r equ i rements ,  and minimizing spe cial  ski l l s  
r equ i red  fo r  welding operat ions .  
It i s  recommended that  a  m o r e  comprehensive  l eak  r e p a i r  s tudy be urlcicr- 
taken which cons iders  speci f ic  leak configurations,  newer container materials,  
a l t e rna te  fluids, and p rocedura l  l e ak - r epa i r  r esponse  t ime  r e q u i r e m e n ~ ~ s ,  
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Appendix A 
POSSIBLE SOURCES O F  NOISE FROM A CHOKED ORIFICE OR C R A C K  
Poss ib le  noise sou rce s  a r e  the following: 
A. Turbulence i n  the  jet downstream of the orif ice.  This noisc cc~uld 
en te r  the  cabin only by t r ansmis s ion  through the  wall.  
B. Trans i t ion  in  a separa t ion  - reat tachment  region. 
C .  Fluctuation of the shock s t ruc tu r e  i n  the jet, due to turbulence o r  
separa t ion  - reat tachment  instability. 
The flow s t ruc tu r e  depends important ly  on the  or i f ice  geometry ,  in par t rcular  
i ts  length - diamete r  ra t io  L /d .  
F o r  ~ / d  = 0 and pi /pe  >> 1 ,  we  have a highly 
underexpanded jet with the c l a s s i ca l  st]-ucturc 
S 
L / d  >> 1 (channel o r  pipe) 
d 
Separation will occur  a t  the inlet edge ( s )  of thc  
orif ice.  A f r ee  jet will go sonic a t  a  rninimi~~r:  
( s e e  sketch).  
Assuming p. = 1 atm,  i t  i s  not quite c l ea r  f o r  
C: FIGURE B 
I 1 what minimum d, the  shea r  l aye r s  will 1)rc : )ni~ 
f turbulent  jus t  a f te r  expansion. This will. depend h on the  Reynolds number based on d iamete r ,  Fluctuations associa ted with th is  t rans i t ion  i oulcl be t ransmi t ted  through the wall near  the edqc of  
FIGURE A the  or i f ice .  
a r e a  (A,:') then expand and reat tach t o  t i l i ' .  c-hanilel 
wall ( r ) ,  f r o m  which point oblique shocl-;s -mil 
originate.  
At the  separa t ion  points, the  flow will  s t i l l  be l aminar ,  due to the  favorable  
p r e s s u r e  gradient  up to that  point; but soon a f te r ,  the separa ted  f r e e  s h e a r  
l aye r  wil l  go turbulent  (again  depending on the  Reynolds number) .  
The unsteadiness  of th is  t rans i t ion  (which can cause  a band of amplified 
unsteadiness  of the  whole separa ted  flow region) could produce sound by 
t r a n s m i s s i o n  through the wal l  o r  by d i r ec t  coupling with the  u p s t r e a m  
region,  s ince  the  separa ted  region and the flow u p s t r e a m  of the  jet throac 
a r e  subsonic. 
In addition, the s a m e  possibi l i t ies  a s  in F igure  A ex i s t  for  the flow on the 
exit s ide.  
In termediate  ~ / d  - 1
The flow will s t i l l  s epa ra t e  a t  the  inlet edge and niust 
S 
f o r m  a th roa t  somewhere .  Where i t  r ea t t aches ,  
A *  
whether  inside the channel o r  on the external  wall, 
i s  not c lea r .  But the s a m e  possibi l i t ies  for  
t rans i t ion  e tc .  a s  in F igu re  B a r e  p resen t  
FIGURE C 
A. 1 TRANSITION CONDITIONS 
The re  i s  a possibil i ty that  the f r e e  shea r  l ayer  wil l  become turbulent  af ter  
separa t ion  and before reat tachment ,  i. e . ,  between s and r. To es t imate  
under  what conditions th i s  might occur ,  the th ickness  of the boundary l aye r ,  
6 at  separa t ion  will  be of o rde r  
s' 
w h e r e  v i s  the kinemat ic  viscosity,  d the hole d iamete r ,  and U the velocity at 
separat ion,  which will  be, for  a l l  p rac t ica l  purposes ,  sonic. 
The  dis tance to  reat tachment  i s  a few d iamete rs ,  s ay  
Q -2d 
and t r a n s i t i o n w i l l  occur  i f  1 > 1 0 6 s .  
Thus the c r i t i ca l  conditions a r e  
Reynolds number based on  h o l e  
d iamete r .  
As suming s tandard a tmospher ic  condition inside the  cabin, 
- 4 g i v e s d  ~ 1 0  cm 
C r  
This es t imate  may  be off by a s  much a s  a factor of 10, but it  s e e m s  c lear  
that  the  possibil i ty of t ransi t ional  separa ted  flow exis ts  for ve ry  small. holps,  
A. 2 FREQUENCIES 
It i s  a l so  very difficult to make  anything but a crude,  order-of-magnitucle 
es t imate .  The m o s t  likely re la t ion for  a dominant frequency i s  
where  S i s  a coefficient which may be dependent on Reynolds number.  Its 
numer ica l  value i s  probably l e s s  than unity. 
5 F o r  S = 1 and d = 1 m m ,  f = 3 x 10 / sec .  
A. 3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Some of the  objectives of a r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m  would be the following. 
A. Spec t ra l  content of the  sound and i t s  dependence on Reynolds 
number  ( i .  e . ,  p o r  d). La t t e r  would fu rn i sh  scaling informatioll. 
A thorough investigation and determinat ion of spec t r a l  distributioil 
f o r  a t  l e a s t  one d iamete r  (about 3 m m )  would be desi rable .  
A c i r c u l a r  hole and a slot should be investigated. Identification oC 
any peaks (whis t les) .  
B. Intensity (I) Once some  idea of spec t r a l  distr ibution w e r e  avai lable ,  
one might rat ionally be able to  get some  idea  of intensity dependence 
2 3 
on d iamete r  (d , d , ?) .  F o r  example,  dec rea se  d and i nc r ea se  p 
to keep Reynolds number constant ,  m e a s u r e  to ta l  output on center  
l ine a t  a  fixed number  of d i ame te r s  f r o m  the  hole. Then study PI;, 
a s  function of d. 
C. Sound radiation field. 
A. 4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
TO ELECTRONICS, SPECTRAL 
ANALYZER, ETC. 
6-IN. D IA  
ANECHOIC 
CHAMBER 
ANECHOIC INLET, PRESSURE 
AND FLOW REGULATED 
ANECHOIC DU :T 
TO VAit)UWi 
PUM" 
A. 5 FLOW RATES 
d = 1 mm, p = 1 atm, m = 0.30 g / s e c  + 300 c c / s e c  
0 
(Probably  one half th is  for  the  long hole) 
d = 3 mm --c 1 g / s e c  - 1 l i t e r / s e c  N T P .  
To main ta in  p = 0. 001 po (1 m m  Hg) -c 1, 000 l i t e r s / s e c .  
e 
Ups t r eam p r e s s u r e :  va ry  up to 3 a t m ?  
Then m a s s  pumping r a t e  up by another factor  of 3. 
A pumping sys t em with a capacity of about 1, 000 l i t e r s / s e c  a t  about 1 mrn K g  
i s  needed (35 cfm).  More  capacity needed for  c r acks ,  depending on aspec t  
ra t io .  
Alternatively,  one might go to  lower-volume flow r a t e s ,  e. g. 3 to 4 cfm, 
us ing s m a l l e r  d but higher p 
0' 
1 1 Max d = - mm (down to - mm). 2 10 
At p - 10 a tm,  m = 0. 7 5  g / s e c  0. 6 s tandard l i t e r s / s e c  
0 
- 2 p -- 10 a t m  60 l i t e r s  / s e c  - 2 c fm 
e 
Another possibil i ty to  consider  i s  the  u s e  of ga se s  other  than air, e. g ,  heavier 
gas to sca le  down the  f requencies .  
A. 6 PARAMETERS 
The p r i m a r y  investigation would best  be done for  l a rge  L / d  (both circular hole 
and channel o r  c rack) ,  with sharp ,  clean, inlet edges. Case s  with L / d  .= 1 and 
L / d  = 0 could follow. Once some  insight into these  c lean ca se s  i s  ob ta ined ,  
fu r ther  complications in  geometry  could be investigated, e ,  g. ,  effect od 
noncircular i ty ,  inlet  edges not sharp ,  " rea l"  holes produced by par t i c le  
impac t  in  the  ball ist ic range,  r e a l  f r ac tu r e  c r acks ,  etc.  

Appendix B 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY O F  A METEOROID 
IMPACT GAGE FOR A SPACE STATION 
As par t  of a MDAC IRAD p r o g r a m  on impact physics ,  the feasibil i ty of  a 
meteoroid  impact gage for Space Station was studied in 1970. 
Sections of a space  s ta t ion wal l  with a meteoroid  bumper and t h e r m a l  
insulat ion (F igu re  B-1) we re  impacted by a light gas  gun in  the MDAC 
Aerophysics  Laboratory Ball ist ic Range. A specia l  t r ansducer  
(F igu re  B-2) that  could detect  acoustic waves a t  f requencies  in  excess  of 
10 MHz was  mounted to the  inner wall. The output was  recorded  by a 
Tektronix 502A oscil loscope writ ing a t  a r a t e  of 100 p s e c / c m  and a 
Tektronix  545A oscil loscope writ ing a t  20 p sec / cm.  The t r ansduce r  was 
connected t o  the  osci l loscopes  by near ly  30. 5 m e t e r s  of coaxial cable, 
attenuating the  signal  by about 60 db. 
Nine impac ts  w e r e  made  using a luminum project i les  with velocit ies f r o m  
6 to  7 k m / s e c .  P ro j ec t i l e  m a s s e s  w e r e  se lected to bracket  the ball ist ic 
l imi t  of the cabin wall  (Table  B-1). Th ree  impacts  w e r e  made  using a 
cadmium bumper and a cadmium projecti le.  To determine difference 
between normal  and high velocity inputs, each shot was  preceded by a t e s t  
consist ing of s t r ik ing the wall with s m a l l  hand-held objects such a s  a. p las t ic  
s c r ewdr ive r  handle, a  s t e e l  bar ,  and a wrench.  F igures  B-3 through B-9 
show the  ma in  signal  components a s  reduced f r o m  osc i l lograms .  The periods 
and amplitudes of the higher f requencies  we re  read  with a microscope ,  It 
was  concluded that  the  signal  f r o m  the  B18- 54 t e s t  (F igu re  B-8) was t r a n s -  
mit ted through the wooden spacer .  Consequently, the spacer  was  resr,o\red 
fo r  the next shot (B48-55)(Figure  B-9). Only a gas cloud s t ruck  the plate 
in th i s  shot,  producing a weak signal  and no damage.  An unresolved 
ins t rumentat ion prob lem prevented any data f r o m  being recorded  on s ix  of 
these  shots.  In a l l  but one ca se ,  high-frequency osci l la t ions  w e r e  c ie tec ied  
---- 
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Figure B-'8. Space Station Wall Configuration 
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Figure B-2. Meteoroid Impact Transducer 
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a s  th(1 ini t i ,d  s igna l .  A til-ncl-frcquc~nc-y h i s t o r y  in  a  typic a1 ancl thc ( Y (  ( p I i o r i , ~ I  
c ~ s c .  i s  il1ustratc.d i n  Figure. 13-10. Figures E- 11 and B- 12 a r c  r c ~ p ~ - ( ~ ~ ( ~ i i L c ~ t l v ~ ~  
r tx(  o1-tic.ci da ta .  I l i gh - f r equency  o s c i l l a t i o n s  a r c  a b s e n t  in thv f i r s t  L O  p s r  c 
a f t v r  projtlc-ti le i m p a c t  of F i g u r e  B-12 followetl by ?-kHz l ~ u r s t  f o r  L O  pi~st,c, 
E v v n  i n  t h i s  cast., t he  f a s t  rist-, t i m c  of t hc  s i g n a l  represents a n  in i t r ;~ l  h ~ q h -  
.L -6-
frc.qucncy component .  
T h c  11ighc.st frc.qucncy of large. amplitude which  c a n  bc exc i ted  in a  s t ruc  t u r c .  
by a n  iimpact i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h c  d u r a t i o n  of t he  i m p a c t ;  t h e  s h o r t e r  t hc  
du ra t ion ,  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  f r equency .  T h e  d u r a t i o n  i s  a  func t ion  of the  trrnc 
r c q u i r c d  for t h e  p u l s e  t o  t r a v e l  t h rough  one  of t he  contac t ing  p a r t s  and rt.ilc i t  
to  the i n t e r f a c e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a 0. 16 c r r ~  d i a m e t e r  (1116- inch)  s t c e l  b a l l  wrll 
exc i t e  a  f r e q u e n c y  of about  1  MHz. L a r g e r  o b j e c t s  wil lproduce l o w c r  
+M.  Gar jup .  C a l i b r a t i o n  of a  M i c r o m e t e o r o i d  I m p a c t  Gauge.  I Jn ive r s i t y  of 
Toron to  Ins t i t u t e  f o r  A e r o s p a c e  S tud ie s .  Technical  No. 97.  M a r c h  1967. 
Figure B-10. TimeIFrequency History of Impacts 
f requencies  because  of the  longer  pulse durations generated.  It has  been 
found that  the  output of a piezogage i s  propor t ional  to the  momentum t r a n s -  
f e r r e d  by an  impact.  Thus,  although s m a l l  objects hitting a cabin wal l  at 
low velocit ies can genera te  high f requencies ,  the amplitudes will be low. 
L a r g e  low-velocity objects,  while producing high amplitudes,  wil l  not 
genera te  high frequencies.  The only obvious mechan i sm for  generating 
high-frequency,  high-amplitude acoustic waves i s  the  d i r ec t  impact  of a 
meteoro id  o r  the sp ray  f r o m  meteoro id /bumper  debr i s  impinging on the  
cabin wall. 
A second s e r i e s  of exper iment  w e r e  designed to evaluate the  impact-generated 
s ignals  a f te r  they have t rave led  some  distance through a s t ruc tu r e  and a s s e s s  
the  potential  of a three-uni t  omnidirectional  sensor  sys tem.  
A sheet  of 7075 T6 aluminum 122 x 58 x 0. 32 c m  was placed in the range 
tank of a light gas  gun. The des i r ed  impact  a r e a  was bolted to the connector 
tube between the range tank and b las t  r e ce ive r  with a gasket  s o  the  blas t  
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r e ce ive r  could be evacuated (F igu re  B- 13). The clamping action prex enled 
f lexure  waves  genera ted  by impact  f r o m  propagating beyond the gasket ,  but 
l i t t l e  at tenuation to the longitudinal wave resu l t ed .  The range tank was  
maintained a t  1 - a t m  p r e s s u r e .  T h r e e  of the specia l  t r a n s d u c e r s  w e r e  
mounted on the r e a r  su r f ace  of the t a rge t  sheet  and connected to s epa ra t e  
osci l loscope channels.  All t r a c e s  w e r e  t r i gge red  together ,  p rese rv ing  the. 
t ime  re la t ionship .  
A to ta l  of t h r e e  shots  w e r e  made  on th i s  shee t  (F igu re s  B-14, B-15 and B- 1 6 ) .  
The longitudinal wave velocity i n  the  sheet  w a s  calculated f r o m  the difference 
in  a r r i v a l  t i m e s  of the f i r s t  s ignal  appear ing a t  two t r a n s d u c e r s  using the 
impac t  location to es tab l i sh  path lengths.  Using th is  velocity constant ,  the 
a r r i v a l  t i m e  di f ferences  a t  the t h r e e  t r an sduce r  p a i r s  was  converted into 
path  length di f ferences .  These  path length di f ferences  w e r e  u sed  to genera te  
the s e t s  of hyperbolas  locating the impact  point. (The  hyperbola  generated 
f r o m  t r a n s d u c e r s  1  and 2 of F igu re  B-14 i s  not shown because  the curvature 
i s  too s teep  fo r  a ccu ra t e  plotting. ) 
ALUMINUM PLATE 
(SIMULATED CABIN WALL) 
11 LONGITUDINAL WAVE 
1 ATMOSPHERE 
IMPACT AREA 
TRANSDUCER 
TO OSCl LLOS 
Figure B-13. Test Set-Up 
NO. 1 
CB 
NO. 2 
CB 
NO. 1 
(8 
IMPACT POINT 
1-3 2-3 
Figure B-15. Shot B-56-2 Test Sheet 
-- 
A 144 
NO. 2 
Figure B-16. Shot 656-3 Test Sheet 
A second shee t  of 7075 T6 a luminum 122 x 61 x 0.254 c m  was  re inforced with 
s t i f feners  of 2024 T3 aluminum a s  shown in  F igu re s  B-17 through B.-20. 
T h r e e  shots  w e r e  made  on th i s  plate and the  calculations per formed  a s  
before. The dec rea sed  plate th ickness  resu l ted  i n  a 10-percent  reduction 
in  shock velocity. Except for  a n  apparent  e r r o r  i n  shock a r r i v a l  t ime  at 
t r ansduce r  2 of Shot B56-6, the  s t i f feners  had no apparent  effect on the 
measu remen t s .  This i s  r a t h e r  surpr i s ing  in  view of the  effect of thrckness 
upon velocity. F igu re  B-2 1 shows typical  impact  s ignatures  for  th is  
configuration. 
A four th  impact  was  made  on  the  second shee t  which was  protected by a 
0. 04 c m  (0. 02 5 inch) thick 707 5 T6 bumper with a 5. 1 - c m  standoff distan: e 
(F igu re  B-22). Although the  bumper caused a l a r g e  sp ray  to impinge 1113 the 
plate, the  project i le  re ta ined enough integr i ty  to pene t ra te  the  t a rge t  plate, 
The t e s t  conditions a r e  summar i zed  in  Table B-2. Two t e s t s  (B56-3 and 
B56-4) a r e  lacking data a s  a r e su l t  of a defective f i lm in  the  osci l loscope 
Table B-2 
TRIANGULATIOlV LOCATION TEST CONDITIONS 
Velocity Transducer  
Shot ( k m l s e c )  1 2 3 .- 
B56-1 6. 18  55 p sec  0 Ref 29 p sec  
All project i les  0. 975 c m  d i ame te r  by 0. 507 c m  long 
(0. 360-g polyethylene) 
Longitudinal velocity on B56-1, 2, and 3 - 0. 56 c m / p s e c  
Longitudinal velocity on B56-4 through 7 - 0. 507 cm/p.sec 
0.159cm -11: 
(0.0625 IN.) 
5.08 cm 
(2.0 IN.) 
0.254 cm 
(0.10 IN.) 
I 
C 
ALUMINUM RIVETS / TARGET SHEET (7075 T6) 
Figure B-17. Stiffener Detail 
A144 
Figure B-78. Shot B56-4 Test Sheet 
Figure B-19. Shot 856-5 Test Sheet 
RIM 
1 1 METER -4 
IMPACT POINT 
Figure 8-20. Shot B56-6 Test Sheet 
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R144 
1 METER 
IMPACT POINT 
RUMPFR CONFIGURATION 
STIFFENERS 
Fiaure B-22. Shot 856-7 Test Sheet-Bum~er Confiauration (Double Wall) 
c a m e r a .  It i s  observed  that  the  high-frequency osci l la t ions  s e e n  in the 
f i r s t  s e r i e s  of t e s t s  a r e  absen t  although f a s t  r i s e  t i m e s  a r e  s t i l l  p r e sen t ,  
(The  high sensi t iv i ty  used  in  the f i r s t  s e r i e s  makes  a  d i r ec t  compar i son  of 
r i s e  t i m e s  difficult. \ 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions w e r e  reached:  
A. Impact  location by a  wave a r r i v a l  t ime  technique has  been proven 
on a  l imi ted sca le  t e s t  and a p p e a r s  l e s s  sensi t ive  to s t ructura i ;  
i r r egu l a r i t i e s  than was  predic ted.  
B. The s ignature  of a  meteoro id  impact  contains high-frequency 
components of high ampli tude.  These  components c an  be used as 
the ba s i s  fo r  act ivating a  detection sy s t em.  

Appendix C 
ACCESS METHODS 
This  appendix p r e s e n t s  a p ic to r ia l  review of a c c e s s  methods  that  can be 
u sed  fo r  l eak  r e p a i r s  on the p r e s s u r e  shel l  o r  to  the ins ta l led  vehicle system 
Each f igure  p r e sen t s  the condition obstructing acce s s ,  identif ies the access 
method,  and h a s  a br ief  comment  on the method.  F o r  additional information 
on how each  a c c e s s  method was  evaluated and identified, r e f e r  to Section 6 
of this  r epor t .  
A- 0.76 m (30 IN.) UNOBSTRUCTED ACCESS AREA REQUIRED TO ALL  PORTIONS OF SHELL 
ACCESS METHOD 
INHERENT IN  DESIGN 
COMMENT 
INHERENT-IN-DESIGN IS THE FIRST METHOD TO BE 
CONSIDERED IN ACCESS SELECTION PROCESS. WHERE 
APPLICABLE, IT  IS TO BE UTILIZED (AS IN ABOVE- 
ILLUSTRATED CONDITION). 
ACCESS METHOD 
PIVOT, SLIDE, SLlDE/PIVOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT ACCESS IS MOST DESIRABLE; SLIDE,SLIDE/ 
PIVOT, AND UNIT REMOVAL ARE SECOND, THIRD, 
AND FOURTH IN  ORDER OF DESIRABLE ACCESS 
METHODS 
Figure C-2. Partition Butting Against Shell 
ACCESS METHOD 
P l VOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT ACCESS IS THE MOST DESIRABLE METHOD. UNIT 
REMOVAL, SLIDE, AND SLIDEIPIVOT ARE SECOND, 
THIRD, AND FOURTH METHODS, RESPECTIVELY 
ACCESS METHOD 
P l VOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT ACCESS IS THE FIRST CHOICE; SLIDE, UNIT 
REMOVAL, AND SLIDEIPIVOT ARE SECOND, THIRD, 
AND FOURTH METHODS, RESPECTIVELY. 
NOTE 
FLEX LINES TO BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE AND 
AS CLOSE TO THE LINE OF PIVOT AS FEASIBLE. 
Figure C-4. Equ~pment Butting Against Shell (Flex ~ ines)  
ACCESS METHOD 
PIVOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT ACCESS METHOD IS THE FIRST CHOICE FOR 
BOTH OF THE ILLUSTRATED ACCESS CONDITIONS, 
FOLLOWED BY UNIT REMOVAL, SLIDE, AND SLIDE1 
PIVOT, RESPECTIVELY. 
Figure C-5. Equipment Butting Against Shell (Disconnect Lines) 
ACCESS METHOD 
SLIDE 
COMMENT 
SLIDE ACCESS TO BE UTILIZED WHEN PIVOT AND 
UNIT REMOVAL ACCESS ARE NOT FEASIBLE. 
Figure 6-6. Storage Cabinets Butting Against Shell 
276 
ACCESS METHOD 
SLIDE 
COMMENT 
SLIDE ACCESS I S T H E  T H I R D  CHOICE OF ACCESS 
METHODS. PIVOT A N D  U N l T  REMOVAL R A N K  FIRST 
A N D  SECOND, RESPECTIVELY, AS ACCESS METHODS 
Figure C-7. Equipment Butting Against Shell (Disconnect Lines) 
R 144 
ACCESS METHOD 
SLIDE 
COMMENT 
SLIDE ACCESS IS THE SECOND-CHOICE METHOD; 
PIVOT ACCESS A N D  U N l T  REMOVAL THE FIRST 
A N D  T H I R D  CHOICES, RESPECTIVELY. 
Figure C-8. Equipment Butting Against Shell (Flex Lines) 
ACCESS METHOD COMMENT 
SLIDEIPIVOT SLIDE/PIVOT ACCESS IS THE LEAST DESIRABLE 
METHOD AND IS UTILIZED ONLY IF PIVOT, UNlT 
REMOVAL, AND SLIDE ACCESS CANNOT BE 
Figure C-9. Storage Cabinets Butting Against Shell INCORPORATED' 
--- 
ACCESS METHOD 
UNlT REMOVAL 
COMMENT 
UNlT REMOVAL IS THE THIRD CHOICE ACCESS 
METHOD. PIVOT ACCESS AND SLIDE ACCESS ARE 
FIRST AND SECOND CHOICE, RESPECTl\lELV. 
Figure 6-10, Equipment Butting Against Shell (Flex Lines) 
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ACCESS METHOD 
UNlT REMOVAL 
COMMENT 
UNlT REMOVAL IS THE SECOND CHOICE ACCESS 
METHOD PIVOT,SLIDE, AND SLlDEIPlVOT ARE 
FIRST, THIRD, AND FOURTH CHOICES, RESPECTlVELY 
ACCESS METHOD 
PIVOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT IS THE FIRST CHOICE ACCESS METHOD UNIT 
REMOVAL, SLIDE, AND SLIDE/PIVOT ARE SECOND, 
THIRD, AND FOURTH METHODS, RESPECTlVEL\i 
NOTE 
A SINGLE PIVOT POINT MAY BE EMPLOYED I F  UNlT 
MASS IS LOW AND A FRACTION PIVOT IS UTILIZED 
Figure (2-12. Shell-Mounted Storage Cabinets 
----- 
279 
ACCESS METHOD 
P l VOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT IS THE FIRST CHOICE ACCESS METHOD. SLIDE 
SLIDEIPIVOT, AND UNIT REMOVAL ARE SECOND, 
THIRD, AND FOURTH METHODS, RESPECTIVELY. 
ADJACENT PIVOTS ARE UTILIZED FOR UPIDOWN 
AND RIGHTILEFT PIV0TING;SINGLE-PIVOT ACCESS 
IS ALSO POSSIBLE ON LOW MASS UNITS. 
Figure 6-73. Shell-Mounted Crew Furniture 
, 
Figure C-14. Shell-Mounted Storage Cabinets 
/ COMMENT 
,--" 
SLIDE ACCESS IS SECOND MOST DESIRABLE METHOD, 
PIVOT A N D  SLIDEIPIVOT ARE FIRST AND T H I R D  
/' CHOICE, RESPECTIVELY 
Figure C-15. Shell-Mounted Crew Furniture 
ACCESS METHOD 
SLIDEIPIVOT 
Fiaure 6-36. Shell-Mounted Storage Cabinets 
COMMENT 
SLIDEIPIVOT ACCESS IS FOURTH CHOICE PIVOT 
U N I T  REMOVAL,  A N D  SLIDE ACCESS ARE. FIRST, 
SECOND, A N D  T H I R D  CHOICE, RESPECTIVELY 
ACCESS METHOD 
SLIDEIPIVOT 
COMMENT 
SLIDE/PIVOT IS THIRD ACCESS METHOD CHOICE. 
PIVOT AND SLIDE ACCESS ARE FIRST AND SECOND 
CHOICE. RESPECTIVELY 
Figure 6-17. Shell-Mounted Crew Furniture 
-- 
R14.4 
t5 
Figure 6-78. Shell-Mounted Storage Cabinets 
COMMENT 
ITEM DISPLACEMENT IS THE PREFERRED ACCESS 
METHOD FOR FLEXIBLE DECOR A N D  PADDING. 
Figure C-19. Shell-Mounted Decor and Crew Protective Padding 
R144 
ACCESS METHOD 
PIVOT 
COMMENT 
PIVOT ACCESS IS THE PREFERRED METHOD FOR 
RIGID DECOR A N D  PADDING. 
Ftgure C-20. Shell-Mounted Decor and Crew Protect~ve Padding 
ACCESS METHOD 
ITEM DISPLACEMENT 
COMMENT 
ITEM DISPLACEMENT IS THE PREFERRED ACCESS 
METHOD. PARTIAL DISASSEMBLY, AND DISASSEMBLY 
ARE SECOND AND THIRD CHOICES. RESPECTIVELY. 
Figure C-21. Liquid and Gas Transfer Lines and Ducting; Conduit and Electrical Cable 
ACCESS METHOD 
PARTIAL DISASSEMBLY 
COMMENT 
PARTIAL DISASSEMBLY OF THE ITEM IS THE SECOND 
CHOICE ACCESS METHOD. ITEM DISPLACEMENT AND 
DISASSEMBLY ARE FIRST AND THIRD CHOICES, 
RESPECTIVELY. 
Figure C-22. Liquid and Gas Transfer Lines and Ducting; Conduit and Electrical Cable 
ACCESS METHOD 
DISASSEMBLY 
COMMENT 
DISASSEMBLY IS THE LEAST DESIRABLE ACCESS METHOD. 
ITEM DISPLACEMENT AND PARTIAL DISASSEMBLY ARE 
FIRST AND SECOND CHOICES, RESPECTIVELY. 
Figure C-23. Liquid and Gas Transfer Lines and Ducting; Conduit and Electrical Cable 
- 

! Appendix D 
DETAILED CREW LEAK REPAIR PROCEDURES 
This a p p e ~ d i x  presents  examples of the procedures  developed to provide the 
basis  for calculations of D in Table T-6. Evaluations were performed on (P) 
each of the procedures  a s  applicable to the fluid- container leak conditions, 
The ground ru le s  were: 
A. All durations a r e  presented in units of minutes. 
B. All durations a r e  g r o s s  estimations of tiime requirements  to 
accomplish each step of a procedural  sequence. While they may 
not be sufficiently accurate  for other purposes,  the i r  standardized 
use  a c r o s s  a l l  applicable procedures  perrni ts  consistent study 
conclusions to be drawn based upon procedural  t ime requirements .  
6. Where necessary ,  sufficient information i s  presented to explain 
apparent incons is tencies in seemingly identical procedures ,  
PROCEDURE 
CONTAINER TYPE & MATERIAL 0 lo- I----" 
PROCEDURE 
SPECIAL PREPARATIONS None 
SPECIAL TEST REQUIREMENTS pressure  test  -- 
1. Inspect failure 
I 
2. Activate control to pas sivate leak 
I 
PROCEDURE 
NO. CREWMEN 
PROCEDURE 
a MATERIAL Stainless tubing NO. 3-  2 
R/R TECHNIQUE Elastomer Sealant 
8. Wait for sea lan t to  cure 1 1,440  
I 
PROCEDURE 
SPECIALSKILLS N n n e  - -- - 
- - - 
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT None - -- - - - - 
SPECIAL PREPARATIONS Nan e --- 
-- 
SPECIAL f EST REQUIREMENTS P r w r e  t es t  
PROCEDURE 
5. Deploy R/R materiel  to work location 
I 7. Disconnect and remove component .50 --I 8. Deploy replacement component 259 
9. Install replacement component 
12. Verify no leak 
PROCEDURE 
-- 
WASTE MATERIAL  GENERATED 
I 1.  Inspect failure 
PROCEDURE 
PROCEDURE 
PROCEDURE 
PROCEDURE 
